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Abstract 
 
The  importance  of  electronic  healthcare  has  caused  numerous 
changes in both substantive and procedural aspects of healthcare 
processes. These changes have produced new challenges to patient 
privacy and information secrecy. Traditional privacy policies cannot 
respond to rapidly increased privacy needs of patients in electronic 
healthcare.  Technically  enforceable  privacy  policies  are  needed  in 
order to protect patient privacy in modern healthcare with its cross 
organisational information sharing and decision making. 
This thesis proposes a personal information flow model that specifies 
a  limited  number  of  acts  on  this  type  of  information.  Ontology 
classified  Chains  of  these  acts  can  be  used  instead  of  the 
"intended/business  purposes"  used  in  privacy  access  control  to 
seamlessly  imbuing  current  healthcare  applications  and  their 
supporting  infrastructure  with  security  and  privacy  functionality.  In 
this thesis, we first introduce an integrated basic architecture, design 
principles,  and  implementation  techniques  for  privacy-preserving 
data mining systems. We then discuss the key methods of privacy-
preserving data mining systems which include four main methods: 
Role  based  access  control  (RBAC),  Hippocratic  database,  Chain 
method and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). 
We  found  out  that  the  traditional  methods  suffer  from  two  main 
problems: complexity of privacy policy design and the lack of context 
flexibility that is needed while working in critical situations such as the 
one  we  find  in  hospitals.  We  present  and  compare  strategies  for 
realising  these  methods.  Theoretical  analysis  and  experimental 
evaluation show that our new method can generate accurate data iii 
 
mining models and safe data access management while protecting 
the  privacy  of  the  data  being  mined.  The  experiments  followed 
comparative kind of experiments, to show the ease of the design first 
and then follow real scenarios to show the context flexibility in saving 
personal information privacy of our investigated method. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 
Information systems are a pervasive feature of everyday life and most of the 
services people use would cease to be able to function without them.  There 
are great benefits associated with them in terms of quality, speed and ubiquity 
of service delivery.  Information systems are involved when people use the 
phone, the Internet, financial services such as insurance and banking, and 
even shopping.  Increasingly, information systems are used in public services, 
such as education and healthcare. 
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To deliver these services they need to hold increasing amounts of personal 
information  including  personal  details,  service  related  usage  and  history 
information, which are needed for the associated customer service and billing 
information.    In  addition,  information  services  display  a  potential  for  other 
purposes such as marketing.  At times this information is passed on to third 
parties  for  vetting  purposes,  third  party  service  support  and  government 
agencies  where  there  are  reporting  requirements  (e.g.  sometimes 
governments need to check legal issues about suspected people). 
 
The fact that these service providers and their information systems are ever 
more accessible over the Internet has benefits in terms of accessing up-to-
date information remotely or connecting systems together to deliver improved 
and  more  sophisticated  services.    However,  there  is  a  downside  to  these 
developments in terms of increased exposure of systems to the open Internet 
and  by  consequence  of  hacking.    In  addition,  there  are  also  potential 
problems in terms of undesirable disclosure of the information these systems 
hold to third parties when companies do not purely use the information for 
service delivery purposes and sell on records to other companies for profit. 
What this thesis seeks is that only authorised people would get the exact and 
correct information at the right time and for the intended purpose. And this 
information shouldn’t be disclosed to people inside the organisation who have 
no right or reason to access it. Furthermore, such information should not be 
disclosed to third parties for the same reason.  What the researcher is looking 
for is a way to ensure that this occurs in information systems and is not left 
purely to chance. In this chapter, the researcher highlights the following topics 
briefly: 
 
-  The definition of Personal Information and the need for Protecting it 
-  The specific case of the Healthcare 
-  The Need for Technical Enforcement to Data Protection 
-  Focus of the investigation 
-  Thesis organisation 15 
 
 
 
1.2 Personal Information and Security Implications 
1.2.1 Definition of Personal Information 
 
This section will mainly discuss issues related to personal information and the 
variant definitions of personal information in order to determine the definition 
that most clearly meets the thesis objectives. 
 
Personal information, in popular understanding, is a term whose scope varies 
significantly from person to person, from law to law and from Act to Act. This 
section  will  highlight  the  most  significant  personal  information  from  the 
literature. 
 
'Personal  information'  is  defined  by  the  Information  Privacy  Act  (Data 
Protection  Act  1998)  to  mean:  “Information  or  an  opinion,  including 
information or an opinion forming part of a database, whether true or not, and 
whether recorded in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity 
is  apparent,  or  can  reasonably  be  ascertained,  from  the  information  or 
opinion.” 
 
A decisive element in this definition is that personal information must be about 
an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained. 
Justice Underhill of the United States District Court (Connecticut) defines it as 
follows: 
 
"Personal  information,  in  the  constitutional  sense  (due  process),  is 
information about an individual that, if widely known, would reasonably 
cause that individual embarrassment, discomfort, or concern." 16 
 
 
This law also focuses on the legal part of personal information to protect it. 
However, it does not give a comprehensive definition of personal information. 
 
While  the  PIPEDA  Act  (University  of  Alberta,  Health  Law  Institute, 
University  of Victoria and  School of  Health  Information  Science     2005) 
protect personal information by including information in its definition such 
as the following: 
•  age, name, income, ethnic origin, religion or blood type; 
•  opinions,  evaluation,  comments,  social  status  or  disciplinary 
actions; 
•  credit records, employment history and medical records. 
 
That helps PIPEDA’s personal information definition to be one of the 
most  comprehensive  personal  information  definitions  and  the 
researcher would quote some of its clauses during the system design 
process. 
In fact, any kind of information that is somehow related to a person can be 
regarded as personal information. This is described by (Jones, 2008), where 
he defines six (sometimes overlapping) classes of information based on their 
relationship to a person or proprietor:  
 
•  Information that is controlled or owned by person; 
•  Information that is about a person or proprietor; 
•  Information that is directed to a person or proprietor; 
•  Information that is sent, posted or provided by a person or proprietor; 
•  Information  that  has  been  already  experienced  by  a  person  or 
proprietor; 
•  Information that is relevant or useful to a person or proprietor.  
 17 
 
Therefore,  personal  information  is  any  information  or  opinion  about  an 
identifiable person. Personal information is divided into: 
 
•  Name, such as full name, maiden name, mother‘s maiden name, or 
alias 
•  Personal identification number, such as social security number (SSN), 
passport  number,  driver‘s  license  number,  taxpayer  identification 
number, or financial account or credit card number 
•  Address information, such as street address or email address 
•  Personal  characteristics,  including  photographic  image  (especially  of 
face  or  other  identifying  characteristic),  fingerprints,  handwriting,  or 
other biometric data (e.g., retina scan, voice signature, facial geometry. 
This could include: 
 
•  Written records about a person 
•  Photograph or image of a person 
•  Fingerprints or DNA samples that identify a person 
•  Information about a person that is not written down, but which is 
in the possession or control of the agency. 
 
As long as information is being communicated to someone who can identify 
the person it is about, the information may meet the definition of ‘personal 
information’. The more details that are given about a person, and the wider 
the  audience,  the  more  likely  it  will  be  that  it  will  amount  to  ‘personal 
information’.  
 
As seen in Figure 1, the personal information definition could cover a huge 
amount of different information about a specific person such as their name, 
address,  passport  number,  date  of  birth,  phone  number  or  bank  account. 
Each piece of information could cause endless trouble for their proprietor if it 
has been disclosed to unauthorised people.   18 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Personal information is a key in our daily life 
 
A set of PI definitions has been analysed to shape the personal information 
definition used in this thesis. To defeat identity theft, developing a robust data 
access management method is needed. Therefore the researcher needs to 
follow on Justice Underhill of the United States District Court PI definition and 
the  clauses  of  HIPAA  and  PIPEDA  and  classes  founded  in  (Jones  2008) 
mentioned above while shaping the system design. The researcher will use 
some clauses of HIPAA and PIPEDA to construct the semantic layer and its 
rules.      Clauses  of  these  PI  definitions  will  be  used  later  in  designing  the 
system ontology and access requirements. 
 
In this thesis the personal information is defined as “Any information that is of 
importance to a person and which the person is interested in keeping track 
and privacy of and its malicious disclosure could harm that person”, which is 
adopted from the definition given in (Larsen, 2005).   19 
 
 
In  next  section  a  discussion  of  why  it  is  needed  to  protect  personal 
information,  its  impact  on  information  systems,  and  the  most  significant 
legalisations to protect privacy.  
 
In  order  to  be  able  to  appreciate  the  extent  of  the  problem,  one  should 
consider what Personal Information comprises.  Personal Information, or what 
is also frequently termed Personally Identifiable Information (PII), is used to 
refer to information that can be used to uniquely identify a specific person or 
can  be  used  with  other  sources  to  uniquely  identify  a  single  individual.  
The PPIP  Act and HRIP  Act  (Privacy  NSW  Privacy  Management  Plan, 
2006) define  'Personal  Information'  as  "information  or  an  opinion  (including 
information  or  an  opinion  forming  part  of  a  database  and  whether  or  not 
recorded in a material form) about an individual whose identity is apparent or 
can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion.” 
 
 
 
1.2.2 The Need for Protection  
 
The information stored in service organisation systems about individuals and 
their usage of these services, should ideally be used for service delivery and 
billing purposes.  Access to this information should be restricted to preserve 
the  privacy  of  the  individuals.    Special  care  should  be  taken  to  keep  this 
information from other organisations with information about those individuals.  
As such, disclosure of this  information may disadvantage those individuals at 
best,  or  worse  still,  cause  concrete  damage  and  harm  (In  May  2006,  an 
employee of the US Department of Veteran Affairs took a laptop home without 
authorisation from the department. The laptop and the sensitive personal data 
of 26.5 million people who were discharged from the US military since 1975 it 
contained, were stolen during a burglary at the employee's home. Included in 20 
 
the data were veterans' names, Social Security numbers and dates of birth.).  
Most governments recognise the individual’s right to protection against loss of 
privacy  and  insider  trading  and  fraud  and  other  forms  of  criminal  activity 
against a person and their estate.  Most countries have enshrined this in the 
form of data protection and privacy protection legislation laws (see Chapter 2 
for examples of such legalisations and laws).  These laws govern what types 
of Personal Information can be held by organisations as well as restrictions 
about  safe-keeping,  disclosure  and  ways  in  which  this  information  can  be 
used. 
 
This  legislation,  as  well  as  any  self-imposed  standards  of  corporate 
governance  and  professional  conduct,  requires  organisations  to  put 
safeguards in place which ensure the safe keeping and appropriate use of 
personal  information  in  their  information  systems,  databases  and  on  their 
respective servers and networks.  This is usually done through a combination 
of  policies  and  technologies.  The  organisation’s  compliance  is  ensured  by 
information  officers,  IT  managers  and  systems  programmers  who  strive  to 
ensure  that  the  information  is  used  in  accordance  with  legislation  and 
professional  practice.  In  addition,  they  ensure  that  the  systems  impose 
appropriate  restrictions  on  data  access  and  proliferation  and  are  secure 
enough to provide for safe-keeping.   The implementation of these restrictions 
can  be  an  onerous  task  if  the  access  requirements  are  complex  and  the 
information concerned is highly sensitive.  The available tools, methods and 
systems to implement this, such as prevalent access control approaches, are 
only  partially  equipped  to  solve  this  problem  (see  Chapter  3)  and  more 
sophisticated  approaches  are  required  to  comply  with  the  appropriate 
restrictions.  This problem is what this thesis aims to address. 
 
The work in this thesis could be applied to infinite number of domains. But 
healthcare  has  been  chosen  because  of  the  vital  and  clear  importance  of 
managing the access to the sensitive information in this domain while keeping 
it available to authorised people. 21 
 
 
1.3 The Specific Case of Healthcare 
 
From ancient civilisations the importance of privacy has been recognised as 
essential to patient-physician relationships as stated in the Hippocratic Oath: 
“What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of the 
treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread 
abroad,  I  will  keep  to  myself,  holding  such  things  shameful  to  be  spoken 
about” (Agrawal et al.  2002). since that time governments and organisations 
have sought for ways to protect personal information in the healthcare sector. 
Therefore,  healthcare  is  one  of  the  areas  in  which  these  issues  are  most 
prevalent.  The digitalisation of this information and its availability through the 
international and local networks makes issues such as privacy and security of 
sensitive information much harder to control.  As there is movement towards 
interoperable electronic health records (where digital copies of the medical 
information can be interchanged between different authorised peers such as 
the hospital and the insurance company), there will be both new challenges 
and  new  opportunities  in  protecting  the  privacy  and  security  of  health 
information. 
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Figure 2:   Personal information in health care 
 
Figure 2 shows the main professionals involved in the healthcare process. All 
those professionals are necessary to make the most accurate diagnoses and 
provide  the  best  treatment  and  health  service.  Patient  information  may  be 
shared with others, such as: insurance companies; pharmacies; researchers; 
and employers, for many reasons, for example: paying the bill for a patient; 
delivering medicines and making quality research. Health records of patients 
are  at  the  very  centre  of  service  delivery  and  a  considerable  number  of 
professionals will need to access and contribute to these records over the 
lifetime  of  a  patient.  In  healthcare,  Personal  Information  is  a  collection  of 
records  that  need  different  levels  of  protection  and  this  depends  on  the 
context  such  as  appointments,  referrals,  surgery,  etc.  Dealing  with  these 
medical records is a very critical issue, as they contain sensitive information 
about the patient and could end or destroy one’s life if misused. 
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1.3.1 Example of Healthcare in Practice 
 
This section introduces a typical scenario for healthcare provision in a hospital 
environment.  Privacy  is  an  underlying  governing  principle  of  the  patient  – 
physician  relationship  for  effective  delivery  of  healthcare.  Patients  are 
required  to  share  information  with  their  physicians  to  facilitate  correct 
diagnosis and determination of treatment, especially to avoid adverse drug 
interactions. However patients may refuse to divulge important information in 
cases  of  health  problems  such  as  psychiatric  behaviour  and  HIV,  as  their 
disclosure may lead to social stigma and discrimination (Applebaum, 2002). 
Over  time,  a  patient’s  medical  record  accumulates  significant  personal 
information  including:  identification;  history  of  medical  diagnosis;  digital 
renderings of medical images; treatment received; medication history; dietary 
habits;  sexual  preference;  genetic  information;  psychological  profiles; 
employment  history;  income;  and  physicians‘  subjective  assessments  of 
personality and mental state among others (Mercuri, 2004).  
 
Figure 4 shows a typical information flow in the healthcare system. Patient 
health  records  can  serve  a  range  of  purposes  apart  from  diagnosis  and 
treatment  provision.  For  example,  information  can  be  used  to  improve 
efficiency within the healthcare system, drive public policy development and 
administration at state and federal level, and in the conduct of research to 
advance medical science (Hodge, 2003). A patient’s medical records are also 
shared  with  other  organisations  such  as  medical  insurance,  to  handle 
payment of services rendered by physicians. Healthcare providers may use 
records to manage their operations, to assess service quality, and to identify 
quality improvement opportunities. Furthermore, providers may share health 
information with other healthcare organisations as they collaborate to provide 
patient support and with governments for statistical purposes. 
 
The scenario shown in Figure 3 is based on the activities carried out by the 
International Clinic (IC) in Kuwait (see Chapter3). 24 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Healthcare provision in the International Clinic, Kuwait 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the process in hospitals is complicated and therefore 
needs  a  reliable  system.  One  patient  record  could,  for  example,  be 
transformed  between  different  parties  such  as:  the  receptionist  who  would 
collect  his  information  first  to  register  him  in  this  hospital.  He  would  then 
transfer his information to the physician, who could also transfer him to other 
parties such as the laboratory to take some X-rays or for the nurse to give him 
some injections. Then he would return back again to the receptionist to book 
another appointment. The hospital could also send some of his information to 
the insurance company.  
 
Considering that in each situation, there are a number of different sensitive 
information records which are either added to or updated, it can be seen how 
crucial the problem in hand is. Also, each user should be authorised to access 
only  a  portion  of  the  personal  information  that  is  related  to  their  role  in  a 25 
 
specific situation. For example in the case of a doctor, receptionist and nurse: 
the doctor can process (edit) the medical record of the patient, he can then 
create (write) a prescription but can’t register a new patient because this is the 
allowed function for the receptionist. The receptionist can (collect) information 
from the patient to register him. But the doctor can see some of the attributes 
of the registration file such as (age, gender, etc...) but he can’t process (edit) 
this information. 
 
The nurse can also collect information from the doctor such as the patient 
temperature and weight. But the nurse can’t view the medical record written 
by the doctor nor can she edit it. Also, she can’t write a prescription to the 
patient as will be explained in Chapter 3 (See Chapter 3 for the full set of 
scenarios). 
 
The typical scenario above illustrates that medical information systems are a 
good  example  of  the  complexity  of  privacy  design  issues  and  personal 
information  management,  and  how  controlling  access  to  these  systems 
becomes a vital issue. 
 
The  way  that  policies  are  defined  in  today's  information  systems  is  highly 
inflexible (Al-Fedaghi et al., 2005). There is a lack of flexible, composable 
constructs for expressing policies. Any modification in the policy architecture 
is  very  hard  to  incorporate  without  affecting  the  rest  of  the  components. 
Consequently there is a need to represent policies using constructs and in a 
manner such that performing policy analysis and propagating changes should 
be comparatively easy. 
 
The  next  section  provides  an  overview  of  privacy  legalisations  needed  for 
privacy protection. The outcomes and expected results will be highlighted to 
draw out the introductory research question and hypothesis (this hypothesis 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4). 26 
 
1.4 The Need to Data Protection 
1.4.1 Existing Legislation on Privacy Protection 
The issues with personal information in the age of the Internet have led to a 
large amount of legislation in different countries and for illustration purposes 
the researcher will give examples of the legalisation set in Canada, the USA 
and the UK to protect personal information: 
 
Canada 
 
The most outstanding law to protect personal information privacy in Canada is 
The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA). 
PIPEDA  was  enacted  to  establish  national  rules  for  personal  information 
protection  in  the  private  sector  and  establishes,  as  law,  the  Canadian 
Standards  Association’s  Model  Code  for  the  Protection  of  Personal 
Information,  which  encompasses  the  following  principles:  accountability; 
identifying purposes; consent; limiting collection; limiting use, disclosure, and 
retention; accuracy; safeguards; openness; individual access; and challenging 
compliance (University of Alberta, Health Law Institute, University of Victoria 
and School of Health Information Science,   2005). 
 
PIPEDA has been phased into effect over three years: 2001, 2002 and 2004. 
PIPEDA defines personal information to mean identifiable information about 
an individual and personal health information is defined from (University of 
Alberta,  Health  Law  Institute,  University  of  Victoria  and  School  of  Health 
Information Science   2005) as follows: 
(a)  Information concerning the physical or mental health of the individual; 
(b) Information concerning any health service provided to the individual; 27 
 
(c) information concerning the donation by the individual of any body part or 
any  bodily  substance  of  the  individual  or  information  derived  from  the 
testing or examination of a body part or bodily substance of the individual; 
(d) Information that is collected in the course of providing health services to 
the individual; or 
(e) Information that is collected incidentally to the provision of health services 
to the individual. 
Taking account of the above principles and consulting experiences from the 
International Health clinic in Kuwait, the researcher has investigated Personal 
Health Information Ontology as will be shown in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
 
United States 
 
A constitutional right to privacy is inferred from the Fourth Amendment; and 
specific federal privacy statutes. It dates back to 1890, when Samuel Warren 
and  Louis  Brandeis  published  their  seminal  work  (Warren  and  Brandeis, 
1890), The Right to Privacy, recognising a “right to be let alone,” Privacy was 
enforceable through legal protection from “injurious disclosures as to private 
matters.” 
 
In a growing number of jurisdictions, the term personal information is defined 
by local statute, typically within the context of an attempt by the legislative 
assembly to protect individuals from careless storage or release of information 
about them. 
 
In Security Industry and Financial (Legal directory, 2012), Justice Underhill of 
the United States District Court (Connecticut) wrote: 
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"Personal  information,  in  the  constitutional  sense  (due  process),  is 
information about an individual that, if widely known, would reasonably 
cause that individual embarrassment, discomfort, or concern." 
 
In  State  v  Reid  (Legal  directory,  2012),  Justice  Weissbard  of  the  appeal 
division of the Superior Court of New Jersey adopted these words: 
 
"Informational privacy has been variously defined as shorthand for the 
ability to control the acquisition or release of information about oneself 
... or an individual's claim to control the terms under which personal 
information is acquired, disclosed, and used. 
 
"In general, informational privacy encompasses any information that is 
identifiable to an individual. This includes both assigned information, 
such as a name, address, or social security number, and generated 
information, such as financial or credit card records, medical records, 
and phone logs...." 
 
Data privacy is not highly  legislated or regulated in the U.S. In the United 
States,  access  to  private  data  contained  in  for  example  third-party  credit 
reports may be sought when seeking employment or medical care, or making 
automobile,  housing,  or  other  purchases  on  credit  terms.  Although  partial 
regulations exist, there is no all-encompassing law regulating the acquisition, 
storage, or use of personal data in the U.S. In general terms, whoever can be 
troubled to key in the data is deemed to own the right to store and use it, even 
if the data was collected without permission. Examples of US laws to protect 
privacy are: the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
the  Children's  Online  Privacy  Protection  Act  of  1998,  and  the  Fair  and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (US State Privacy Laws, 2010). 
 
Although Personal information exposure as a result of a private-entity data 
breach does not infringe upon constitutional rights, the constitutional right to 29 
 
privacy influences the overall approach to legal protections of privacy in the 
United States. As discussed above, the evolution of the right to privacy in the 
United  States  does  not  incorporate  personal  information,  and  the  federal 
privacy laws so far enacted only address specific types of data and are often 
not applicable to exposures of personal information. 
 
United Kingdom 
 
The Data Protection Act (1998) is a United Kingdom Act of Parliament which 
defines UK law on the processing of data on identifiable living people. It is the 
main piece of legislation that governs the protection of personal data in the 
UK. Although the Act itself does not mention privacy, it was enacted to bring 
UK  law  into  line  with  the  EU  data  protection  directive  of  1995  (Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995, 
1995) which required Member States to protect people's fundamental rights 
and  freedoms  and  in  particular  their  right  to  privacy  with  respect  to  the 
processing of personal data. In practice it provides a way for individuals to 
control  information  about  themselves.  Most  of  the  Act  does  not  apply  to 
domestic  use  (Data  Protection  Act,  1998)  for  example  keeping  a  personal 
address  book.  Anyone  holding  personal  data  for  other  purposes  is  legally 
obliged to comply with this Act, subject to some exemptions. The Act defines 
eight data protection principles. It also requires companies and individuals to 
keep personal information to them. 
1.4.2 Problems Facing Privacy Legalisations and Rules 
 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  laws  to  protect  privacy  of  personal 
information  in  large  countries  such  as  the  USA  and  Canada  lacks  the 
completeness and the tools to enforce them. 
The PIPEDA law is one of the most important laws that have been set to 
preserve  the  privacy  of  personal  information  especially  in  the  health  care 30 
 
domain.   It clauses look at the problem from different perspectives unlike the 
laws that have been discussed in the US section,  and each one focuses on a 
specific part of personal information and tries to protect it.  For example the 
Health  Insurance  Portability  and  Accountability  Act  is  concerned  with 
preserving the personal health information while the Children's Online Privacy 
Protection Act preserves the right of children and their parents information to 
be protected while using the internet. 
Current laws do not help consumers who are trying to limit the collection, use, 
dissemination, and misuse of their Personal Information.   Victims of privacy 
violations have no cause of action unless they can show direct loss as a result 
of  unauthorised  use  of  their  personal  information,  while  privacy  violation 
notification laws only indirectly encourage encryption of data.  Privacy laws 
are also not well-suited to personal information. Better privacy policies can 
lead to more visitor awareness of personal information.  Better awareness of 
these personal information-handling practices can lead to visitors being more 
careful  before  submitting  personal  information  to  unauthorised  people  or 
organisations that may not protect it adequately or who may sell it on the open 
market.  This type of privacy protective behaviour could give organisations 
more  of  an  incentive  to  protect  personal  information  in  order  to  maintain 
business that would be lost under their current privacy regimes. 
 
In  conclusion,  government  organisations  and  companies  must  design, 
implement,  and  maintain  adequate  security  systems  to  protect  personal 
information.  Based on the continuous reports of privacy violation, companies 
have  yet  to  be  properly  motivated  to  implement  such  systems.  Eventually, 
governments must pass legislation that would at least require comprehensive 
internal  data  protection  procedures  and  systems,  coupled  with  substantial 
fines  for  failing  to  implement  and  maintain  such  procedures  and  systems.  
This would not only continue the privacy  violation notification requirements 
already  in  place  in  most  countries,  but  also  mandate  adequate  privacy 
preserving systems, and include the fines necessary to give organisations and 31 
 
companies  the  proper  incentive  to  put  those  programs  in  place. 
 
In the next section, problem of saving privacy in healthcare is presented as 
this is the domain that has been chosen in this thesis to be applied in the 
proposed  principle  of  data  access.  This  is  because  this  domain  is  rich  in 
sensitive data that should be protected. 
 
As previously discussed, there is a vital need to find a means of protection to 
Personal  information  especially  in  sensitive  domains  such  as  healthcare. 
Traditional  non-technical  methods  do  not  provide  a  solution  to  the  privacy 
violation problem in the age of digitalisation and semantics (See Chapter 2). 
Information systems are a collection of integrated applications that manage 
the work of the enterprise databases and control the flow of information from 
and into the enterprise.  
 
Hacking into databases can give someone access to sensitive data and to its 
unintended disclosure. This encourages the need for increased protection at 
source – i.e. at the database level using technical approaches that enforce 
data  protection  policies  while  taking  care  of  the  context  (situation-user 
combination). Privacy rules cannot be set without ensuring their application in 
the  face  of  a  flow  of  thousands  of  users  who  want  to  access  different 
information at specific times, and at the same time save the privacy, accuracy 
and  correctness  of  the  retrieved  information.  This  needs  a  system  to  be 
developed that could overcome all these problems while remaining reliable. 
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1.5 Focus of the Investigation 
 
Current  research  on  access  control  largely  tends  toward  a  theoretical 
approach (Al-Fedaghi, 2007, Al-Fedaghi, 2006, Agrawal et al., 2002). There 
are a vast number of digital rights access management, access control and 
data protection approaches that have been proposed. Nevertheless some of 
them such as “Chain” method which is suggested in (Al-Fedaghi, 2007) have 
never been put into real applications, this is because the lack of design and 
implementation specification in that reference.   
 
There are a vast number of papers presenting varied access control methods. 
While some of them use healthcare as a motivating example, some are based 
on  empirical  studies  that  support  the  selection  of  model  properties  (i.e. 
(Komlenovic  et  al.,  2011))  or  explain  in  more  detail  why  the  models  are 
suitable for a healthcare setting.  
 
Research  on  access  control  may  be  viewed  on  a  scale  from  theoretical 
through implementation to problem focused. Research to date leans toward 
the former while little has been done on the latter. Motivated by this fact, this 
PhD project has taken a practical approach to access control in healthcare.  
 
Chapter 4 goes through the details of the research question, hypothesis and 
methodology.  But  here  a  short  introduction  about  the  research  question  is 
needed. The main objective of this thesis is to develop a reliable method that 
could overcome all of the outstanding problems in data access management. 
Therefore the main research question is:  
 
“Would  a  data  access  management  method  that  is  based  on 
semantics  overcome  the  outstanding  problems  faced  by  other 
existing methods?” 
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A practical methodology is then set and verified by set of experiments.  In 
order  to  reach  the  objectives  of  this  thesis  the  following  process  will  be 
followed: 
 
•  Analysis of the available methods in the literature by surveys and 
makes  comparison  of  their  structures  and  how  each  attacks  the 
problem of data access management; 
•  After doing the analysis, the advantages and shortcomings of each 
method have been clearly highlighted; 
•  Design the new data access method based on findings from the 
literature analysis; 
•  Collaboration with experts in the field from different organisations 
such  as:  IBM,  University  of  Eindhoven,  University  of  Madrid  and 
University of Trento; 
•  Implementing  the  system  in  three  central  parts  (i.e.  ontology, 
database and semantic layers); 
•  Integration of the three parts into one cohesive system; 
•  Evaluation of the experimental results. 
 
The main objectives of our work can therefore be summarised as follows: 
 
•  First, an enhanced access control model is defined; 
 
•  Second, the deﬁned access control model is integrated with a data 
handling model and ontology allowing users to deﬁne restrictions on 
the  management  of  their  sensitive  data  used  by  the  receiving 
parties.  For  this  purpose,  the  researcher  focuses  on  the 
development  of  an  architecture  implementing  a  privacy-aware 
access  control  system  that  integrates  access  control  and  data 
handling policies.  
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In this section, the focus of investigation has been summarised in the above 
points and the next section will have an overview of the dissertation to explain 
how the goals of the work have been achieved. 
 
The problem presented in this chapter raises the question of the availability of 
an  approach  that  has  a  simple  design  and  can  improve  the  following  two 
criteria in data access management: 
 
-  Simplification of the data access management configuration 
-  Increasing the precision of the retrieved data. 
 
The research question, contribution and hypothesis are presented in detail 
with the methodology of the thesis in Chapter 4.   
 
To  find  key  tools  to  implement  a  reliable  data  access  management,  a 
systematic literature review will be undertaken in the next chapter to provide 
guidance to researchers, decision-makers and others who are involved in the 
planning and implementation of integrated e-health systems. The researcher 
will focus on the different solutions that have been suggested in the literature 
in order to know how to achieve the above requirements and overcome these 
problems.  An  overview  of  each  method  will  be  presented  in  addition  to  a 
comparison  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  each.35 
 
 
 
1.6 Overview of the Dissertation 
 
The  previous  sections  have  drawn  the  main  features  that  will  shape  this 
thesis. The details of the topics highlighted above will be discussed in the rest 
of the thesis as described below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Overview on Thesis Chapters  
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An overview of each chapter separately is given below: 
 
•  Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This  chapter  provides  the  reader  with  a  comprehensive  background 
and  describes  the  main  suggested  solutions  to  privacy  violation. 
Legislation  and  legal  requirements,  Access  control  mechanisms  and 
semantic technologies are all presented, discussed and compared in 
this chapter. 
 
•  Chapter 3: International Clinic Kuwait Case Study 
 
This  chapter  provides  a  general  background  to  the  case  study 
“International Clinic”, general presentations of Patient and Information 
Flows  in  the  International  Clinic,  Record  Storage  and  Access 
Requirements and Current and future systems and systems needs of 
the hospital. 
 
•  Chapter 4: Hypothesis and Methodology 
 
In  this  chapter  the  research  question,  hypothesis,  objectives  and 
proposed methodology are discussed in detail. 
 
 
•  Chapter 5: Proposed Solution 
 
This chapter presents the chain method implementation, the design of 
the  ontology  and  the  overall  design  of  the  Chain-ontology  based 
system. 
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•  Chapter 6: Implementation  
 
This  chapter  discusses  the  system  implementation,  and  how  the 
integration between the chain and the semantics has taken place. 
 
•  Chapter 7: Experiments and Analysis of the Results 
 
Experiments that have taken place by expert database administrators 
on  scientific  scenarios  are  analysed.  Results  conducted  from  the 
experiments  on  the  semantic  chain-ontology  based  system  are  also 
discussed.  
 
 
•  Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
An  overall  discussion  of  the  thesis  objectives  and  outcomes  is 
provided.  In  addition,  this  chapter  will  include  suggestions  for  future 
work. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the previous chapter it has become clear that there is a crucial problem 
in  data  access  management.  The  problem  is  how  to  save  the  privacy  of 
personal information while using a reliable system. And this problem becomes 
worse when it exists in the healthcare field, where a lot of patients’ information 
is to be entered and processed in one information system. 
 
From the discussion in the previous chapter, the researcher will start to draw 
an outline of the system that is needed to overcome this problem. The main 
feature of this system is to have relatively simple design while keeping the 
capability  of  retrieving  the  correct  and  exact  information  to  the  authorised 
system. This should be done within a suitable time limit in order for the system 
to be reliable. And all of this should be done under the umbrella of a secure 
system that could preserve the privacy of the information. 39 
 
 
The relevant literature should be examined to find answers to the question 
raised in Chapter 1: “Does a reliable data access management method exist 
in  the  literature?”  and  in  order  to  answer  this  question  the  researcher  will 
identify the working, advantages and disadvantages of each method. 
 
So in order for a researcher to have better vision for the problem of privacy 
preserving, one needs to look at a long list of privacy preserving attempts. 
One needs to look first for the legalisations that have been proposed in order 
to  save  the  privacy  of  personal  information.  A  good  definition  of  personal 
information should be set in order for the researcher to know what should be 
protected.  Then  the  researcher  should  consider  the  database  and  non-
database oriented methods. After looking at the database oriented systems 
and methods, the researcher may seek supporting context for these methods.  
 
So this chapter is organised as follows: first, personal information and privacy 
specifications are presented with their definitions from different perspectives. 
Then, the researcher will start presenting the existing privacy languages set to 
preserve  privacy  and  personal  information.    Next,  the  different  database 
approaches are outlined to solve the data privacy violation problem.  Finally 
the semantic approach is presented as a complementary component in any 
modern database privacy preserving system.  
 
 
2.1 Personal Information and Privacy specifications 
 
Information of a personal nature can in some instances allow identification of 
an individual. This includes information such as a person's name, address, 
financial information, marital status or billing details. 
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The  Privacy  and  Personal  Information  Protection  ( PPIP)  Act and  Health 
Records and Information Privacy (HRIP) Act (New South Wales Consolidated 
Acts,  2012) define  'personal  information'  as  "information  or  an  opinion 
(including information or an opinion forming part of a database and whether or 
not recorded in a material form) about an individual whose identity is apparent 
or can reasonably be ascertained from the information or opinion”. 
 
In the next two subsections the researcher will discuss in detail two methods 
suggested by the literature to preserve the personal information discussed 
above.  The first discusses privacy specifications and the other discusses a 
language that describes privacy preferences.  
 
3.1.1 Privacy specifications 
 
As the World Wide Web became a genuine medium in which one can buy 
products  and  get  services, commercial websites  tried  to  collect  more 
information  about  the  people  who  purchased  their  products.    Some 
companies used controversial ways such as tracker cookies to ascertain the 
users' demographic information and buying habits. This information is used to 
provide  specifically  targeted  advertisements  or  what  is  known  also  as 
“Adware”. Users who think this violates their privacy would sometimes turn off 
HTTP cookies or use proxy servers to keep their personal information secure.  
P3P is designed to give users a more precise control of the kind of information 
that  they  allow  to  release.  According  to  the  World  Wide  Web  Consortium 
(W3C) the main goal of the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) “is 
to  increase  user  trust  and  confidence  in  the  Web  through  technical 
empowerment”. 
 
P3P  (w3C  website,  2012)  is  a  machine-readable  language  that  helps  to 
express a website’s data management practices. P3P manages information 
through privacy policies. When a website uses P3P, the developers set up a 
set  of  policies  that  allows  them  to  state  their  intended  uses  of  personal 41 
 
information that may be gathered from their site visitors (Ashley et al., 2002). 
When a user decides to use P3P, they set their own set of policies and state 
what personal information they will allow to be seen by the sites that they visit. 
Then when a user visits a site, P3P will compare what personal information 
the user is willing to release, and what information the server wants to get – if 
the two are not equivalent, P3P will inform the user and ask whether he/she is 
willing to proceed to the site, and risk giving up more personal information. As 
an example, a user may store in the browser preferences that information 
about their browsing habits should not be collected. If the policy of a Website 
states that a cookie is used for this purpose, the browser automatically rejects 
the cookie. The main content of a privacy policy is the following: 
 
The information the server stores: 
￿  Which kind of information is collected (identifying or 
not); 
￿  Which particular information is collected (IP address, 
email address, name, etc.); 
 
Use of the collected information: 
￿  How this information is used (for regular navigation, 
tracking, personalisation, telemarketing, etc.); 
￿  Who  will  receive  this  information  (only  the  current 
company, third party, etc.); 
 
Permanence and visibility: 
￿  How long information is stored; 
￿  Whether  and  how  the  user  can  access  the  stored 
information (read-only, option, opt out). 
 
P3P allows browsers to understand their privacy policies in a simplified and 
organised manner rather than searching throughout the entire website.  By 
setting  your  own  privacy  settings  at  a  certain  level,  P3P  will  automatically 42 
 
block any cookies that you might not want on your computer. Additionally, the 
W3C explains that P3P will allow browsers to transfer user data to services, 
ultimately promoting an online sharing community. 
 
The Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) has been critical of P3P and 
believes P3P  makes  it  too difficult  for  users  to protect  their  privacy  (EPIC 
website, 2011). In 2002, it assessed P3P, and referred to the technology as a 
“Pretty  Poor  Policy”  (EPIC  website,  2011). According  to  EPIC,  some  P3P 
software is too complex and difficult for the average person to understand, 
and  many  Internet  users  are  unfamiliar  with  how  to  use  the  default  P3P 
software on their computers or how to install additional P3P software. Another 
concern is that both websites and Internet users are not obligated to use P3P. 
P3P has been known to undermine public confidence by collecting enormous 
amounts of information that can be used against its user. Moreover, the EPIC 
website  claims  that  P3P’s  protocol  would  become  burdensome  for  the 
browser and not as beneficial or efficient as it was intended to be. 
 
2.1.2 Privacy Languages  
  
IBM was able to see the limitation of P3P. Michael Kaply from IBM is reported 
saying  the  following  when  the Mozilla  Foundation was  considering  the 
removal of P3P support from their browser-line:  “We (IBM) wrote the original 
P3P implementation and then Netscape proceeded to write their own. So both 
our companies wasted immense amounts of time that everyone thought was a 
crappy proposal to begin with. Remove”, and decided to build a technology 
that  would  fill  that  deficiency,  and  thus  was  the  Enterprise  Privacy 
Authorisation Language (EPAL) (Ashley et al., 2002) project created in 2002.  
EPAL  is  mainly  a  business-to-business  (B2B)  technology  that  helps 
streamline information flow during business interactions. It helps ensure that 
information  is  protected  and  used  in  accordance  with  the  responsible 
organisation’s privacy policies. IBM introduced EPAL as a formal language 
that provides enterprises with a way to automate and enforce privacy policies 43 
 
across  IT  applications  and  systems.  The  language  allows  organisations  to 
specify their privacy practices in a way that they, and other organisations with 
which they interact, can read and use. EPAL policies, unlike P3P policies, are 
enforceable, as they are written and structured in a similar fashion to access 
control policies that one may find in the security domain. EPAL stores policies, 
as  well  as  log  and  audit  access  to  data  as  a  means  to  document  policy 
enforcement. The policies are enforced by an enforcement engine that parses 
the  files,  assuring  the  information  collection,  use  and  storage  that  occurs 
within  the  organisation,  and  amongst  the  organisation  and  its  partners, 
complies with the EPAL specified privacy practices.  
 
EPAL  policies  contain  meta-information  that  does  not  exclusively  address 
information access and usage, a property shared also by P3P. The meta-
information includes the policy ID and description (as in the example of Figure 
5  where  the  description  in  Rules  1  and  2),  information  about  the  issuing 
organisation,  and  modification  dates  and  document  revision  numbers. 
Organisations define a vocabulary specific to their needs using EPAL, and the 
only resulting condition is that every agent that wants to use the policy to 
govern  their  interactions  must  agree  upon  and  understand  the  vocabulary 
being used. EPAL rules specify the policies regarding a specific information 
access. 
 
At first, the EPAL vocabulary defines several elements which can be used in 
EPAL  Policy.    As  shown  in  Figure  5,  it  has  sets  of  user  category,  data 
category, purpose, action, and obligation. It serves as the definition of internal 
privacy policy. EPAL Policy would be setup according to some specific EPAL 
Vocabulary with additional information. 
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Figure 5:  Example on the work of EPAL 
 
Let’s take an example of a doctor who wants to write a medical note for his 
patient during the appointment. In this case the Privacy statement would be: 
“Medical Note can be used for writing the doctor’s medical note if the patient 
has an appointment with him” 
If translated into EPAL it would be: 
 
“ 
EPAL RULE <ALLOW  
User-category = “Medical Staff” 
Data-category=“Medical Note” 
Purpose=“Writing the medical note” 
Operation=“write” 
Condition=“/Appointment=True&&the  patient  has  appointment  with  the 
doctor”> 
“ 
 
From  the  above  example,  many  requirements  are  needed  to  be  carefully 
written in order to write a privacy policy in EPAL such as user category, data 
category,  purpose,  operation  and  condition.  Therefore  a  special  expert 
database  administrator  is  needed  in  order  to  create  a  data  access 
management  system  that  uses  EPAL  to  write  its  privacy  policy.  Such  a 
database administrator cannot be easily found especially in the developing 45 
 
countries  such  as  Kuwait.  In  addition  hiring  them  would  add  costs  to  the 
system costs, and this wouldn’t be very appealing to the project owners. 
 
On the technical side, it will be clear later on in this chapter that there are 
other  methods  such  as  the  Chain  method  combine  many  of  the  above 
requirements such as the purpose and the condition in one goal. This makes 
the implementation much easier and cost effective.  
 
Accordingly,  EPAL  can’t  stand  as  a  proposed  solution  according  to  the 
requirements  presented  in  this  section  because  it  doesn’t  have  a  simple 
design nor is it reliable for large sensitive systems.  
 
 
2.2 Database Oriented Solutions 
 
Before going into available database oriented solutions, it is necessary to go 
through the theoretical definition of Access Management and the basic design 
of  it  that  has  been  developed  by  Lampson.  And  then  the  researcher  will 
present  the  most  significant  Access  Management  methods  such  as  DAC, 
MAC, RBAC, XACML and the Hippocratic database. 
 
Chong (2004) defines Identity and Access Management (I&AM) as follows: 
 
"Identity  and  access  management  refers  to  the  processes,  technologies 
and policies for managing digital identities and controlling how identities can 
be used to access resources." 
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From the above definition it can be noted that: 
 
•  I&AM is not just about technology, but rather, is comprised of three 
indispensable elements: policies, processes and technologies. Policies 
refer to the constraints and standards that need to be followed in order 
to  comply  with  regulations  and  business  best  practices;  processes 
describe  the  sequences  of  steps  that  lead  to  the  completion  of 
business tasks or functions; technologies are the automated tools that 
help accomplish business goals more efficiently and accurately while 
meeting the constraints and guidelines specified in the policies. 
 
•  The relationships between elements of I&AM can be represented by 
the triangle illustrated in Figure 6. Of significant interest is the fact that 
there  is  a  feedback  loop  that  links  all  three  elements  together.  The 
lengths of the edges represent the proportions of the elements relative 
to one another in a given I&AM system. Varying the proportion of one 
element  will  ultimately  vary  the  proportion  of  one  or  more  other 
elements in order to maintain the shape of a triangle with a sweet spot 
(shown as an intersection in the triangle). 
 
•  The  triangle  analogy  is  perfect  for  describing  the  relationships  and 
interactions of policies, processes and technologies in a healthy I&AM 
system  as  well.  Every  organisation  is  different  and  the  right  mix  of 
technologies,  policies  and  processes  for  one  company  may  not 
necessarily  be  the  right  balance  for  a  different  company.  Therefore, 
each organisation needs to find its own balance represented by the 
uniqueness of its triangle.  
Figure 6:  Essential elements of an identity and access management system (C
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–  In this case cryptographic techniques are needed; 
–  There is a software layer between the attacker and the information 
and thus there is a need for access control techniques. 
 
 
 
Figure 7:  General Access Control Model (Lampson’s model (Lampson and Butler, 
1971)). 
 
As shown in the figure above:  
– Actions are written as procedures  
– Behaviour of the guard is specified by:  
• Declaration of state variables  
• Implementations of the action procedures  
 
In  short  all  the  database  oriented  solutions  below  would  be  based  on  the 
above  principles  of  Lampson’s  model.  All  of  them  would  have  two  areas: 
Authentication and Authorisation. Inside the Authentication area they would 
have the principal and action, but the content of the principal and action would 
differ according to the design of different methods.  
 
In the next section the researcher will start to look at the different Database 
Oriented Solutions available in the literature, and highlight their infrastructure 
and their advantages and disadvantages in solving the problem at hand. 49 
 
 
2.3 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a type of access control in which users 
have complete control over all the programs they own and execute, and also 
determines the permissions other users have over those files and programs. 
Because  DAC  requires  permissions  to  be  assigned  to  those  who  need 
access,  DAC  is  commonly  called  described  as  a  "need-to-know"  access 
model. 
 
ACLs and owner/group/other access control mechanisms are by far the most 
common  mechanisms  for  implementing  DAC  policies.  Other  mechanisms, 
even though not designed with DAC in mind, may have the capabilities to 
implement  a  DAC  policy.    This  represents  a  problem  for  practical  access 
control  systems,  because  there  are  numerous  access  control  policies  that 
have aspects of discretionary access control, but are not purely discretionary 
(Osborn and Hulme, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 8:  Infrastructure of DAC. 
 
As shown in the figure above, DAC leaves a certain amount of access control 
to the discretion of the object's owner or anyone else that is authorised to 
control the object's access. For example, it is generally used to limit a user's 
access to a file; it is the owner of the file who controls other users’ access to 
the file. Only those users specified by the owner may have some combination 
of read, write, execute, and other permissions to the file. DAC policy tends to 50 
 
be very flexible and is widely used in the commercial and government sectors. 
However, DAC is known to be inherently weak for two reasons. First, granting 
read access is transitive; for example, when Ann grants Bob read access to a 
file, nothing stops Bob from copying the contents of Ann’s file to an object that 
Bob controls. Bob may now grant any other user access to the copy of Ann’s 
file  without  Ann’s  knowledge.  Second,  DAC  policy  is  vulnerable  to  Trojan 
horse attacks. Because programs inherit the identity of the invoking user, Bob 
may,  for  example,  write  a  program  for  Ann  that,  on  the  surface,  performs 
some useful function, while at the same time destroys the contents of Ann’s 
files. When investigating the problem, the audit files would indicate that Ann 
destroyed her own files. Thus, formally, the drawbacks of DAC are as follows:  
 
•  Information can be copied from one object to another; therefore, there 
is no real assurance on the flow of information in a system.  
•  No restrictions apply to the usage of information when the user has 
received it.  
•  The privileges for accessing objects are decided by the owner of the 
object,  rather  than  through  a  system-wide  policy  that  reflects  the 
organisation’s security requirements.  
 
In addition, if there is no restriction to the usage of information once the user 
receives it. This could cause horrible consequences, which means that nurses 
for  example  could  re-write  the  dosage  of  the  injections  given  to  a  certain 
patient because once  she  receives  this  information  she  could  perform any 
action on it. And the last drawback is self-criticising in the case of a hospital.  
 
From the above, it can be seen that DAC does give us a good starting point 
for policies in data access management but it still can’t be used to solve the 
problem presented in previous chapters. 
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2.4 Non-Discretionary Access Control  
 
In computer security, discretionary access control (DAC) is a type of access 
control defined by the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TSEC) 
(United  States  Department  of  Defence,  1985) "as  a  means  of  restricting 
access to objects based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which 
they belong. The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with 
certain  access  permission  is  capable  of  passing  that  permission  (perhaps 
indirectly)  on  to  any  other  subject  (unless  restrained  by mandatory  access 
control)". 
 
In  general,  all  access  control  policies  other  than  DAC  are  grouped  in  the 
category of nondiscretionary access control (NDAC). As the name implies, 
policies in this category, unlike DAC, have rules that are not established at the 
discretion of the user. Non-discretionary policies establish controls that cannot 
be changed by users, but only through administrative action. So if one turns 
back to Figure 8, there would be an additional layer of administration between 
the user and the rights.   Separation of duty (SOD) policy can be used to 
enforce constraints on the assignment of users to roles or tasks. An example 
of  such  a  static  constraint  is  the  requirement  that  two  roles  be  mutually 
exclusive; if one role requests expenditures and another approves them, the 
organisation may prohibit the same user from being assigned to both roles. 
So, membership in one role may prevent the user from being a member of 
one or more other roles, depending on the SOD rules, such as Work Flow and 
Role-Based Access Control. Another example is a history-based SOD policy 
that regulates, for example, whether the same subject (role) can access the 
same  object  a  certain  number  of  times.  A  typical  example  of  NDAC  is 
Mandatory  Access  Control  (MAC).    An  example  of  MAC  occurs in  military 
security,  where an individual data owner does not decide who has a Top-
Secret clearance, nor can the owner change the classification of an object 52 
 
from  Top  Secret  to  Secret.  MAC  is  the  most  mentioned  NDAC  policy 
(Loscocco et al., 1998).  
 
MAC takes a hierarchical approach to controlling access to resources. Under 
a MAC enforced environment access to all resource objects (such as data 
files) is controlled by settings defined by the system administrator. As such, all 
access to resource objects is strictly controlled by the operating system based 
on  system  administrator  configured  settings.  It  is  not  possible  under  MAC 
enforcement for users to change the access control of a resource. 
 
MAC  begins  with security  labels assigned  to  all  resource  objects  on  the 
system.  These  security  labels  contain  two  pieces  of  information  -  a 
classification  (top  secret,  confidential,  etc.)  and  a  category  (which  is 
essentially an indication of the management level, department or project to 
which the object is available). 
 
Similarly,  each  user  account  on  the  system  also  has  classification  and 
category properties from the same set of properties applied to the resource 
objects.  When  a  user  attempts  to  access  a  resource  under  MAC,  the 
operating  system  checks  the  user's  classification  and  categories  and 
compares them to the properties of the object's security label. If the user's 
credentials match the MAC security label properties of the object access is 
allowed. It is important to note that both the classification and categories must 
match.  A  user  with  top  secret  classification,  for  example,  cannot access  a 
resource if they are not also a member of one of the required categories for 
that object. 
 
MAC is by far the most secure access control environment but does not come 
without  a  price.    Firstly,  MAC  requires  a  considerable  amount  of  planning 
before it can be effectively implemented. Once implemented it also imposes a 
high  system  management  overhead  due  to  the  need  to  constantly  update 53 
 
object and account labels to accommodate new data, new users and changes 
in the categorisation and classification of existing users. 
 
The need for a MAC mechanism arises when the security policy of a system 
dictates that:   
 
1. Protection decisions must not be decided by the object owner.   
2. The system must enforce the protection  
 
Multilevel  security  models  such  as  the  (Bell-La  Padula  Confidentiality)  and 
Biba integrity models are used to formally specify this kind of MAC policy.  
However,  information  can  pass  through  a  covert  channel  in  MAC,  where 
information  of  a  higher  security  class  is  deduced  by  inference  such  as 
assembling and intelligently combining information of a lower security class. 
 
These  policies  for  access  control  are  not  particularly  well  suited  to  the 
requirements  of  government  and  industry  organisations  that  process 
unclassified  but  sensitive  information.  In  these  environments,  security 
objectives often support higher-level organisational policies which are derived 
from existing laws, ethics, regulations, or generally accepted practices. Such 
environments  usually  require  the  ability  to  control  actions  of  individuals 
beyond just an individual's ability to access information according to how that 
information is labelled based on its sensitivity. 
 
Most organisations nowadays do not use MAC in their applications, as it is 
hard to design and apply to real systems. They usually use another type of 
NDAC which is Role based Access Control that will be explained in detail in 
the next section. 
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2.5 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
 
Access is the ability to do something with a computer resource (e.g., use, 
change, or view). Access control is the means by which the ability is explicitly 
enabled  or  restricted  in  some  way  (usually  through  physical  and  system-
based controls). Computer based access controls can prescribe not only who 
or what process may have access to a specific system resource, but also the 
type of access that is permitted. These controls may be implemented in the 
computer system or in external devices. 
 
The  concept  RBAC  has  been  used  with  multi-user  computer  systems  and 
multi-application  online  systems  since  the  late  1960s  and  early  1970s.  
However, RBAC has rapidly emerged in the 1990s as a promising technology 
for managing and enforcing security in large-scale enterprise-wide systems, 
largely  because  of  the  lack  of  enhancement  in  the  traditional  Mandatory 
Access Control (MAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) used in many 
computer systems and networks.  Thus, RBAC is an attractive alternative to 
traditional MAC and DAC policies.  
 
With role-based access control, access decisions are based on the roles that 
individual users have as part of an organisation. Users take on assigned roles 
(such as doctor, nurse, teller, manager). The process of defining roles should 
be based on a thorough analysis of how an organisation operates and should 
include input from a wide spectrum of users in an organisation. 
 
Access  rights  are  grouped  by  role  name,  and  the  use  of  resources  is 
restricted  to  individuals  authorised  to  assume  the  associated  role.  For 
example, within a hospital system the role of doctor can include operations to 
perform diagnosis, prescribe medication, and order laboratory tests; and the 
role of researcher can be limited to gathering anonymous clinical information 
for studies. 55 
 
 
The use of roles to control access can be an effective means for developing 
and  enforcing  enterprise-specific  security  policies,  and  for  streamlining  the 
security management process. 
 
Below, the features and the infrastructure of RBAC are explained. 
 
2.5.1 Users and Roles 
 
As previously explained, in RBAC, access decisions are based on the roles 
that individual users have as part of an organisation. 
 
When  a  user  is  associated  with  a  role,  the  user  can  be  given  no  more 
privilege than is necessary to perform the job. This concept of least privilege 
requires identifying the user's job functions, determining the minimum set of 
privileges  required  to  perform  that  function,  and  restricting  the  user  to  a 
domain with those privileges and nothing more. In less precisely controlled 
systems, this is often difficult or costly to achieve. Someone assigned to a job 
category may be allowed more privileges than needed because it is difficult to 
tailor access based on various attributes or constraints. Since many of the 
responsibilities overlap between job categories, maximum privilege for each 
job category could cause unlawful access. 
 
Under RBAC, roles can have overlapping responsibilities and privileges; that 
is,  users  belonging  to  different  roles  may  need  to  perform  common 
operations. Some general operations may be performed by all employees. In 
this  situation,  it  would  be  inefficient  and  administratively  cumbersome  to 
specify repeatedly these general operations for each role that gets created. 
Role hierarchies can be established to provide for the natural structure of an 
enterprise.  A role hierarchy defines roles that have unique attributes and that 
may contain other roles; that is, one role may implicitly include the operations 
that are associated with another role. 56 
 
 
In  the  healthcare  situation,  a  role  “Specialist”  could  contain  the  roles  of” 
Doctor”  and  “Intern”.  This  means  that  members  of  the  role  Specialist  are 
implicitly associated with the operations associated with the roles” Doctor” and 
“Intern”  without  the  “administrator”  having  to  explicitly  list  the  “Doctor”  and 
“Intern” operations. Moreover, the roles “Cardiologist” and “Rheumatologist” 
could each contain the Specialist role. 
 
Role  hierarchies  are  a  natural  way  of  organising  roles  to  reflect  authority, 
responsibility,  and  competency:  the  role  in  which  the  user  is  gaining 
membership  is  not mutually  exclusive  with  another  role for  which  the user 
already possesses membership. These operations and roles can be subject to 
organisational policies or constraints. When operations overlap, hierarchies of 
roles  can  be  established.  Instead  of  instituting  costly  auditing  to  monitor 
access,  organisations  can  put  constraints  on  access  through  RBAC.  For 
example,  it  may  seem  sufficient  to  allow  physicians  to  have  access  to  all 
patient  data  records  if  their  access  is  monitored  carefully.  With  RBAC, 
constraints can be placed on physician access so that only those records that 
are associated with a particular physician can be accessed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  RBAC Model. 57 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the mechanism of RBAC which depends mainly on the role of 
the user as discussed earlier. 
 
 
2.5.2 Roles and Operations 
 
Organisations can establish the rules for the association of operations with 
roles. For example, a healthcare provider may decide that the role of clinician 
must  be  constrained  to  post  only  the  results  of  certain  tests  but  not  to 
distribute them where routing and human errors could violate a patient's right 
to privacy. Operations can also be specified in a manner that can be used in 
the demonstration and enforcement of laws or regulations. For example, a 
pharmacist can be provided with operations to dispense, but not to prescribe 
a medication. 
 
An  operation  represents  a  unit  of  control  that  can  be  referenced  by  an 
individual role, subject to regulatory constraints within the RBAC framework. 
An  operation  can  be  used  to  capture  complex  security-relevant  details  or 
constraints that cannot be determined by a simple mode of access. 
 
For example, there are differences between the access needs of a teller and 
an  accounting  supervisor  in  a  bank.  An  enterprise  defines  a  teller  role  as 
being able to perform a savings deposit operation.  This requires read and 
write access to specific fields within a savings file. An enterprise may also 
define  an  accounting  supervisor  role  that  is  allowed  to  perform  correction 
operations. These operations require read and write access to the same fields 
of a savings file as the teller.  However, the accounting supervisor may not be 
allowed to initiate deposits or withdrawals but only perform corrections after 
the fact. Likewise, the teller is not allowed to perform any corrections once the 
transaction has been completed. The difference between these two roles is 58 
 
the operations that are executed by the different roles and the values that are 
written to the transaction log file. 
 
The RBAC framework provides administrators with the capability to regulate 
who can perform what actions, when, from where, in what order, and in some 
cases under what relational circumstances. 
 
Only those operations that need to be performed by members of a role are 
granted  to  the  role.  Granting  of  user  membership  to  roles  can  be  limited. 
Some roles can only be occupied by a certain number of employees at any 
given period of time.  The role of manager, for example, can be granted to 
only one employee at a time.  Although an employee other than the manager 
may act in that role, only one person may assume the responsibilities of a 
manager at any given time. A user can become a new member of a role as 
long as the number of members allowed for the role is not exceeded. 
 
 
Figure 10:  RBAC Roles and Users. 
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2.5.3 Advantages of RBAC  
 
A properly administered RBAC system enables users to carry out a broad 
range  of  authorised  operations,  and  provides  flexibility  and  breadth  of 
application. System administrators can control access at a level of abstraction 
that is natural to the way that enterprises typically conduct business. This is 
achieved by statically and dynamically regulating users' actions through the 
establishment  and  definition  of  roles,  role  hierarchies,  relationships,  and 
constraints.  Thus,  once  an  RBAC  framework  is  established  for  an 
organisation, the principal administrative actions are the granting and revoking 
of users into and out of roles. This is in contrast to the more conventional and 
less intuitive process of attempting to administer lower-level access control 
mechanisms  directly  (e.g.,  access  control  lists  [ACLs],  capabilities,  or  type 
enforcement entities) on an object-by-object basis. 
 
Further, it is possible to associate the concept of an RBAC operation with the 
concept  of  "method"  in  Object  Technology.  This  association  leads  to 
approaches  where  Object  Technology  can  be  used  in  applications  and 
operating systems to implement an RBAC operation. 
 
For distributed systems, RBAC administrator responsibilities can be divided 
among central and local protection domains; that is, central protection policies 
can be defined at an enterprise level while leaving protection issues that are 
of  local  concern  at  the  organisational  unit  level.  For  example,  within  a 
distributed healthcare system, operations that are associated with healthcare 
providers may be centrally specified and pertain to all hospitals and clinics, 
but  the  granting  and  revoking  of  memberships  into  specific  roles  may  be 
specified by administrators at local sites. 
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2.5.4 RBAC versions and Status of Current RBAC Activities  
 
RBAC  is  a  technical  means  for  controlling  access  to  computer  resources. 
While still largely in the demonstration and prototype stages of development, 
RBAC  appears  to  be  a  promising  method  for  controlling  what  information 
computer  users  can  utilise  the  programs  that  they  can  run,  and  the 
modifications  that  they  can  make.  Only  a  few  off-the-shelf  systems  that 
implement  RBAC  are  commercially  available;  however,  organisations  may 
want  to  start  investigating  RBAC  for  future  application  in  their  multi-user 
systems.  RBAC  is  appropriate  for  consideration  in  systems  that  process 
unclassified but sensitive information, as well as those that process classified 
information. 
 
Several organisations are experimenting with the inclusion of provisions for 
RBAC  in  open  consensus  specifications.  RBAC  is  an  integral  part  of  the 
security  models  for  Secure  European  System  for  Applications  in  a  Multi-
vendor  Environment  (SESAME)  distributed  system  and  the  database 
language SQL3.  
 
RBAC has performed well as data access management method that fit for 
different privacy policies in different organisations. Nevertheless, some RBAC 
models have been considered to be inefficient for several reasons: 
 
First, differentiating roles in different contexts often proved to be difficult. This 
has resulted in large quantities of role definitions in some cases producing 
more roles than users.  
 
Second,  RBAC  remains  somewhat  coarse  grained  while  modern 
requirements are increasingly fine grained.  
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Finally,  while  the  initial  RBAC  model  was  based  on  permissions  only,  the 
need to explicitly specify denial of access became unavoidable. 
 
So in short the drawbacks of RBAC are: 
 
•  The method is more categorical as you can specify some roles and 
stick to them but it’s not context sensitive.  
•  The  lack  of  knowledge  and  staff  expertise  in  the  area  of  RBAC 
increases  the  uncertainty  of  technical  feasibility  and  developing 
successfully. 
•  This  would  increase  time,  effort  and  funding  needed  for 
implementation and design. 
 
These  factors  have  resulted  in  multiple  variations  of  the  RBAC  model; 
Administration  RBAC  (ARBAC)  involves  control  over  components  such  as 
roles, users, and permissions (Sandhu et al., 1998).  
 
 
Figure 11:  ARBAC Roles and Users. 62 
 
 
In the ARBAC, the roles are not directly involved with access control rules – 
except perhaps that they may show up as an attribute of the user and be used 
in  the  rules’  truth  evaluations.  However  the  roles  are  very  useful  in  the 
administration  of  massive  sets  of  users.  They  are  also  very  useful  in  the 
attestation,  auditing  and  other  security  and  identity  processes  around 
entitlement management. 
 
The  RBAC  versions  include  creations  and  deletion  of  roles,  creation  and 
deletion of permissions, assignment of permissions to roles and their removal, 
creation and deletion of users, assignment of use to roles and their removal.  
Moreover, it also includes definition and maintenance of the role hierarchy, 
definition  and  maintenance  of  constraints;  all  of  these  in  turn  are  for 
administrative roles and permissions.  It has three components or sub-models 
called  user-role  assignment  (URA97),  permission-role  assignment  (PRA97) 
and  role-role  assignment  (RRA97)  (Sandhu  et  al.,  1998),  (Sandhu  et  al., 
1997).  
 
Moffet (1998) expanded the NIST RBAC model to make it more suitable for 
complex  systems.  He  presented  an  RBAC  model,  with  three  types  of 
hierarchies;  is-a,  activity,  and  supervision.  For  example,  in  the  healthcare 
system,  one  can  create  a  role  called  healthcare  provider  who  has  all  the 
responsibilities common to nurses, physicians, and lab technicians. By giving 
a set of permissions to healthcare providers, the nurses, physicians, and lab 
technicians also inherit the same set of permissions. Moffett called this type of 
hierarchy  is-a;  and  the  relationship  can  be  read  as:  a  physician/nurse/lab 
technician is-a healthcare provider. Activity hierarchy connects the roles that 
are  needed  to  perform  a  task.  For  example,  only  a  physician  who  is 
responsible for a patient can give a prescription to him/her. The supervision 
hierarchy connects senior roles to junior ones, for instance, nurse to a head 
nurse. 
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Covington (Covington et al., 2001) included another type of permission to the 
RBAC  that  is  based  on  the  environment.  This  type  of  permission  is  not 
needed in systems such as healthcare where the healthcare providers have 
access to patients’ medical information anywhere and anytime there is a need 
for it. Crook (2003) defined roles and categorised them as follows: functional 
role, seniority role, and contextual role. Access is defined as a relation among 
users, roles, operations, and assets. If a user has certain role(s), he can do 
specific operations on one or more assets. A contextual role is connected to a 
context type where it is connected to an asset (Crook et al., 2003). Fig. 12 
shows  an  example  where  a  doctor  (role)  has  read  and  write  (operation) 
access  to  a  patient’s  medical  record  (asset),  provided  that  the  doctor  is 
responsible (role) for that patient (context). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  The doctor who is responsible for the patient has read and write access to a 
patient’s medical record. 
 
Using Crook’s RBAC technique, one has to consider that the purpose of an 
individual in requesting access is not included in Crook’s role based access 
control.  Users  may  need  to  have  access  to  variant  information  for  variant 
purposes. As a result, the type of access they get should change depending 
on  their  purpose.  For  example,  a  doctor  may  need  access  to  a  patient’s 
information.  His  purpose  can  be  to  give  a  prescription  to  the patient  or  to 64 
 
complete  the  patient's  profile.  In  the  first  case,  the  system  can  give  read 
access to the physician. However, in the second case, the physician should 
also be able to add or change the patient’s profile as well. Therefore, access 
control should be able to give different types of accesses in the two cases. 
Crook’s  models  are  not  able  to  take  the  purpose  of  the  data  into 
considerations 
 
2.6 Task Based Authorisation Control TBAC 
 
Task Based Access Control (TBAC) is well suited for distributed computing 
and information processing activities with multiple points of access, control, 
and  decision  making  such  as  those  found  in  workflow  and  distributed 
processes  and  transaction  management  systems.  TBAC  differs  from 
traditional  access  controls  and  security  models  in  many  respects  (Thomas 
and Sandhu, 1997). Instead of having a system-centric view of security, TBAC 
approaches  security  modelling  and  enforcement  at  the  application  and 
enterprise level, which makes it more desirable in real world enterprises. 
 
In 2000, Sandhu et al. pioneered NIST (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology)  RBAC  models  (W3  website,  2001).  Like  other  RBAC  models, 
permissions  are  given  to  the  roles  rather  than  the  users,  where  roles  are 
defined  to  be  mutually  exclusive.  Sandhu  et  al  introduced  two  types  of 
hierarchies: a role hierarchy and an activity hierarchy. In the role hierarchy, 
senior  roles  inherit  all  permissions  of  junior  roles,  whereas  in  the  activity 
hierarchy senior roles inherit only partial permissions of junior roles. 
 
There  are  some  non-canonical  (or  non-"standard")  access  control  models 
(besides  the  well-known  MAC,  DAC  and  RBAC)  that  are  simply not  well 
defined. Anyone can define or redefine them as they want, as long as the 
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That is, the access is granted based on a task but the access check then 
compares this task to roles that contain that task, and users that are part of 
one of those roles. In other words, tasks can be seen as "sub-roles" - or if it is 
easier to understand, roles become role-containers, and the tasks are the real 
roles. 
 
Clearly, this is a huge improvement on straight RBAC, since it gives you some 
granularity and dynamics to play with, but it is still a form of (extended) RBAC. 
It allows many dynamic information processing activities with multiple points 
of access, control, and decision making. An active security system takes into 
account  the  impact  of  context  as  it  emerges  with  progressing  tasks  and 
distinguishes  task-based  and  context-based  permission  activation  from 
permission assignment. 
TBAC differs from traditional access controls and security models in many 
respects.  Instead  of  having  a  system-centric  view  of  security,  TBAC 
approaches  security  modelling  and  enforcement  at  the  application  and 
enterprise level. Secondly TBAC lays the foundation for a new breed of what 
is called “active” security models. By active security models, the researcher 
means models that approach security modelling and enforcement from the 
perspective of activities or tasks, and as such, provide the abstractions and 
mechanisms for the active runtime management of security as tasks progress 
to completion. In an active approach to security management, permissions 
are constantly monitored and activated and deactivated in accordance with 
emerging context associated with progressing tasks (such as in workflows). 
Such a task-based approach to security represents a radical departure from 
classical  passive  security  models  such  as  those  based  on  one  or  more 
variations  of  the  subject-object  view  of  security  and  access  control.  In  a 
subject  object  view  of  security,  a  subject  is  given  access  to  objects  in  a 
system based on some permission (rights) the subject possesses. However, 
such a subject-object view typically divorces access mediation from the larger 
context (such as the current state of tasks) in which a subject performs an 66 
 
operation on an object.  The most obvious application of TBAC is in secure 
workflow management.  
 
TBAC enables the granting, usage tracking, and revoking of permissions to be 
automated and co-ordinated with the progression of the various tasks. Without 
active authorisation management, permissions will in most cases be “turned 
on” too early or too late and will probably remain “on” long after the workflow 
tasks have terminated. This opens up vulnerabilities in systems. Any attempt 
to minimise such vulnerabilities will require a security administrator to keep 
track of the progress of the tasks for all enacted workflow instances; an error 
prone  and  impossible  task!  Thus  what  is  needed  is  an  approach  where 
access control permissions are granted and revoked according to the validity 
of authorisations and one where this can be done without manual security 
administration. The authorisations themselves are of course processed strictly 
according to some application logic and policy.  In the remaining sections of 
this  project  the  researcher  will  describe  how  TBAC  ideas  can  be  used  to 
accomplish this.  
 
TBAC focuses on security modelling and enforcement at the application and 
enterprise  level.  In  the TBAC paradigm  of access  control,  permissions  are 
associated  with  contextual  information  about  on-going  activities  when 
evaluating an access request. Permissions are checked-in and checked-out 
from protection states in a just-in-time fashion based on activities or tasks and 
synchronised  with  the  processing  of  authorisations  in  progressing  tasks.  
Thus, TBAC dynamically manages permissions as authorisations by progress 
to completion and minimises the vulnerabilities in a system.  
 
There are basically two broad objectives guiding the research efforts in TBAC. 
The  first  is  to  model  from  an  enterprise  perspective,  various  authorisation 
policies that are relevant to organisational tasks and workflows, and a set of 
user  friendly  envisioned  tools  to  help  a  security  officer  model  and  specify 
policies.  The  second  objective  is  to  seek  ways  in  which  these  modelled 67 
 
policies  can  be  automatically  enforced  at  runtime  when  the  corresponding 
tasks are invoked. Preliminary ideas for TBAC that recognised the need for 
active security were presented in (Thomas and Sandhu 1997). More recently, 
a  workflow  authorisation  model  (WAM)  was  presented  in  (Qin  and  Atluri 
2003).  WAM  has  the  same  general  motivation  as  TBAC  in  that  it  tries  to 
provide some notions of active security and just-in-time permissions.  
 
TBAC  keeps  track  of  the  usage  and  consumption  of  permissions,  thereby 
preventing  the  abuse  of  permissions  through  unnecessary  and  malicious 
operations. However, in TBAC as in all the modified Access Control family, 
there are no contexts in relation to activities, tasks, or workflow progress and 
it only keeps track of usage and validity of permissions. This is insufficient for 
collaborative systems that require a much broader definition of context. More 
fine grained components need to be defined to support dynamic environments 
motivated  by  TBAC.  TBAC  can  be  used  effectively  in  an  application  or 
enterprise, but for most collaborative environments, TBAC is used within other 
access control models.   
 
In  conclusion,  TBAC  would  have  the  same  problem  that  RBAC  has  in 
complex  systems  such  as  large  healthcare  systems.  In  that  the  privacy 
extension  will  add  to  the  complexity  of  the  system.  And  the  context  issue 
needs  to  be  well  addressed  in  TBAC  before  it  could  be  applied  in  real 
application.  And  in  (Omran  et  al.  2010  and  Omran  et  al.  2012),  the 
researchers  have presented a study that has real numbers for comparing the 
required  number  of  tables,  SQL  statements  and  policies  to  show  how  the 
complexity  of  the  design  using  RBAC  and  TBAC  as  compared  with  our 
method.  68 
 
 
2.7  Comparisons  between  DAC,  MAC,  RBAC  and 
TBAC 
 
So,  although  the  Access  Control  family  presented  above  provides  a 
reasonable solution to the access management problem, none of them has 
answered  the  question  from  Chapter  1  which  is  the  lack  of  “Context 
sensitivity”.  As  all  of  them  are  static  and  can’t  be  flexible  with  different 
situations.  This  doesn’t  give  reliability  in  real  case  applications  such  as  a 
hospital, where you have different upcoming cases and some with emergency 
demands.  
 
In  conclusion,  it  can  be  stated  that  earlier  RBAC  models  have  some 
limitations; for instance, they do not include purpose and therefore, cannot 
distinguish  between  scenarios  where  the  healthcare  providers  need 
information for different purposes. This problem has been addressed in RBAC 
models with privacy extension. However even those with a privacy extension 
still  lack  simplicity  of  the  design  as  the  privacy  obligation  adds  to  the 
complexity of the RBAC design and the work still needs developments. As 
they (Thomas and Sandhu, 1997) have admitted in their paper that they have 
not  included  obligation  and  retention  and/  or  a  more  complete  privacy 
requirements model. Below is a table that compares DAC, MAC, RBAC and 
TBAC according to three main criteria: 
 
-  Access right Permission given by database administrator. 
-  Context sensitivity. 
-  Need for expert database administrator. 
 
These three criteria are vital for any system to be durable in preserving the 
privacy.  In  addition,  the  context  sensitivity  adds  flexibility  to  the  system  in 69 
 
order  to  face  the  changing  situations.  The  need  for  an  expert  database 
administrator, however, adds to the cost of any project. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison between DAC, MAC, RBAC and TBAC 
 
In  the  next  section,  an  overview  of  a  new  method  for  data  access 
management  that  works  at  the  data  level  will  be  discussed.    This  thesis 
provides a new model for access management, ChBAC, and a comparison of 
these methods with ChBAC is provided in section 7.5 
 
2.8 Hippocratic Database 
 
In a paper titled “Hippocratic Databases", (Agrawal et al. 2002) outlined the 
concept  of  integrating  the  right  to  privacy  within  database  management 
systems.  Their  proposed  database  system  was  inspired  by  the  medical 
Hippocratic Oath, hence the term “Hippocratic Database". A founding tenet of 
a Hippocratic Database system is that it should be responsible for the privacy 
Method  DAC  MAC  RBAC  TBAC 
Access right 
Permission 
given by 
Users  Administrator  Administrator  Administrator 
Context 
sensitivity 
Not aware  Not aware  Not aware  Not aware 
 
Need for 
expert 
database 
administrator 
No need  In need  In need  In need 70 
 
of the data it manages. The ten principles of Hippocratic database systems 
have been defined as follows (Zurich IBM website): 
 
1.  Purpose specification: 
For personal information stored in the database, the purpose for which the 
information has been collected should be associated with that information. 
2.  Consent: 
The purpose associated with personal information should have the consent of 
the donor of the personal information. 
3.  Limited collection: 
The  personal  information  collected  should  be  limited  to  the  minimum 
necessary for accomplishing the specified purposes. 
4.   Limited use: 
The  database  should  run  only  those  queries  that  are  consistent  with  the 
purposes for which the information has been collected. 
5.   Limited disclosure: 
Personal  information  stored  in  the  database  should  not  be  communicated 
outside the database for purposes other than those for which there is consent 
from the donor of the information. 
6.   Limited retention: 
Personal information should be retained only as long as necessary for the 
fulfilment of the purposes for which it has been collected. 
7.   Accuracy: 
Personal information stored in the database should be accurate and up-to-
date. 
8.   Safety: 
Personal information should be protected by security safeguards against theft 
and other misappropriations. 
9.   Openness: 
A donor should be able to access all information about him or her stored in 
the database. 
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10.   Compliance: 
A  donor  should  be  able  to  verify  compliance  with  the  above  principles. 
Similarly,  the  database  should  be  able  to  address  a  challenge  concerning 
compliance. 
 
The initial concept of the Hippocratic database might well have been inspired 
by the Hippocratic Oath, but the outlined principles are, also, deeply rooted in 
the  idea  of  “Fair  Information  Practices".  These  practices  are  themselves 
based on the privacy principles outlined by Organisation for Economic Co-
operation  and  Development  (OECD)  in  1980.    The  Hippocratic  designers 
further outlined a straw man design along with a set of use cases against 
which Hippocratic databases could be tested.  
 
2.8.1 The Hippocratic Database Architecture 
 
In a summary of current database systems, (Agrawal et al., 2002) considers 
two  properties  fundamental  for  a  database  system:  the  ability  to  manage 
persistent data; and the ability to access large amounts of data efficiently. In 
addition to these two properties they further postulate that certain capabilities 
are universal to database management systems: 
 
High level language support for data structure definition, data access and data 
manipulation,  concurrency  control  in  the  form  of  transaction  management, 
controls to ensure authorised data access and data validity and also a means 
to recover from system failure with minimal loss of existing data. 
 
In defining the concept of Hippocratic Databases, the designers were  very 
clear  on  two  points.  Firstly,  a  Hippocratic  database  will  need  all  of  the 
capabilities available in current database systems. Secondly, in the interests 
of privacy preservation, efficiency, while still important, may not be the central 
focus. Instead, ensuring that data is used for the purpose for which it was 
collected will be the overriding concern. The straw man architecture outlined 72 
 
by the Hippocratic database designers, serves not as a blueprint, but rather 
as a road-map for future development on the path to the realisation of a fully 
functional Hippocratic database system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus the main components of the Hippocratic database architecture are: 
 
1- Privacy Metadata 
 
Privacy  metadata  tables  are  the  means  by  which  the  purposes  of  data 
collection are defined. Each piece of collected information must be associated 
with the purpose(s) for which it is collected. Additionally, the following needs 
to be described and defined by the metadata: 
-  The external-recipients: with whom may this information be shared, the 
retention-period: the duration of time that the collected information is to 
be stored, and 
-  The  authorised-users:  the  set  of  users  and/or  applications  that  may 
access the information. 
Figure 13:  Hippocratic Database model. 73 
 
Creating the metadata tables can be made easier by the privacy metadata 
creator. Its  task  would  be  to  automatically  generate  the  required  metadata 
tables using the organisation’s privacy policy as its data source. 
 
2- Data Collection 
 
Prior  to  a  user  releasing  information,  the  Privacy  Constraint  Validator  will 
verify that the organisation's privacy policy is in line with the user's privacy 
preferences. An audit trail of a user's acceptance of the privacy policy must be 
maintained to address any future challenges regarding compliance. Once the 
user’s acceptance has been obtained, data can be inserted into the database. 
Along with each stored attribute, the purposes to which the user has agreed to 
must also be stored. In order to address the principle of accuracy, the Data 
Accuracy Analyser should perform data accuracy checks. This may take place 
prior to or after data insertion. 
 
3- Queries 
 
An  audit  trail  of  all  queries  must  be  maintained  to  address  compliance 
challenges, as well as to enable external privacy audits. There are essentially 
three phases that take place in the fulfilment of a Hippocratic database query 
 
4- Retention 
 
The Data Retention Manager is responsible for deleting all information whose 
retention period has expired. 
 
5- Additional Features 
 
The  Data  Collection  Analyser  will  examine  all  queries  for  all  purposes  to 
determine  any  data  collected  but  not  used.  Thus  other  words  ensuring 
adherence to the principle of limited collection. 74 
 
 
It also collects any data held for longer than required, thus supporting the 
principle of limited retention whether persons have unneeded authorisations 
for queries with a given purpose. This will play a vital role in ensuring the 
principles of limited use and limited disclosure. 
 
2.8.2 Challenges to Hippocratic Databases 
 
During  the  course  of  designing  the  straw  man  architecture  the  designers 
identified  some  problems  and  challenges  regarding  the  10  principles 
mentioned above that the Hippocratic database is based on. This subsection 
presents a summary of their findings: 
 
1- A Policy and Preference Language 
 
The specification of policies lies at the very heart of Hippocratic databases. 
The Hippocratic database designers believe that P3P form a solid base for the 
expression of privacy policies. However, since P3P was geared towards the 
Web and Web  shopping,  they  recommend building  on  the  work of  P3P  to 
provide greater support for the richer environments in which they envisage 
Hippocratic databases operating. The efforts of (Karjoth et al. 2003) are cited 
by the designers as they work towards this end.  
 
2- Large numbers of purposes 
 
Despite the intuitive appeal of Hippocratic Databases there are problems with 
administering  large  numbers  of  purposes  correctly  and  with  automatically 
determining concretely the purpose of any given access request (Al-Fedaghi, 
2007). 
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3- Limited Disclosure 
 
Allowing users the ability to dynamically choose the external recipients of their 
private information poses challenges for limiting disclosure. The Hippocratic 
designers show identity theft as one such problem. They propose that public-
private  key  cryptography  offers  a  possible  solution,  but  concede  that 
deploying this solution poses its own challenges. 
 
4- Limited Retention 
 
Adhering to the principle of limited retention seems simple enough. On the 
face of it, it would appear that information should be deleted when it is no 
longer required. However, data is not only stored in the data table, but in the 
database  logs  and  past  checkpoints.  Deleting  data  from  these  logs  and 
checkpoints, without affecting recovery will be a challenge. 
 
5- The management of attributes and users purposes 
 
The management of attributes and users’ purposes is a complicated issue 
(Masacci et al., 2005). 
 
6- Safety of Information 
 
Controlling the access to tables can primarily be controlled by the database 
system. However, the storage media on which the tables are stored may be 
vulnerable. For example, someone with super user authority may not have 
permission to access a table, but may gain access to database files using the 
operating  system.  While  encryption  of  database  files  may  help,  the 
performance implications it entails will need serious consideration. 
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7- Openness 
 
Even  the  principle  of  openness,  which  on  the  face  of  it  appears 
straightforward, has its own challenges. Users should be able to determine if 
a  database  has  information  stored  about  them.  However,  in  allowing  this 
determination, the database should not know who issued the query, if they in 
fact hold no information about the querying user. Additionally, a user whose 
information is not stored, and who initiates a query for information, should 
learn nothing beyond the fact that no information is stored. 
 
8- Compliance 
 
Generating audit trails of every access to personal information and making 
this available to users can be a powerful means to protect privacy. Doing this 
without paying a large performance penalty is a challenge. A potential solution 
may be the use of a trusted intermediary. Rather than sending the logs to 
each individual user, they may be sent to the intermediary. Users can then 
access log information on demand from the intermediary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next section, a summary that shows the drawbacks and advantages of 
the Hippocratic database will be given. 
 
Figure 14:  The infrastructure of the Hippocratic database. 77 
 
  
2.8.3  Summary  of  the  Drawbacks  and  Advantages  of  the 
Hippocratic Database 
 
There  were  attempts  in  the  literature  to  use  the  Hippocratic  database  in 
designing real applications such as (Masacci et al., 2005) and (Omran et al., 
2008).  But these attempts have stumbled against problems of the Hippocratic 
database, Such as: 
 
•  The numerous number of purposes that can be used as a reason 
for accessing the database in the Hippocratic model (Al-Fedaghi, 
2007),  and  the  problem  of  mapping  these  purposes  with  the 
authenticated group of users (Omran et al., 2008) and (Masacci et 
al., 2005). 
•  Hippocratic Database is the first method to implement privacy at the 
data level. This requires data access constraints to be defined at 
the data level, and mapped to attributes in the original database 
tables.  Database implementation and adoption subsequently have 
added difficulty.  
 
Figure 15 shows how complex the hierarchy and number of purposes would 
be in the healthcare case. The figure shows only a portion of the possible 
purposes for selected users. In this figure which is similar to the findings in 
(Omran et al., 2008), the researcher tried to show how complicated it is to for 
the non-expert database administrator to design his system using principles of 
Hippocratic database. Using the example of a hospital, he needs to have a 
good background in the detailed processes of the hospital and then translate 
them into purposes and hierarchies of users. 
 
The  complexity  of  limiting  the  huge  number  of  purposes  available  for  a 
specific domain is highlighted in (Omran et al., 2008). 
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In the next section, a data access management that suggests lest parameter 
for data access management will be presented. 
 
2.9 Chain Method 
 
Chain-Based Access Control is based on the notion of a chain of acts (Al-
Fedaghi, 2007). In his paper, Al-Fedaghi presented the idea by changing the 
principle of data access control from purposes to chains of limited acts. He 
stated that the management of attributes and users’ purposes is a complex 
issue. To simplify the mapping process, he depends on the idea that users 
Figure 15:  Prototype for Hippocratic database in healthcare application. 79 
 
are  assigned  roles  and  access  purpose  permissions  are  granted  to  roles 
associated with tasks or functionalities, not directly to individual users.  
 
The idea of the Chain method has been derived from Al-Fadaghi’s personal 
information theory which has been presented in a long series of publications 
such as:  (Al-Fedaghi et al., 2005), (Al-Fedaghi, 2005), (Al-Fedaghi, 2006a) 
and (Al-Fedaghi, 2006b). The next sub section will give a brief summary of his 
personal information theory. 
 
2.9.1 Al-Fedaghi Personal information Theory 
 
Personal  Information  Theory  (PIT)  is  based  on  an  ethical  foundation  (Al-
Fedaghi, 2006a). Potential abuse of personal/private information raises many 
ethical,  legal,  and  economic  issues.  One  aspect  of  (PIT)  is  Personal 
Information  Ethics  (PIE),  which  is  based  on  the  thesis  that  personal 
information  itself  has  an  intrinsic  moral  value.  Recognition  of  the  intrinsic 
ethical value of personal information does not imply prohibiting acting upon 
the information. Rather, it means that, while others may have a right to utilise 
personal information for legitimate needs and purposes; it should not be done 
in such a way that devalues personal information as an object of respect (Al-
Fedaghi,  2006b).  The  human-centred  significance  aspect  of  personal 
information derives from its value to a human being as something that hides 
his/her secrets, feelings, embarrassing facts, etc., and something that gives 
him/her  a  sense  of  identity,  security,  and,  of  course,  privacy  (Al-Fedaghi, 
2006a). The notion of security in this context means that personal information 
would be protected from malicious users while it moves through the seven 
acts in the PI flow model (collecting, creating, processing, storing, disclosing, 
using and mining). For example, the typical countermeasure against attacks in 
the  processing  act  involves  enforcing  access  permissions  policies.  When 
malicious  users  gain  access  to  personal  data,  the  database  system  is 
responsible for protecting the personal information.  
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Personal  information  privacy  involves  acts  in  reference  to  personal 
information. For example, creating, collecting, processing, and disclosing as 
reflected in the PI flow model, are examples of these acts. Al-Fedaghi grasps 
the  difference  between  privacy  and  security  in  the  context  of  personal 
information  from  the  Health  Insurance  Portability  and  Accountability  Act 
(HIPAA), which may be said to be a comprehensive venture in the direction of 
privacy. He uses of the following HIPAA clause:  
 
“Security refers to the specific measures and efforts taken to protect privacy 
and to ensure the integrity of personal information. Security is the ability to 
prevent unauthorised breaches of privacy, such as might occur if data are lost 
or  destroyed  by  accident,  stolen  by  intent, or  sent  to  the  wrong  person  in 
error.” 
 
After a deep analysis he gives his definition of personal information which is: 
“Personal information is any linguistic expression that has referent(s) of type 
individual,  assuming  that  p(X)  is  a  sentence  such  that  X  is  the  set  of  its 
referents and V is the verb used in this sentence”. According to this definition 
there are two types of personal information: 
 
(1)  p(X) is atomic personal information if X ∩ V is the singleton set {X}. That 
is,  atomic  personal  information  is  an  assertion  that  has  a  single  human 
referent. 
 
(2) p(X) is compound personal information if |X ∩  V| is greater than 1. That is, 
compound  personal  information  is  an  expression  that  has  more  than  one 
human referent. 
 
A single piece of atomic personal information may have many possessors; 
where its proprietor may or may not be among them. A possessor refers to 
any  entity  that  knows,  stores,  or  owns  the  information.  Any  compound 
personal  statement  is  privacy-reducible  to  a  set  of  atomic  personal 81 
 
statements.  Personal  information  privacy  involves  acts  on  personal 
information in the context of creating, collecting, processing, and disclosing 
this type of information.  
 
At this point, all the basic requirements needed to form the chain method to 
be suggested as a candidate for managing data access have been covered 
as the next subsection illustrates.   
 
  
2.9.2 The infrastructure of the Chain method 
 
Unlike RBAC, Chain doesn’t need to have long, complicated policies for each 
group of roles (Al-Fedaghi, 2007).  Instead, a set of 7 limited acts (Creating, 
Processing,  Disclosing,  Storing,  Collecting,  Using  and  Mining  as  shown  in 
Figure 17), are distributed amongst the different group of roles. These acts 
are  the  policy  and  purpose  of  why  this  group  of  roles  is  accessing  the 
database and at the same time it includes the action that the user can apply to 
the database. 
 
As shown in Figure 16, data usage can be divided into four phases, namely 
creation, collection, processing and disclosure of personal information. Each 
phase can be associated with a number of allowed acts. Personal information 
can be created by proprietors (i.e., the data subject), by non-proprietors (i.e., 
any data recipient different from the data subject), or can be deduced from 
existing  information  (e.g.,  using  data  mining).  Created  information  can  be 
either  used  (e.g.,  for  decision  making),  stored,  or  disclosed.  In  addition, 
information  can  enter  into  the  processing  and  disclosing  phases.  The 
processing  of  personal  information  involves  storing,  using,  and  mining 
personal  information.  The  disclosure  phase  involves  releasing  personal 
information to other actors.  
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Al-Fedaghi  argues  that  each  role  can  be  translated  to  a  chain  of  acts  on 
personal  information, such  as  in  Figure  16.    He  further  proposes  that  any 
piece of personal information only requires a limited set of acts that can be 
operated on it. He claimed that those limited acts could be used to design a 
more robust data access control mechanism that could safeguard personal 
information  privacy.  So,  instead  of  huge  policy  tables,  there  is  only  a 
manageable set of limited acts.    
 
Using the PI flow model, the researcher can build a system that involves a 
proprietor on one side and others (other persons, agencies, companies, etc.) 
who perform different types of activities in the PI transformations among the 
four phases of flow of personal information. Al-Fedaghi refers to any of these 
as PI agents. PI agents may include any one who participates in activities 
over PI. The proprietor is not accepted as an agent with respect to his/her 
own  PI  (Al-Fedaghi,  2007).    In  order  to  bring  the  principles  of  the  Chain 
method that Al-Fedaghi has developed, this researcher has applied it to the 
healthcare domain (which is the domain of our interest in this thesis). 
Figure 16:  Personal Information flow model (based on (Al- 
Fedaghi, 2007)). 83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  17  represents  the  personal  information  flow  model  of  a  typical 
healthcare  scenario.    Here,  the  proprietor  of  personal  information  is  the 
patient,  whereas  the non-proprietors are  doctors, nurses,  receptionists  and 
insurance  companies.  Every  actor  involved  in  the  data  processing  is 
represented along with the acts that he can perform. For instance, nurses can 
collect, store, process and disclose patient information. The arrows between 
acts  represent  the  allowed  chains  of  acts.  For  instance,  the  information 
disclosed by the patient can be collected by the nurse, who in turn can either 
store  it  or process  it.  If the  nurse  stores them,  she  can  either collect  new 
information or process it. In (Omran et al., 2010a) the researchers have drawn 
the basic lines of the specifications of Chain method construction. 
 
2.9.3 The Chain Method in Real Applications 
 
The chain method has not been implemented before the work on this project. 
Therefore, when the researcher started the real work on it, many practical 
Figure 17:  Architecture of Information Flow (based on Figure 4 in (Al-
Fedaghi, 2007). 84 
 
problems appeared and the researcher started to fill in the gaps resulting from 
Al-Fedaghi’s  work.  And  in  order  to  do  so,  she  published  a  series  of 
publications such as: (Omran et al., 2008), (Omran et al., 2009c), (Omran et 
al., 2010) and (Omran et al., 2012). 
 
While working on the Chain, the researcher has realised the simplicity of its 
design compared with the other methods such as: RBAC, TBAC, Hippocratic 
and XACML (Omran et al., 2010) and (Omran et al., 2012). The results of this 
study will be fully presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
 
It has been shown that if the acts of the Chains are written compared with the 
policies of RBAC-both in XACML, one gets much straight forward and less 
commands in favour of the Chain as will be shown in Chapter 8. 
 
2.9.4 Summary  
 
From the above, it becomes clear that the Chain gives us the first key for a 
solution to the problem because: 
 
•  Chains  have  been  proposed  to  simplify  the  complexity  of 
Hippocratic databases (Omran et al.,  2010) 
•  The chain improves upon the RBAC with its simple design (Omran 
et al.  2011) 
•  In Al-Fedaghi (2007) a personal information flow model is proposed 
that specifies permitted acts on personal information. 
•  Chains  of  these  acts  can  be  used  to  control  acting  on  personal 
information instead of purposes used in privacy access control. 
 
But the main outstanding problems for the Chain method are: 
   
•  It  suffers  from  the  same  problem  as  RBAC  in  not  being  able  to 
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•   The Chain of acts method has not been applied in real applications 
because of difficulty in defining the data for the chains of acts.  
 
These problems were the motivation that has inspired us to go and look for 
our second key solution which is “Semantics” in order to be able to specify the 
7 acts of Al-Fedaghi for the domain and get use of the simple design of the 
Chain model. 
 
2.10 XACML and SAML 
 
When  the  network  was  contained  within  a  single  building  or  campus,  the 
problem  was  relatively  simple  and  generally  handled  by  software  that  was 
hooked  into  the  operating  system.  But  today's  networks  involve 
interconnected segments distributed across the country and around the globe, 
and many of these are also joined to the public Internet. 
 
Markup  Language  (SAML)  defines  how  identity  and  access  information  is 
exchanged and lets organisations convey security information to one another 
without having to change their own internal security architectures. However 
SAML  can  only  communicate  information.  How  to  use  that  information  is 
where XACML comes in. This is a language, which uses the same definitions 
of subjects and actions as SAML, and offers a vocabulary for expressing the 
rules  needed  to  define  an  organisation's  security  policies  and  make 
authorisation  decisions.  XACML  has  two  basic  components. 
 
The first is an access-control policy language that lets developers specify the 
rules  about  who  can  do  what  and  when.  The  other  is  a  request/response 
language  that  presents  requests  for  access  and  describes  the  answers  to 
those queries. 
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XACML is an OASIS standard that describes both a policy language and an 
access  control  decision  request/response  language  (both  written  in  XML) 
(OASIS  2005).  The  policy  language  is  used  to  describe  general  access 
control  requirements,  and  has  standard  extension  points  for  defining  new 
functions, data types, combining logic, etc. The request/response language 
lets one form a query to ask whether or not a given action should be allowed, 
and  interpret  the  result.  The  response  always  includes  an  answer  about 
whether  the  request  should  be  allowed  using  one  of  four  values:  Permit, 
Deny, Indeterminate (an error occurred or some required value was missing, 
so  a  decision  cannot  be  made)  or  Not  Applicable  (the  request  can't  be 
answered by this service). 
 
The typical setup is that someone wants to take some action on a resource. 
They will make a request to whatever actually protects that resource (like a 
file  system  or  a  web  server),  which  is  called  a  Policy  Enforcement  Point 
(PEP). The PEP will form a request based on the requester's attributes, the 
resource  in  question,  the  action,  and  other  information  pertaining  to  the 
request. The PEP will then send this request to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), 
which will look at the request and some policy that applies to the request, and 
come  up  with  an  answer  about  whether  access  should  be  granted.  That 
answer is returned to the PEP, which can then allow or deny access to the 
requester. It should be noted that the PEP and PDP might both be contained 
within a single application, or might be distributed across several servers. In 
addition  to  providing  request/response  and  policy  languages,  XACML  also 
provides  the  other  pieces  of  this  relationship,  namely  finding  a  policy  that 
applies to a given request and evaluating the request against that policy to 
come up with a yes or no answer. 
 
There  are  many  existing  proprietary  and  application-specific  languages  for 
doing this kind of thing but XACML has several points in its favour (OASIS 
2003): 
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•  It is standard. By using a standard language, a user doesn't need to 
change his own system each time, and he doesn't need to think about 
all  the tricky  issues  involved  in  designing  a  new  language.  Plus,  as 
XACML becomes more widely deployed, it will be easier to interoperate 
with other applications using the same standard language. 
 
•  It  is  generic.  This  means  that  rather  than  trying  to  provide  access 
control for a particular environment or a specific kind of resource, it can 
be used in any environment. One policy can be written which can then 
be  used  by  many  different  kinds  of  applications,  and  when  one 
common language is used, policy management becomes much easier. 
 
•  It is distributed. This means that a policy can be written which in turn 
refers  to  other  policies  kept  in  arbitrary  locations.  The  result  is  that 
rather  than  having  to  manage  a  single  monolithic  policy,  different 
people or groups can manage sub-pieces of policies as appropriate, 
and XACML knows how to correctly combine the results from these 
different policies into one decision. 
 
•  It is powerful. While there are many ways the base language can be 
extended,  many  environments  will  not  need  to  do  so.  The  standard 
language already supports a wide variety of data types, functions, and 
rules  about  combining  the  results  of different  policies.  In  addition  to 
this,  there  are  already  standard  groups  working  on  extensions  and 
profiles  that  will  hook  XACML  into  other  standards  like  SAML  and 
LDAP,  which  will  increase the number  of ways  that  XACML  can  be 
used. 
 
To give you a better idea of how all these aspects fit together, what follows is 
a discussion of XACML policy, which will demonstrate many of the standard 
features of the language. Note that XACML is a rich language, so only some 88 
 
of its features are shown here. You should look at the specification for more 
information on all of the features. 
 
2.10.1 Top-Level Constructs: Policy and PolicySet 
 
At the root of all XACML policies is a Policy or a PolicySet. A PolicySet is a 
container that can hold other Policies or PolicySets, as well as references to 
policies found in remote locations. A Policy represents a single access control 
policy,  expressed  through  a  set  of  Rules.  Each  XACML  policy  document 
contains exactly one Policy or PolicySet root XML tag. 
 
Because a Policy or PolicySet may contain multiple policies or rules, each of 
which may evaluate according to different access control decisions, XACML 
needs  some  way  of  reconciling  the  decisions  each  makes.  This  is  done 
through  a  collection  of  combining  algorithms.  Each  algorithm  represents  a 
different way of combining multiple decisions into a single decision. There are 
Policy  Combining  Algorithms  (used  by  PolicySet)  and  Rule  Combining 
Algorithms  (used  by  Policy).  An  example of  these  is  the  “Deny”  Overrides 
Algorithm, which says that no matter what, if any evaluation returns “Deny”, or 
no  evaluation permits,  then  the final  result  is  also  Deny. These  combining 
algorithms are used to build up increasingly complex policies, and while there 
are seven standard algorithms, you can build your own to suit your needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18:  XACML Policy model. 89 
 
 
 
2.10.2 Targets and Rules 
 
Part of what XACML Policy Decision Point (PDP) - Point (which evaluates and 
issues authorisation decisions) needs to do is to find a policy that applies to a 
given request. To do this, XACML provides another feature called a target. A 
Target is basically a set of simplified conditions for the Subject, Resource and 
Action (a Subject element is the entity requesting access, an Action element 
defines the type of access requested on the Resource (such as a file system 
or a web server)) that must be met for a PolicySet, Policy or Rule to apply to a 
given request. These use Boolean functions to compare values found in a 
request with those included in the Target. If all the conditions of a Target are 
met, then its associated PolicySet, Policy, or Rule applies to the request. In 
addition to being a way to check applicability, Target information also provides 
a way to index policies, which is useful if you need to store many policies and 
then quickly sift through them to find which ones apply. For instance, a Policy 
might  contain  a Target  that  only  applies  to  requests  on  a  specific  service. 
When a request to access that service arrives, the PDP will know where to 
look  for  policies  that  might  apply  to  this  request  because  the  policies  are 
indexed  based  on  their  Target  constraints.  Note  that  a  Target  may  also 
specify that it applies to any request. 
 
Once a Policy has been found and verified to apply to a request, its Rules are 
evaluated. A policy can have any number of Rules which contain the core 
logic of an XACML policy. The heart of most Rules is a Condition, which is a 
Boolean function. If the Condition evaluates to true, then the Rule's Effect (a 
value of Permit or Deny that is associated with successful evaluation of the 
Rule)  is  returned.  Evaluation  of  a  Condition  can  also  result  in  an  error 
(Indeterminate) or discovery that the Condition doesn't apply to the request 90 
 
(Not Applicable). A Condition can be quite complex, built from an arbitrary 
nesting of non-Boolean functions and attributes. 
 
2.10.3 Attributes, Attribute Values, and Functions 
 
The currency that XACML (OASIS 2003) deals in is attributes. Attributes are 
named values of known types that may include an issuer identifier or an issue 
date  and  time.  Specifically,  attributes  are  characteristics  of  the  Subject, 
Resource, Action, or Environment in which the access request is made. A 
user's name, their security clearance, the file they want to access, and the 
time of day are all attribute values. When a request is sent from a PEP to a 
PDP, that request is formed almost exclusively of attributes, and they will be 
compared to attribute values in a policy to make the access decisions. 
 
A  Policy  gets  attribute  values  from  a  request  or  from  some  other  source 
through two mechanisms: the Attribute Designator and the Attribute Selector. 
An Attribute Designator lets the policy specify an attribute with a given name 
and type, and optionally an issuer as well, and then the PDP will look for that 
value in the request, or elsewhere if no matching values can be found in the 
request. There are four kinds of designators, one for each of the types of 
attributes in a request: Subject, Resource, Action, and Environment. Because 
Subject attributes can be broken into different categories, Subject Attribute 
Designators can also specify a category to look in. Attribute Selectors allow a 
policy to look for attribute values through an XPath query. A data type and an 
XPath expression are provided, and these can be used to resolve some set of 
values either in the request document or elsewhere. 
 
Both the Attribute Designator and the Attribute Selector can return multiple 
values (since there might be multiple matches in a request or elsewhere), so 
XACML provides a special attribute type called a Bag. Bags are unordered 
collections  that  allow  duplicates,  and  are  always  what  designators  and 
selectors return, even if only one value was matched. In the case that no 91 
 
matches  were  made,  an  empty  bag  is  returned,  although  a  designator  or 
selector may set a flag that causes an error instead in this case. 
 
Once  some  Bag  of  attribute  values  has  been  retrieved,  they  need  to  be 
compared in some way to expected values to make access decisions. This is 
done  through  a  powerful  system  of  functions.  Functions  can  work  on  any 
combination  of  attribute  values,  and  can  return  any  kind  of  attribute  value 
supported  in  the  system.  Functions  can  also  be  nested,  so  you  can  have 
functions that operate on the output of other functions, and this hierarchy can 
be arbitrarily complex. Custom functions can be written to provide an even 
richer language for expressing access conditions. 
 
One thing to note when building these hierarchies of functions is that most 
functions  are  defined  as  working  on  specific  data  types  (like  strings  or 
integers) while designators and selectors always return Bags of values. To 
handle  this,  XACML  defines  a  collection  of  standard  functions  of  the  form 
[type]-one-and-only, which accept a bag of values of the specified type and 
return the single value if there is exactly one item in the bag, or an error if 
there are zero or multiple values in the bag. This is one of the most common 
functions that one will see in a Condition. Type-one-and-only functions are not 
needed  in  Targets,  however,  since  the  PDP  automatically  applies  the 
matching function to each element of a Bag. 
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There was an attempt to join the RBAC with XACML as in (Crampton, 2003) 
and (Crampton, 2004). The aims were to: 
 
• Obtain a closer correspondence between XACML policies and the RBAC 
model 
• Provide a more natural way of deﬁning: 
– Role hierarchies 
– Permissions 
Figure 19:  An example to show how the XACML represents a policy that states: 
Physician can see any medical record (OASIS 2003). 93 
 
– Permission-role assignment 
• Support the idea of complex permissions 
 
But the main problem was that there is no mechanism for associating subjects 
with  roles  and  it  was  designed  for  centralised  systems  with  a  known  user 
population and is hardly suitable for web services. 
 
2.10.4 Drawbacks of XACML 
 
1) Readability of target elements 
 
In XACML targets, normally, it is possible to have several matches on a target 
element (subject, resource and action). One problematic issue with targets is 
that  they  are  hard  to  read  because  there  is  no  explicit  indication  about 
whether  the  multiple  matching  specifications  are  linked  via  conjunction  or 
disjunction operators. 
 
The second issue with XACML targets is the limitation in expressive power 
due to the fact that subjects, resources and actions are related implicitly by a 
conjunction operator. This prevents writing logical expressions where various 
combinations of subjects, resources and actions could be specified in a single 
policy or rule. For example two different resources r1 and r2 that would be 
associated respectively with action a1 for r1 and a2 for r2 would require two 
separate policies or rules to be specified using an ordinary XACML target. If, 
on the other hand, the target could be written using a single logical expression 
mixing subjects, resources and actions using disjunction operators, it would 
require only one policy. 
 
2) Disadvantages of the rule target/condition conjunctive Model  
 
A  third  issue  with  XACML  targets  is  similar  to  the  second  but  with  the 
additional problem of a rule target’s relation with the rule’s condition part. The 94 
 
condition part applies to the entire target either at the rule, policy or policy set 
level  and thus  here again  multiple policies or  rules must  be  specified  with 
individual  combinations  of  conditions  for  the  target  elements.  This  has  the 
immediate  result  of  forcing  the  administrator  to  write  separate  policies  for 
each combination of targets and conditions, while the same could have been 
represented in a single rule or policy if the logic of target elements could be 
related to the condition using a single logical expression.  
 
Thus, in order to alleviate the above problems, it is strongly recommended to 
use single logical expressions that allow the combination of target elements 
and conditions. It will be shown that this has the direct result of reducing the 
number  of  policies  or  rules,  thus  making  the  administration  of  policies 
considerably easier. 
 
In the XACML RBAC profile, role inheritance is represented using the Policy 
SetIdReference and PolicyIdReference language elements. While inheritance 
is  an  important  reusability  technique,  it  has  the  undesirable  side  effect  of 
dispersing information. This dispersal is by definition unavoidable. There is a 
need for a XACML rule inheritance mechanism as XACML rules currently do 
not have such an inheritance mechanism, even in version 3.0. 
 
Decentralised access control, for example, requires sophisticated techniques 
for conflict detection and for managing rules across multiple applications with 
different rule formats. XACML is an OASIS standard whose interoperability 
qualities help in solving the latter problem. XACML has its own limitations, 
however. In particular, although it has the expressive power to specify very 
complex conditions like those needed in the ABAC (Attribute Based Access 
Control)  model,  users  tend  to  avoid  using  its  full  power  because  of  its 
verbosity. 
 
 
 95 
 
2.10.5 Discussion 
 
In  general  XACML  provides  promising  method  to  preserve  privacy  while 
taking  care  of  the  context  (but  the  context  sensitivity  in  this  method  is 
scattered through the system with a set of complicated rules). Therefore the 
main disadvantages of XACML can be outlined as its being complex and hard 
to understand (policies and rules) (OASIS, 2003). 
 
When  targeting  a  complex  system  such  as  large  hospitals  and  healthcare 
institutions,  the  design  and  application  of  XACML  systems  becomes  even 
more difficult.  Taking care of all these targets and attributes (in XML format) 
in an ocean of information flow would be confusing. Therefore, the XACML in 
its original situation and without real developments and enhancement would 
not be a complete solution to the problem in hand.    
 
The  usage  of  semantics  in  XACML  has  paved  the  way  for  us  to  include 
semantics in our solution. In a way, that does not repeat the same errors and 
problems  that  are  in  XACML.  For  example,  the  purpose  of  accessing  the 
database and the action that would be performed can be combined in one 
goal,  in  order  to  make  use  of  the  principles  found  in  the  chain  method to 
access  the  database,  can  be  controlled  with  semantics  as  in  XACML.  But 
even the semantics that will be used, it would be based on durable personal 
information ontology and not scattered throughout the system as in the case 
of XACML. That’s why it is important to have a closer look at on the semantics 
in the next section. 
 
2.11 Ontology and Semantics 
 
The  history  of  artificial  intelligence  shows  that  knowledge  is  critical  for 
intelligent systems. In many cases, better knowledge can be more important 96 
 
for solving a task than better algorithms. To have truly intelligent systems, 
knowledge  needs  to  be  captured,  processed,  reused,  and  communicated. 
Ontologies support all these tasks (Obitko, 2007). 
 
The development of ontologies - explicit formal specifications of the terms in 
the domain and relations among them (Gruber, 1993) - has been moving from 
the  realm  of  Artificial  Intelligence  laboratories  to  the  desktops  of  domain 
experts. Ontologies are starting to become common on the World-Wide Web. 
The  WWW  Consortium  (W3C)  is  building  up  the  Resource  Description 
Framework, a language for encoding knowledge on Web pages to make it 
understandable  to  electronic  agents  searching  for  information.    Many 
disciplines now develop standardised ontologies that domain experts can use 
to share and annotate information in their fields. Medicine, for example, has 
produced  large,  standardised,  structured  vocabularies  such  as 
SNOMED (Price  and  Spackman,  2000) and  the  semantic  network  of  the 
Unified  Medical  Language  System (Humphreys  and  Lindberg,  1993). 
Nevertheless,  none  of  these  medical  ontologies  describe  the  process  of 
medical care. At this a point that the researcher has stopped at and started 
from  to  develop  a  complete  Medical  care  ontology  that  contains  all  the 
medical processes in addition to the medical personal information.  
“Ontology” in general, defines a common vocabulary for people who need to 
share information in a domain. It includes machine-interpretable definitions of 
basic concepts in the domain and relations among them. The term "ontology" 
can be defined as an explicit specification of conceptualisation. Ontologies 
capture the structure of the domain, i.e. conceptualisation. This includes the 
model  of  the  domain  with  possible  restrictions.  The  conceptualisation 
describes  knowledge  about  the  domain,  not  about  the  particular  state  of 
affairs in the domain. In other words, the conceptualisation is not changing, or 
changes  very  rarely.  The  Ontology  is  then  the  specification  of  this 
conceptualisation - which is specified by using a particular modelling language 97 
 
and particular terms. Formal specification is required in order to be able to 
process ontologies and operate on ontologies automatically. 
The Artificial Intelligence literature contains many definitions of an ontology; 
many of these contradict one another. For the purposes of this dissertation 
an ontology is  a  formal  explicit  description  of  concepts  in  a  domain  of 
discourse (classes, sometimes called concepts), properties of each concept 
describing various features and attributes of the concept (slots, sometimes 
called roles or properties),  and  restrictions  on  slots  (facets,  sometimes 
called role  restrictions).  An  ontology  together  with  a  set  of 
individual instances of  classes  constitutes  a knowledge  base.  In  reality, 
there is a fine line where the ontology ends and the knowledge base begins 
(Natalya et al., 2003).  
 
Some of the reasons to investigate and develop ontologies are: 
•  To  share  common  understanding  of  the  structure  of  information 
among people or software agents; 
•  To enable reuse of domain knowledge; 
•  To make domain assumptions explicit; 
•  To separate domain knowledge from the operational knowledge; 
•   To analyse domain knowledge. 
 
An  Ontology  describes  a  domain,  while  a  knowledge  base  (based  on  an 
ontology)  describes  a  particular  state  of  affairs.  Each  knowledge  based 
system  or  agent  has  its  own  knowledge  base,  and  only  what  can  be 
expressed using an ontology can be stored and used in the knowledge base. 
When  an  agent  wants  to  communicate  to  another  agent,  he  uses  the 
constructs  from  some  ontology.  In  order  to  understand  in  communication, 
ontologies must be shared between agents (Obitko, 2007). 
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2.11.1 Specifications of Conceptualisations 
 
The  second  definition  of  ontology  given  above,  "explicit  specification  of 
conceptualisation",  comes  from  Thomas  Gruber  (Gruber,  1993).  The  exact 
meaning  depends  on  the  understanding  of  the  terms  "specification"  and 
"conceptualisation". Explicit specification of conceptualisation means that the 
ontology  is  a  description  (like  a  formal  specification  of  a  program)  of  the 
concepts  and  relationships  that  can  exist  for  an  agent  or  a  community  of 
agents.  This  definition  is  consistent  with  the  usage  of  ontology  as  set  of 
concept definitions, but is more general. 
 
A conceptualisation can be defined as an intentional semantic structure that 
encodes implicit knowledge constraining the structure of a piece of a domain. 
An  ontology  is  a  (partial)  specification  of  this  structure,  i.e.,  it  is  usually  a 
logical  theory  that  expresses  the  conceptualisation  explicitly  in  some 
language. A conceptualisation is language independent, while an ontology is 
language dependent. Notice that an ontology does not have to express all the 
possible constraints - the level of detail in conceptualisation depends on the 
requirements of the intended application and expressing conceptualisation in 
an ontology in addition depends on the used ontology language. 
 
In this sense, an ontology is important for the purpose of enabling knowledge 
sharing  and  reuse.  An  ontology  is  in  this  context  a  specification  used  for 
making ontological commitments. Practically, an ontological commitment is an 
agreement to use a vocabulary (i.e., ask queries and make assertions) in a 
way that is consistent (but not complete) with respect to the theory specified 
by  an  ontology.  Agents  then  commit  to  ontologies  and  ontologies  are 
designed so that the knowledge can be shared among these agents. 
 
The representation of a body of knowledge (knowledge base) is based on the 
specification  of  conceptualisation.  A  conceptualisation  is  an  abstract, 
simplified view of the world that should be represented for some purpose. For 99 
 
knowledge-based systems, what "exists" is what can be represented. When 
the knowledge of a domain is represented in a declarative formalism, the set 
of objects that can be represented is called the universe of discourse. This set 
of objects and the describable relationships among them are reflected in the 
representational  vocabulary  with  which  a  knowledge-based  program 
represents knowledge. Thus, in the context of AI, the ontology of a program 
can  be  described  by  defining  a  set  of  representational  terms.  In  such  an 
ontology,  definitions  associate  the  names  of  entities  in  the  universe  of 
discourse (e.g. classes, relations, functions, or other objects) with descriptions 
of what the names mean, and formal axioms that constrain the interpretation 
and well-formed use of these terms. Formally it can be said that an ontology is 
a statement of a logical theory. 
 
The  backbone  of  an  ontology  is  often  a  taxonomy.  A  taxonomy  is  a 
classification of things in a hierarchical form. It is usually a tree or a lattice that 
express  the  subsumption  relation,  where,  A  subsumes  B  means  that 
everything  that  is  in  A  is  also  in  B.  An  example  is  classification  of  living 
organisms. The taxonomy usually restricts the intended usage of classes - 
where classes are subsets of the set of all possible individuals in the domain. 
A taxonomy of properties can be defined as well. 
 
However, ontologies need not be limited to taxonomic hierarchies of classes 
and need not be limited to definitions that only introduce terminology and do 
not  add  any  knowledge  about  the  world.  To  specify  a  conceptualisation, 
axioms that constrain the possible interpretations for the defined terms may 
be also needed. Pragmatically, an ontology defines the vocabulary with which 
queries  and  assertions  are  exchanged  among  agents.  The  ontological 
commitment is then a guarantee of consistency for communications. 
 
 
 
 100 
 
2.11.2 Semantics and semantic models 
 
Semantics definition as appeared in (Richmond and Thomason 1996) is the 
study of the meaning of linguistic expressions. The language can be a natural 
language, such as English or Navajo, or an artificial language, like a computer 
programming language. Meaning in natural languages is mainly studied by 
linguists.  In  fact,  semantics  is  one  of  the  main  branches  of  contemporary 
linguistics. Theoretical computer scientists and logicians think about artificial 
languages. In some areas of computer science, these divisions are crossed. 
In machine translation, for instance, computer scientists may want to relate 
natural language texts to abstract representations of their meanings; to do 
this, they have to design artificial languages for representing meanings. 
 
Semantic network (also called concept network) is a graph, where vertices 
represent concepts and where edges represent relations between concepts. 
Semantic network at the level of ontology expresses vocabulary that is helpful 
especially for human, but that still can be usable for machine processing. The 
relations between concepts that are used in semantic networks are as follows: 
 
Synonym - concept A expresses the same thing as concept B 
Antonym - concept A expresses the opposite of concept B 
Meronym, holonym - part-of and has-part relation between concepts 
Hyponym, hypernym - inclusion of semantic range between concepts in both 
directions 
 
The complexity of communication in information technology is characteristic 
for more than the last ten years. A number of technical solutions have been 
provided  as  technical  standards  to  improve  the  communication  facilities 
especially between processes. However, standards as SQL, CORBA, DCOM 
define a common syntax, only. There is no way to support semantic standards 
based on standard terminology. 
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This  section  gives  a  short  introduction  to  the  context  sensitivity  models, 
introduction to semantic model, the meaning of semantic interfaces and finally 
several reasons for the urgent need of semantic interfaces are shown.  
 
According  to  (Doumen  et  al.,  2005),  context  sensitivity  is  needed  for  the 
following reasons: 
 
• Current security static and intrusive 
Something you have such as (username) and (password) and there 
are numerous usernames / passwords but sometimes Identity is not 
relevant and it would be hard to audit it. 
 
• Increasing use of context information 
In  multilevel  authentication  systems  such  as  healthcare,  the  context 
plays a vital role in giving authentication rights. 
 
• Use of context to enhance / replace existing security 
Context is used to make it more flexible and less intrusive. 
 
2.11.3 Context-based security model 
 
The Context-based security model emerged recently as a new approach to 
cope with the new types of security problems introduced by the high mobility 
of pervasive systems and the heterogeneity of devices used in these types of 
environments. A Context- based security model treats context as a first-class 
principle both in the specification and enforcement of policies.  It models and 
represents the contexts in which agents operate and to which policies are 
associated, defines what actions are permitted or forbidden on resources in 
specific contexts, defines the actions that must be performed on resources in 
specific contexts, and dynamically associates agents with contexts.   
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In the context based security model, contextual graphs help specifying context 
-based  security  policies  in  a  pervasive  environment  and  are  used  as  a 
management tool that eases security administration for complex environments 
with many heterogeneous services and devices. The exploitation of context as 
a mechanism for grouping applicable policies (not as a limit to the applicability 
of  already  retrieved  policies  as  in  traditional  access  control  solutions) 
simplifies access control management by increasing policy specification reuse 
and by simplifying policy update and revocation. It also includes fine-grained 
control,  policy  specifications,  and  policy  enforcement  characteristics. 
However, this model is relatively new and requires further testing within the 
collaborative systems domain. 
 
When the authorised user enters a certain security context, the context will be 
associated  with  the  corresponding  action  automatically.  The  obligated  user 
cannot  access  the  security  context.  Here  context  can  be  any  useful 
information about the world, such as the user location, the characteristics of 
the underlying device, relationship with other users and many others.  
 
2.11.4 Semantic model 
 
A semantic  data  model in software  engineering has  various  meanings 
(NIST, 2012): 
1.  It is a conceptual data model in which semantic information is included. 
This  means  that  the  model  describes  the  meaning  of  its  instances. 
Such  a  semantic data  model is  an  abstraction  that  defines  how  the 
stored symbols (the instance data) relate to the real world (Computer 
Systems  Laboratory  of  the  National  Institute  of  Standards  and 
Technology (NIST, 2012). 
2.  It  is  a conceptual  data  model that  includes  the  capability  to  express 
information  that  enables  parties  to  the  information  exchange  to 
interpret meaning (semantics) from the instances, without the need to 
know  the  meta-model.  Such  semantic  models  are  fact  oriented  (as 103 
 
opposed to object oriented). Facts are typically expressed by binary 
relations  between data elements,  whereas  higher  order  relations  are 
expressed as collections of binary relations. Typically binary relations 
have the form of triples: Object-RelationType-Object. For example: the 
Eiffel Tower <is located in> Paris. 
 
Typically, the instance data of semantic data models explicitly includes the 
kinds of relationships between the various data elements, such as <is located 
in>. To interpret the meaning of the facts from the instances it is required that 
the  meaning  of  the  kinds  of  relations  (relation  types)  is  known.  Therefore, 
semantic data models typically standardise such relation types. This means 
that the second kind of semantic data model enables the instances to express 
facts that include their own meaning. The second kind of semantic data model 
is usually meant to create semantic databases. The ability to include meaning 
in  semantic  databases  facilitates  building distributed  databases that  enable 
applications  to  interpret  the  meaning  from  the  content.  This  implies  that 
semantic databases can be integrated when they use the same (standard) 
relation types. This also implies that in general they have a wider applicability 
than relational or object oriented databases. 
 
2.11.5 The Need for Semantic Interface 
 
Communication  involves  always  an  interface,  an  agreement  that  allows 
exchanging  information  between  objects.  Only  persons  and  processes  are 
considered as communicating objects, nevertheless there exist many other 
communicating objects such as exchanging information between two agents 
(e.g.  hospital  and  insurance  company).  With  this  restriction  one  can  vary 
between three types of communication: 
 
•  "Person to Person"  
•  "Person to Process"  
•  "Process to Process" communication. 104 
 
 
“Person  to  Person”  communication  has  been  highly  standardised  during 
human’s history by means of natural language. There are about a hundred 
local standards (languages) for local communications. During the last century 
English became more and more an international standard.  
 
In contrast to natural language there is no general agreement on semantics in 
process  languages.  Programmers  choose  names  for  program  variables  or 
database attributes according to their taste. When reading an SQL statement 
or a C-program it is in general not possible to interpret the meaning of the 
syntax because of using very specific technical names (terms). This causes 
difficulties  not  only  in  “Person  to  Process”  communication,  but  also  in 
“Process to Process” communication.  
 
So in short, a semantic interface is “an agreement on terms and meaning, a 
language within a group of communicating objects. In this case the language 
is not only defined by its syntax but also by its semantic. Without semantic 
interface communication is impossible”. 
 
The following are main features for semantic interfaces: 
 
•  A  semantic  interface  is  a  natural  way  to  handle  the  increasing 
complexity of information structures.  
 
•  Semantic  interfaces  are  one  step  to  “Person  to  Process” 
communication via natural language. 
 
•  Semantic interfaces used in “Process to Process” communication will 
increase the flexibility of standard software. Metadata driven standard 
software becomes universal and fits into any environment. 
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•  Metadata  driven  applications  and  standard  software  becomes 
(metadata)  database  independent.  Modern  technologies  as  object 
orientation (object-oriented databases) and standard interfaces (COM, 
CORBA, XML) are the technical background that makes it possible to 
build and to use semantic interfaces. 
 
2.11.6 Semantics applications 
 
Currently, describing the semantics of Web services is a very active research 
area.  DAML-S  (DAML-S,  2001)  (later  OWL-S)  is  a  comprehensive  effort 
defining  an  upper  ontology  for  Web  services.  Service  discovery  through 
DAML-based  languages  is  also  addressed  in  the  literature  (Denker  et  al., 
2003) and (Paolucci et al., 2001) where artificial intelligence techniques are 
used to discover services. In (Omelayenko et al., 2002), an RDF mapping 
meta-ontology, called RDF Translation (RDFT), is proposed which specifies a 
language for mapping XML DTDs to and from RDF Schemas for business 
integration tasks. 
 
The P2P paradigm is used to improve semantic interoperability, in particular in 
revealing new possibilities on how semantic agreements can be achieved. It is 
argued  that  establishing  local  agreements  is  a  less  challenging  task  than 
establishing  global  agreements  by  means  of  globally  agreed  schemas  or 
shared ontologies. Once such local agreements exist, through the semantic 
gossiping” process proposed, global agreements can be achieved in a P2P 
manner. 
   
There were also attempts to make use of semantics in the healthcare domain 
such as in (Dogac, 2006).  In that paper they tried to provide interoperability in 
the  healthcare  domain.  They  represent  healthcare  applications  as 
semantically enriched Web services and they stated that “only very recently 
semantics and Web services started to appear in the medical domain”. But 
they  did  not  investigate  a  comprehensive  of  completed  ontology  that 106 
 
describes the domain and services, as their aim was identifying the need for 
service functionality and service message ontologies to semantically annotate 
Web services. It can be seen that work on semantics in general and in the 
medical  domain  specific  still  progresses.  It  attracts  a  huge  number  of 
researchers to work on it because of its importance. Therefore it has been 
decided to make use of semantics and to integrate it in the work described in 
this thesis as will be presented in Chapter 6.  
 
2.12  Conclusion  and  Summary  of  Outstanding 
Problems with Traditional Methods 
 
On  the  way  to  solving  the  problem  of  the  personal  information  privacy 
violation  problem,  the  researcher  highlighted  in  this  chapter  the  most 
significant attempts to protect privacy in the literature. And from the discussion 
raised at the end of each method was seen that there is no perfect method in 
the  literature  that  preserves  privacy  while  keeping  simplicity,  reliability  and 
context  sensitivity.  The  outstanding  problems  found  in  the  different 
approaches could be summarised as follows: 
 
•  A  need  for  expert  programmers  that  could  implement  complex 
systems  such  as  of  those  of  the  Hippocratic  database  and  the 
RBAC  to take care of the inherent complexity in managing personal 
information and its legitimate access and use and the consequent 
risks of errors in setting up data access correctly; 
 
•  The second problem concerns the way Data access management 
approaches work in run-time as they need to be sensitive to the 
context  in  which  data  and  functionality  is  accessed  and  more 107 
 
dynamic  to  be  more  effective  and  precise  in  the  application  of 
permissions and restrictions. 
 
In the health care domain, physicians and practitioners are concerned about 
serious  threats  to  patient  privacy  due  to  information  gathering  methods, 
record accuracy and access, and unauthorised secondary use (Baume et al., 
2000).  
 
There  are  many  attempts  to  protect  privacy  in  the  literature.  A  research 
stream focuses on the development of machine readable privacy policies and 
mechanisms that assist end-users in understanding those policies. The most 
prominent privacy language is the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project 
(P3P)  (W3C  website,  2002).  P3P  is  a  W3C  standard,  which  enables 
organisations to express their privacy practices in a standard format, using an 
XML-based  policy  specification  language. Privacy  policies  can be  retrieved 
automatically and interpreted easily by policy-checking agents on the user’s 
behalf, such as Microsoft’s Internet Explorer or Privacy Bird of CMU. These 
agents check the website privacy policies against user preferences and carry 
out  the  compensation  actions  when  policies  are  in  conflict  with  user 
preferences.  A  main  limitation  of  P3P  is  the  lack  of  on  enforcement 
mechanism  that  guarantees  that  the  privacy  promises  made  by  the 
organisation are fulfilled.  
  
Protection of sensitive information is usually carried out by access control. 
Examples  of  access  control  models  are  RBAC  (Sandhu,  1998)  and  TBAC 
(Thomas  and  Sandhu,  1997).  The  Role-Based  Access  Control  (RBAC)  is 
proposed to address the limitations of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and 
Discretionary  Access  Control  (DAC).  In  particular,  RBAC  simplifies  the 
management of permissions by assigning privileges for operating on some 
resources  to  roles  instead  of  assigning  them  to  users  (Sandhu,  1998), 
(Ferraiolo and Kuhn, 1992). Users are then assigned to roles depending on 108 
 
their  current  position,  responsibility  and  job  requirements  within  the 
organisation.  However,  access  control  does  not  provide  the  necessary 
constructs to address privacy issues (Ashley et al., 2002). 
 
When explicitly addressing privacy protection, access control mechanisms are 
often augmented with the concept of purpose (Al-Fedaghi, 2007), (Ashley et 
al.,  2002),  (Byun  and  Li,  2008),  (W3C  web  site,  2003).  The  Hippocratic 
Database (HDB) (Agrawal et al., 2002) has been proposed as a system that 
enforces privacy policies by technical means. The idea underlying the HDB is 
based on the Hippocratic Oath which aims to protect patient privacy. A HDB 
stores  privacy  metadata  which  specify  privacy  policies  and  privacy 
authorisations. Privacy policies define the privacy practices of the organisation 
(e.g., which data are collected, their intended purpose, retention period, etc.). 
Privacy authorisations capture the access controls that support the privacy 
policies by specifying usage purposes and authorised users for each attribute 
in the database. These authorisations are determined by comparing privacy 
policies  against  user  preferences  during  data  collection.  During  query 
processing, the HDB checks whether data are requested for the legitimate 
purposes. If the purpose for which date are requested matches the intended 
purpose, then the requested data are returned. 
 
IBM developed the Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL) (W3C 
web site, 2003) to support organisations in keeping their privacy promises. 
EPAL provides enterprises with a way to formalise the exact privacy policy 
that  shall  be  enforced  within  the  enterprise.  An  EPAL  policy  consists  of  a 
vocabulary and a rule set. The vocabulary defines the scope of the policy. 
Rules are statements that specify which actions a user can or cannot perform 
on  a  certain  object  and  for  which  purpose. When  data  are  requested,  the 
privacy management enforcement monitors ensure that only data accesses 
complying with the privacy policy are allowed. 
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A similar framework, eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 
(OASIS, 2005), is proposed by OASIS. XACML is a structured language for 
expressing  access  control  policies  and  a  query-response  protocol  for  the 
access  of  requests  and  decisions.  To  address  privacy  concerns,  OASIS 
defines a profile of XACML for the specification of privacy policies (OASIS, 
2005). In particular, the XACML's Privacy Profile defines standard variables to 
represent the purpose for which data was collected and the purpose for which 
data is requested, and shows how to create a constraint that requires these to 
be consistent. The advantage of using XACML is that the developer does not 
need to worry about multiple protocols to implement a security solution. Using 
one set of markup tags enables the developer to control security for a Web 
application. However, the problem that the database administrator could face 
is that the XACML profile needs to specify five main components to handle 
access decisions: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), which is the interface of 
the  whole  environment  to  the  outside  world,  Policy  Administration  Point 
(PAP), which is the policy repository, Policy Decision Point (PDP), which is 
the component where access request are evaluated against policies, Policy 
Information Point (PIP), which is the point where the necessary attributes for 
the policy evaluation are retrieved, and a context handler. Handling those five 
components may require a deep knowledge of the information system and 
application domain before the database administrator can start his work. 
 
From  the  above  it  could  be  seen  that  the  available  methods  have  vital 
limitations. Thereby, there is a need for a new method that could overcome 
these problems.   
 
Several methods and access control models have been proposed to protect 
sensitive information (e.g., Agrawal et al., 2002; Ashley et al., 2002; Byun and 
Li,  2008;  Sandhu,  1998.  In  this  section  the  researcher  compares  those 
methods  and  models  with  the  chain  ontology-based  method,  especially,  in 
terms of policy specification and management, as shown in Table 2. 
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Purpose is widely recognised as a fundamental concept for the specification 
of privacy policies (Guarda et al., 2009). This has spurred several researchers 
to extend existing access control models by accommodating the concept of 
purpose  into  them.  However,  in  most  purpose-based  frameworks  like 
purpose-based access control, Hippocratic databases, EPAL, and the Privacy 
Profile  of  XACML,  there  is  no  logical  relation  between  a  purpose  and  the 
actions that are allowed for achieving that purpose. Consequently, one has to 
specify separately the actions that a user can perform on personal information 
and the purpose for which actions can be performed. Thereby, this approach 
can be error prone, leading to unauthorised access to personal information. 
 
 
                          
                         Table 2: Comparison between the different methods. 111 
 
 
 
In contrast, the Chain method is based on the idea that each purpose, i.e. 
conceptual task or function, can be translated into chains of acts on personal 
information (Al-Fedaghi, 2007).  The implicit assumption is that any piece of 
personal information does not need more than a limited number of acts to be 
dealt  with,  such  as  creating,  storing,  processing  and  disclosing.  The 
advantage of the Chain method is that when the policy administrator allows a 
user to perform a chain of acts, he defines at the same time the purpose and 
the actions that the user can perform. 
 
In addition, chains of actions can be used to design more lightweight  and 
durable databases that safeguard personal information privacy. For instance, 
they make it possible to replace the complex Hippocratic database design, 
which usually include a huge number of purposes with chains of limited acts. 
Our  experience  at  the  International  Clinic  in  Kuwait  indicates  that  the 
Hippocratic  database  design  is  complicated  even  for  expert  database 
administrators; this is what makes it difficult to apply Hippocratic database 
systems in real applications. A study that compares the application of RBAC 
and the Chain method to a real healthcare application in Kuwait is presented 
in (Omran et al., 2010a). This study shows that the number of tables (required 
to  apply  the  authentication  and  constraints  on  the  same  database)  using 
RBAC is larger than the number of tables used when the Chain method is in 
place. In particular, the number of administration tables was 4 using RBAC 
and 1 for the Chain method, the number of tables for doctors’ interface is 7 for 
RBAC  and  3  in  the  Chain  method,  the  number  of  tables  for  the  nurses’ 
interface was 4 for RBAC compared to 1 in the Chain method and number of 
conditions required for authorisation is 3 compared to 1in the Chain method.  
 
Additional advantages are obtained by complementing the Chain method with 
ontologies.  In particular, the use of ontologies makes it possible to give a 
precise semantics to the concepts characterising an application domain and 112 
 
therefore to connect permissions to personal information as well as to the 
particular context in which the permission should be granted. For instance, the 
time and place in which the access is requested can influence the access 
decision; in emergency situations a physician is allowed to access patient’s 
medical  records.  Although  the  context  is  necessary  to  specify  fine-grained 
policies which allow individuals more control on their personal data, it is not 
included in many frameworks like Hippocratic databases and purpose-based 
access control. 
 
Therefore, a need for a new method that overcomes the problems of previous 
systems and makes use of the advantage is needed. The new method should 
take care of the semantics as a vital component. Finding such a method is 
challenge described in the following chapters. 113 
 
Chapter 3 
Case  Study: 
International 
Clinic (IC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Background 
 
As a natural conclusion to the discussion in the previous chapters, a concrete 
case study is needed where one can investigate a sophisticated data access 
requirement in a reasonably complicated setting that reflects much of what is 
typical of modern healthcare, and thus a hospital is a good example. 114 
 
 
Here patients are seen to by a variety of departments and different types of 
staff where distinctions have to be made with respect to who can access what 
in what circumstance.    
 
Hundreds of patients come in and out every day and where one needs to 
arrange all their incoming and outgoing information while keeping it available 
and secure. 
 
Health  care organisations  must  address  a  growing  number  of  data 
management  regulations  and  corporate  governance  requirements.  If  highly 
sensitive  patient  information  is  breached  or  lost, the  organisation  faces 
serious legal and financial consequences.   
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this investigation the researcher has chosen to 
work  in  collaboration  with  one  of  the  most  successful  hospitals  and  large 
companies in Kuwait which is the “International Clinic” hospital. This hospital 
has  a  sufficiently  large  operation  of  all  the  standard  departments  and  the 
services  they  deliver  and  with  a  requisite  large  number  of  staff  including 
consultants, doctors, nurses and medical support staff as well as admin staff.   
 
3.1.1 Summary of International Clinic 
 
International Health Services (IHS), a Kuwaiti Closed Shareholding Company 
was founded on June 15th, 1992 with the aim of improving and adding value 
to the private health sector in Kuwait and the Gulf region.  Soon afterwards, 
International  Clinic  (IC),  a  western  oriented  private  health  care 
multidisciplinary  facility  was  inaugurated  as  the  first  subsidiary  of  IHS  to 
provide  high  quality  comprehensive  health  services  to  all  the  local  and 
expatriate population living in Kuwait. 
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Since  then,  IC  has  grown  and  flourished  into  a  healthcare  facility  of 
international standards offering a full range of health care services in almost 
all medical, surgical, paediatric and obstetrics/gynaecology specialities within 
the IC Premises. 
 
In March, 2005, IC opened its 24-hour, 7-day per week care centre with its 
separate male and female sections, each with beds and a private room for the 
individual care required.  The 24-hour Care Centre was opened to treat men, 
women,  and  children  who  require  a  medical  evaluation,  treatment,  and 
appropriate support services at any time of the day or night; and, if needed, 
the option to remain in a safe and comfortable setting for an extended period 
for care, under the close attention and observation provided by IC's team of 
doctors and nurses. 
 
Some departments in IC have the most sophisticated and latest technology 
equipment including the laser machines in their dermatology department and 
the latest, MultiSlice CT Scanner in our diagnostic imaging department. 
 
Their  Support  Services  include  highly  sophisticated  state-of-the-art  medical 
technology  found  in  such  departments  as  Diagnostic  Imaging,  Laboratory, 
Physiotherapy,  Plastic  Surgery  and  Dermatology  and  the  Pharmacy.   They 
also  offer  high  quality  Dental,  Periodontics,  Implantology,  and  Orthodontic 
service in their Dental Unit. 
 
Their  comprehensive  services  continue  to  touch  and  enrich  the  lives  of 
residents and visitors living in Kuwait. 
 
The collaboration with IC started when my local supervisor Dr Shereef Abu 
Almaati, the head of the science division in the American University in Kuwait, 
sent  me  there  to  meet  the  manager.  This  helped  in  obtaining  information 
about the processes in the system, how the IT department work and most 
important how the data access management system works there.  In the next 116 
 
sections the policy, the process, the services and the different departments of 
the hospital will be presented. 
 
3.2 Transformation to Electronic Health Records  
 
Moving from paper records to electronic health records (EHRs) has been a 
challenge  for  many  Kuwaiti  hospitals.  Implementation  of  this  innovative 
technology  will  assist  in  providing  better  patient  care  by  allowing  for  and 
providing more accurate and available patient information. The purposes of 
the collaboration with the IC  was to assess the status of implementation of 
EHRs  in  outstanding  sample  of  Kuwaiti  hospitals;  the  factors  that  are 
associated with EHR implementation; and have a closer look at the benefits 
of, barriers to, and risks of, EHR implementation. 
 
 The key factor driving electronic health record (EHR) implementation was to 
improve clinical processes or workflow efficiency. Lack of adequate funding 
and resources was the major barrier to EHR implementation in many hospitals 
in Kuwait. Often this was the reason for the delay in the transition from paper 
based to electronic based records.  
 
The reasons behind the transition to the EHR according to discussions with 
the manager and staff at the hospital can be summarised by the following 
points: 
 
-  EHR implementation will improve patient care by having better linkage 
to all caregivers, and reducing the need for file space, supplies, and 
workers for retrieval and filing of medical records; 
-  Improving  workflow  would  be  the  major  benefit  of  implementing  the 
system; 
-  Reducing medical errors; 
-  Reducing cost and treatment time. 117 
 
-  Increasing revenue   
 
The  barriers  to  Implementing  EHRs  and  the  reason  behind  the  slow 
transformation to the electronic records can be summarised into: 
 
•  Lack of adequate funding and resources.  
•  Lack of knowledge of database administrators to build reliable 
EHRs.  
•  Lack  of  support  from  medical  staff  and  the  need  for  training 
courses for the new system.  
•  Implementation  and  interpretation  of  rules  to  preserve  health 
information privacy such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability  Act  (The  Health  Insurance  Portability  and 
Accountability Act of 1996, 1996). 
The insistence of the administration there to build their own HER system has 
advanced  the  process  effectively.  To  this  end,  they  hired  expert  staff, 
especially  the  database  administrator  who  has  more  than  20  years’ 
experience in implementing such systems especially for hospitals. In addition, 
effective training was given to the staff at the hospital on the new investigated 
system.  The  system  was  designed  to  comply  with  all  the  hospital  policies 
some of which are listed below:  
 
•  All patients have the right to receive considerate and appropriate 
medical care for their problem without regard to considerations 
such  as  race,  colour,  religion,  national  origin,  disability  or  the 
source of payment for their care. 
 
•  All patients have the right to know the name and professional 
status  of  the  physician  who  is  responsible  for  their  care. 
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•  All patients have the right to obtain from their physicians current 
and  understandable  information  about  their  clinical  condition, 
treatment  choices  and  potential  benefits,  risks  and  expected 
outcomes. 
 
•  All patients have the right to make informed choices about their 
health care. They have the right to receive information from their 
physicians that is necessary to give informed consent prior to 
the  start  of  a  medical  procedure  and/or  treatment.  They  may 
accept or refuse treatment for any or all of the care offered. 
 
•  All patients have the right to personal privacy, safety, security 
and confidentiality. 
 
•  All  patients  have  the  right  to  have  private  and  confidential 
medical records except as otherwise provided by law or upon 
the patient's written authorisation. 
 
•  All patients have the right to be treated respectfully by others 
and  to  be  addressed  by  their  proper  names  without  undue 
familiarity,  to  be  listened  to  when  they  have  a  question,  and 
receive an appropriate response. 
 
•  All patients have the right to receive courteous attention from all 
personnel when they request help, with the understanding that 
other patients may have similar or more urgent needs. 
 
•  All patients have the right to communicate with any person or 
persons of their choice, including but not limited to physicians, 
administrators, nurses at any reasonable hour. 
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•  All  patients  have  the  right  to  know  about  the  policies  and 
procedures related to patient care. 
 
•  Patients  are  responsible  to  follow  instructions  and 
recommendations provided by their physicians. 
 
•  Patients  are  expected  to  provide  complete  and  accurate 
information about their medical history. 
 
•  Patients are expected to treat staff members and other patients 
with respect and consideration. 
 
•  Patients  are  expected  to  be  fully  responsible  for  the 
consequence of refusing treatment. 
 
•  Patients are expected to fulfil the financial obligations ensuing 
from their medical treatment. 
 
As can be seen from the policies above, this is an attempt to balance the 
rights of the patients and the rights of the hospital, and it tries to manage the 
relationship  between  them.  The  policies  above  must  to  be  taken  into 
consideration when managing the data access system.  
   
3.3 Process and services in the IC 
 
This section introduces a typical scenario for healthcare provision in a hospital 
environment.  Healthcare  provision  demonstrates  a  considerable  amount  of 
complexity in terms of processes and actors for providing medical treatments 
to patients. To execute the treatment plan, patient medical information needs 
to be accessed and shared by a number of professionals: physicians examine 
patients  and  can  consult  colleagues  for  a  second  opinion,  nurses  treat 120 
 
patients according to the diagnosis made by physicians; pharmacists have to 
provide the medicines prescribed by physicians, etc.  
 
Our scenario describes the activities carried out by a hospital in Kuwait, the 
International Clinic (IC). According to this analysis in the IC and discussions 
with its staff, the researcher has produced the list of scenarios as shown in 
Figure 20; the complete list is presented in Table 1. 
 
 
- Patient registration: When a patient visits the hospital for the first time, he 
needs to open a file at the reception desk. In order to register the patient with 
hospital, the receptionist asks him to provide his civil ID number and fill in a 
form  with  his  personal  information.  In  addition,  other  information  may  be 
required. For instance, if the patient has a health insurance, he has to present 
a valid insurance card upon registration; if he is an employee of a company 
that  has  credit  billing  facility  with  hospital,  he  is  requested  to  show  his 
company  ID  card  and/or  a  referral  letter  from  his  company.  When  the 
necessary documentation has been presented, the receptionist creates a file 
for the patient in the hospital database system. Information about the patient 
Figure 20:  Healthcare provision in the International Clinic. 121 
 
(e.g.,  name,  age,  gender,  disabilities,  civil  ID  number,  phone  number  and 
address) is entered into his file. 
 
-  Appointment  booking:  a  patient  can  request  an  appointment  by  phone 
and/or  in  person.  Appointments  scheduled  the  same  day  and  walk-in 
appointments are accommodated at the earliest possible time depending on 
the physician's schedule. The receptionist checks the visit schedule of doctors 
for free time slots. If a slot is available, the receptionist arranges the visit and 
enters the patient’s name and ID number as well as the time slot into the 
doctor’s schedule. The receptionist should not assign the same time slot of 
the same physician to two different patients. Therefore, the system should be 
designed  in  a  way  to  simplify  the  booking  process  for  the  receptionist. 
Moreover, the system should retrieve the needed information for the booking 
(e.g., the name of the available physicians for a specific time slot) in a very 
short  time  so  that  patients  do  not  need  to  wait  for  a  long  time  at  the 
receptionist’s desk or on the phone. 
 
Figure 21:  Esraa Omran (myself) looking at the paper 
based records at the IC. 122 
 
- Doctor’s visit: during the patient referral, the physician needs to review the 
notes he (or another physician) has made on the patient’s health condition. 
He  also  needs  to  write  his  new  notes  as  well  as  prescriptions  for  certain 
dosages of medicines. In addition, he may need to order X-Ray images and 
analyse images sent by the laboratory. He can also access information from 
the  registration  file  or  from  the  nursing  database  (e.g.,  temperature  and 
weight, etc.).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Nursing notes: Nurses should make information about patients available to 
the  doctor  in  charge  of  providing  medical  care.  In  addition,  nurses  should 
access  doctors’  notes  to  gather  information  about  a  specific  dosage  of 
injections or drips. However, nurses should not be able to access the whole 
medical record and doctor’s notes. They only need access to the part that is 
related to their job.   
Figure 23:  Some Nurses from the IC. 
Figure 22:  Some Doctors from the IC. 123 
 
 
- Laboratory reports: Physicians can ask for specific laboratory tests from 
the laboratory using specific forms. The lab returns the results (e.g., blood 
test, radiology). Only the physician and the lab specialist have the right to 
access the lab report. Those images usually require a higher storing capacity; 
therefore, the greater the storing capacity is for the system, the better the 
retrieving and transferring of these images will be.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
 
-Pharmacy: Physicians can write a prescription for the patient that specifies a 
dosage of a certain medicine from the pharmacy. The patient then goes to 
collect his medicine from the pharmacy. The pharmacist’s information system 
should retrieve the information correctly without confusing the dosage or the 
name of the medicine or the patient.  
 
-Insurance  Coverage:  If  the  patient  has  insurance,  he  should  present  his 
valid  insurance  card  to  the  receptionists  and  sign  a  medical  insurance 
payment declaration form. After the visit, he should sign a claim form and an 
invoice. Then the invoice with a special report is sent by the hospital to the 
insurance  company.  However,  the  disclosure  of  sensitive  information  (e.g., 
 
Figure 24:  Radiology lab in the IC. 124 
 
patient’s health condition) to the insurance company could harm the patient’s 
interest as the insurance company can take advantage of such information.  
 
In order for the IC to provide excellent services, the IC has a reputable set of 
departments in a variety of specialisations such as:  
 
•  General Practitioner 
•  Cardiology 
•  Dermatology 
•  General Surgery 
•  Internal Medicine 
•  Obstetrics & Gynaecology 
•  Ophthalmology 
•  ENT 
•  Orthopaedics 
•  Paediatrics 
•  Paediatric surgery 
•  Plastic surgery 
•  Dental 
 
A. General Practitioner Clinic 
 
General Practitioners provide comprehensive primary healthcare services to 
patients of all ages.  They provide high quality medical services to many acute 
and  chronic  medical  conditions,  and  when  needed,  they  refer  you  to  the 
appropriate consultant.  
 
B. Cardiology department 
 
The Cardiology Clinic provides state of the art technology and compassionate 
care to patients with cardiovascular diseases. 
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C. Dermatology 
 
The Dermatology Clinic at IC offers a full range of dermatological care for both 
common and rare problems of skin, hair, nails and mucous membranes. 
 
D. Surgery department 
 
Highly  skilled  surgeons  address  a  large  range  of  conditions  that  require 
surgical interventions. They provide comprehensive and conservative services 
to patients as needed and appropriate. 
 
E.  Internal Medicine 
 
The  Clinic  provides  diagnostic  and  therapeutic  services  for  patients  with 
medical  disorders  including  major  systems  like  cardiovascular,  respiratory, 
and gastroenterology.  In addition, this is the only haematology clinic in the 
private section in Kuwait that deals with blood disorders. 
 
F. Obstetrics & Gynaecology 
 
This clinic offers confidential counselling for and treatment of a broad range of 
important  women's  health  issues  and  deals  with  the  welfare  of  women  of 
different age groups with special emphasis at the two ends of the spectrum: 
Adolescence and Menopause. 
 
G. Ophthalmology 
 
The IC ophthalmology Clinic deals with all problems of the eyes with special 
services  for  glaucoma,  cataract,  retinal  eye  problems  and  paediatric 
ophthalmology. The clinic is well equipped with retinal camera, perimeter and 
retinal laser Scanners. 
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H.  E.N.T 
 
The Otorhinolaryngology Clinic in the IC is a highly advanced well equipped 
unit for the management of diseases of the ear, nose and throat for adults and 
children. Surgical operations are done by our consultants in the clinic or in the 
hospitals using the latest techniques available such as lasers, radio waves 
and endoscopes. 
 
I. Orthopaedics 
 
Orthopaedics is a discipline concerned with preventing or correcting disorders 
of the body’s basic framework, including the bones, joints, and muscles. An 
orthopaedic surgeon is a physician with many years training in the physical, 
medical,  or  surgical  treatment  and/or  rehabilitation  of  the  body’s  intricate 
mechanical  system.  Our  Orthopaedic  physicians  may  also  have  additional 
training in subspecialties such as sports medicine, joint replacement, knee, 
ankle,  or  shoulder  reconstruction,  foot  problems  and  scoliosis  or  other 
disorders of the spine. 
 
J. Physical Therapy & Rehabilitation service 
 
IC provide services that help restore function, improve mobility, relieve pain, 
and prevent or limit permanent physical disabilities of patients suffering from 
injuries or disease. They restore, maintain, and promote overall fitness and 
health. Their patients include accident victims and individuals with disabling 
conditions  such  as  low-back  pain,  arthritis,  fractures,  and  sports  injuries. 
Physical  therapists  also  use  electrical  stimulation,  hot  packs  or  cold 
compresses, and ultrasound to relieve pain and reduce swelling. They may 
use traction or deep-tissue massage to relieve pain. Therapists also teach 
patients exercises to do at home to expedite their recovery. 
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K. Paediatrics 
The  IC  Paediatricians  provide  comprehensive  care  for  a  wide  range  of 
childhood illnesses and injuries with an emphasis on health promotion and 
disease prevention. They play an important role in enhancing the physical, 
mental, and emotional growth and development of new-born babies as well as 
adolescents. 
 
L. Paediatric Surgery 
 
The  IC  skilled  paediatric  surgeons  perform  a  broad  range  of  surgical 
procedures and services and they address a large scope of conditions that 
require surgical interventions. They provide comprehensive and conservative 
services  to  patients  as  needed  and  appropriate.  The  Paediatric  Surgery  & 
Laparoscopy Clinic provides surgical treatment for patient between 0 and 14 
years of age. 
 
M. Plastic Surgery 
 
The  IC  surgeons  perform  a  wide  range  of  procedures  encompassing  both 
Cosmetic and Reconstructive Surgery. The goal is to help the patients to look 
and feel better by utilising the most advanced plastic surgery techniques and 
providing them with their utmost personal care and attention. 
 
N.  Dental Clinic 
 
The dental clinic deals with a wide variety of dental services covering general 
dentistry, oral surgery, dental implantology and conservative dentistry. 
 
The IC provides all the above services to reach its vision which is to be the 
private healthcare facility recognised for setting the standards for excellence 
and responsiveness in the Gulf region. They aim at being desired and chosen 
by the masses for the provision of high quality healthcare services due to the 128 
 
hospital excellent service, modern facility and latest technology  equipment, 
skilled and compassionate staff and very friendly home environment. 
 
ICs unswerving mission entails provision of the highest quality comprehensive 
healthcare services in a caring, friendly, efficient and cost effective manner 
that represents value to their patients, while at the same time sustaining their 
needs and expectations for the wellbeing of the community. 
 
The IC wants to reach their mission while keeping their values which is the 
commitment  to  maintaining  the  highest  healthcare  standards  and  levels  of 
patient care. They value each patient and their right to receive professional, 
efficient, ethical, and quality service from all IC employees. They also value 
each person's (patient or visitor) time and need to be evaluated and treated in 
a  safe,  clean,  well-equipped,  and  well-managed  setting  where  patient 
satisfaction matters and continuous improvement is recognised as a priority. 
 
The IC is committed to establishing goals and objectives that are consistent 
with the needs and expectations of consumers while keeping pace with the 
growing  trends  in  healthcare  technology  and  improvement.  The  IC  is  a 
dynamic organisation continuously striving to be the best at what they do and 
how they meet their customer and his family's healthcare needs. To that end, 
IC values the importance of remaining accessible at all times, amicable and 
professional, and able to provide the best of what the customer needs to live a 
safe and healthy life. 
 
In  order  to  handle  these  processes,  the  IT  department  in the hospital  has 
developed a system called HealthPlus. The system has different interfaces for 
different  users,  such  as  that  shown  Figure  25  for  the  receptionist  and  the 
interface in Figure 26 for the doctor.  129 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25:  HealthPlus interface for receptionists. 
Figure 26:  HealthPlus interface for doctors. 130 
 
The system works based on the role based access (RBAC) principles, where 
each  set  of  users  (Doctors,  nurses,  receptionists)  have  their  own  access 
policies and can view almost the same set of data. For example all doctors 
can search for the information of any patient and edit them regardless of the 
context. The system uses a Java GUI that is connected to a huge database, 
where  function  icons  are  enabled  for  each  set  of  users  so  that  they  can 
process the authorised data.  
 
3.3.1 Hospital scenarios 
 
The goal of our discussions and observations in the hospital was to develop 
and provide flexible and adaptable coordination strategies that can be applied 
to real world hospital scenarios. This special hospital-scheduling scenario is 
typical for a computer-based simulation model, where different strategies and 
their  consequences  can  be  evaluated.  The  treatment  of  hospital  patients 
requires  complex  coordination of  many  autonomous  organisational  entities. 
Special  requirements  to  coordination  emerge  at  the  intersection  between 
wards that have to organise patients’ appointments, and functional units that 
provide  medical  services  for  treatment  and  examination.  The  capacities  of 
these  functional  units  are  limited  by  their  resources  (medical  devices, 
personnel, rooms). Coordination strategies can vary from simple queues to a 
precise anticipatory scheduling that also considers shifting of appointments. In 
particular, the researcher wants to evaluate the benefit of complex distributed 
coordination strategies using negotiation to meet all the actors' interests and 
goals.  These  interests  may  conflict,  and  can  be  formally  expressed  by 
appraisals for appointments and local restrictions that are valid for a certain 
entity.  For  example,  a  high  load  might  be  desirable  by  a  functional  unit, 
whereas  patients  prefer  short  waiting  periods.  To  evaluate  the  effects  of 
different strategies the researcher focuses on patient processes of selected 
standardised medical guidelines. These are used to create realistic demands 
in  the  scenario.  In  addition  to  these  standardised  guidelines  and  general 
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and typical for the specific considered hospital. This includes the structure of 
the organisation and the preferences and restrictions of the different actors. 
All  this  was  taken  into  account  in  the  development  of  the  ontology  that  is 
presented in the next chapter. Thus, various scenarios can be described and 
the researcher can achieve a high grade of flexibility without having to change 
the ontology. Below is a table that contains all the possible scenarios that the 
researcher  has  observed  and  collected  during  more  than  two  years  of 
collaboration with the IC hospital:  
 
 
Number  Possible 
scenarios  for 
group  of 
users 
Name  of 
scenario 
Description  Database 
entities 
Data  access 
privileges 
1.1  Receptionist/ 
Administrator 
New  patient 
registration 
 
registering  patients 
for  first  time,  taking 
basic details 
 
Patient record   Creation  of  patient 
record  but  read-edit 
only  for  demographic 
part 
1.2    Booking 
appointments 
patient  booking  for 
his  next 
appointment  
Patient record 
 
Appointments 
read-edit  access  to 
demographic  part  and 
no  access  to  other 
parts 
read-edit-creation  and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
1.3    Visit  for 
appointment 
patient  arriving  to 
see  doctor  with 
existing appointment 
 
Patient record 
 
Appointments 
read-write  access  to 
demographic  part  and 
no  access  to  other 
parts 
read-write-creation and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
1.4    Emergency 
case 
patient  arriving  in 
emergency case 
 
Patient record 
 
A&E Waiting List 
read-write  access  to 
demographic  part  and 
no  access  to  other 
parts 
read-write-creation 
access  to  appointment 
records 
1.5    Billing  Preparing  and 
managing  bills  with 
insurance company 
 
Patient record 
 
Billing records 
read-access  to 
demographic  part  and 
no  access  to  other 
parts 132 
 
read-edit-creation  and 
deletion    access  to 
billing records 
1.6    Managing 
Patients 
Managing  patients 
for  actions  required 
by  healthcare 
professionals 
 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
 
 
Read  access  to 
demographic  part  and 
pharmacy  records,  but 
no  access  to  other 
parts 
read  access to referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
read-write-creation and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
read-write-creation and 
deletion    access  to 
waiting lists records 
2.1  Doctors/  
Consultants 
Routine  Patient 
Consultation 
Seeing patients who 
have appointment or 
are  on  lists  to  be 
seen 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
Read-write  access  to 
full patient record 
 
read  access to referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
read-write    access  to 
appointment records 
2.2    Outgoing 
referral 
Patient  to  be 
referred  to 
consultant/nurse  or 
radiology 
 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
Read-write  access  to 
full patient record 
 
Read-write    access  to 
referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
Read-write    access  to 
appointment records 
Read-write    access  to 
waiting lists records 
2.3    Incoming 
referral 
Patient  has  been 
referred to doctor by 
other  healthcare 
professionals 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
Read    access  to 
demographic  and 
prescriptions  part  of 
patient record 
read  access to referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
read    access  to 
appointment records 
 
read  access to waiting 
lists records 
2.4    Issuing 
Prescriptions 
Prescription  to  be 
issued to patient 
 
Patient record 
 
Prescription 
Record 
Read-write  access  to 
full patient record 
Read-write    access  to 
prescriptions 133 
 
2.5    Emergency 
case 
Patient  coming  in 
emergency  case 
without appointment 
 
Patient record 
 
A&E Waiting List 
Read-write  access  to 
full patient record 
 
Read-write  access  to 
waiting list 
2.6    Waiting  list 
consultation 
Patient  without 
appointment but not 
in emergency case 
Patient record 
 
All Waiting Lists 
 
Read-write  access  to 
full patient record 
 
read-write    access  to 
waiting lists records 
3.1  Nurse  Nurse 
Consultation 
Patient  initiated 
service  requests  
with appointment 
 
Patient record 
 
 
Appointments 
read-edit  access  to 
demographic  and 
nursing  part  and  no 
access to other parts 
read-edit-creation  and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
3.2    Incoming 
Referral 
Deal  with  patient 
according  to  the 
doctor’s instructions 
Patient record 
 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
read-edit  access  to 
demographic  and 
nursing  part  and  no 
access to other parts 
Read    access  to 
referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
read-edit-creation  and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
read  access to waiting 
lists records 
3.3    Emergency 
Assessment 
Patient  coming  in 
emergency  case 
without appointment 
 
Patient record 
 
A&E Waiting List 
 
Read-write  access  to 
full  patient  record 
without clinical record 
read-write    access  to 
waiting lists records 
4.1  Manager  and 
Senior 
Administrator 
Compliance 
auditing 
A  patient  is 
complaining  about 
sensitive information 
being  disclosed. 
And  he  asked  the 
hospital  to  know 
who  is  behind  this 
disclosure.  
 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
 
Data  Access 
Logs 
read-edit  access  to 
demographic  part  and 
no  access  to  other 
parts 
Read-edit    access  to 
referral records 
 
read-edit-creation  and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
read-write  access  to 
waiting lists records 
Read  access  to  data 
access  logs  (where 134 
 
available) 
4.2    Managing 
Healthcare 
Managing  patients 
and  healthcare 
provision 
 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
 
User Accounts 
Read  access  to 
demographic  part  but 
no  access  to  other 
parts 
read  access to referral 
records but not doctors’ 
letters 
read-write-creation and 
deletion    access  to 
appointment records 
read-write-creation and 
deletion    access  to 
waiting lists records 
read-write-creation and 
deletion    access  to 
user accounts 
5.1  Insurance 
company 
Billing  Receiving  bills  for 
treatment of patient 
 
Billing records  read    access  to  billing 
records 
6.1  Radiology lab  Radiology 
referral 
Patient  being 
referred to radiology 
by doctor 
 
Referral  records 
 
Appointments 
 
All Waiting Lists 
Read-write    access  to 
referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
Read-write    access  to 
appointment records 
Read-write    access  to 
waiting lists records 
7.1  Pharmacist  Dispensing 
Prescriptions 
Dispensing 
Medication 
according  to 
Doctor’s instructions 
 
Patient record 
 
Prescription 
Record 
Read  access  to basic 
details  of  name 
address and DOB 
Read-write    access  to 
prescriptions 
8.1  Laboratory  Laboratory 
referral 
Patient  being 
referred  to 
laboratory  for  blood 
analysis 
Patient record 
 
Referral  records 
 
Read  access to basic 
information  (name, 
address, DOB) 
Read    access  to 
referral 
records/doctors’ letters 
 
 
Table3: Aggregated scenarios for health care. 
 
Collecting  these  scenarios  is  of  crucial  importance  for  the  ontology  and 
database design in the next chapter. As shown in Chapter 2, no one to the 
researcher’s  knowledge  has  made  this  type  of  research  although  its 135 
 
importance has been recognised, as in (Becker et al., 2002). In that paper, the 
authors have mentioned the importance of collecting such scenarios from a 
real hospital in order to build a reliable ontology for health information. 
 
The next chapter illustrates how these scenarios are used in the design of this 
system.  
 
3.4 Discussion 
 
The above sections in this chapter have shown the importance of ethics and 
the  hospital  policy  in  the  process  of  the  daily  work  at  the  hospital  and 
accordingly the data access system that manages the flow of the patient’s 
sensitive information and control the application of the hospital ethics, rules 
and policies. 
   
Table 3 shows that there are at least 21 different and sensitive situations in 
the hospital.  Each one of them has different actors with different situations 
with different pieces of information. Some of them (such as scenario 1.4, 2.5 
and 3.3) are very sensitive and need the right information at the right time or 
otherwise a human being could pay with his life as a result of any error or 
lateness. Some of them need a highly flexible system to carry the on-going 
changes (such as scenario 2.6).  Openness is also crucial in cases such as 
scenario 2.4 (In order to issue an updated prescription). In all scenarios (from 
1.1-8.1) accuracy and availability are extremely important for a reliable health 
care system. 
 
The objective of the collaboration with the IC hospital was: 
 
1.  To  study  the  existing  hospital  daily  process  and  their  information 
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2.  To identify the shortcomings, if any, in the existing Hospital Information 
System to obey the requirements of the daily process (hospital work 
chain). 
3.  To  suggest  the  necessary  steps  to  improve  the  existing  Hospital 
Information System and data access management. 
 
The researcher has noticed through her observation in the hospital that staff 
in general and managers in particular would be able to access information if 
they had the competent skills to drive the system, as the system will retrieve 
all authorised information once the user has gained access with his username 
and  password.  This  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  those  people with  better 
computer skills were able to use the system optimally to get the information 
they needed. Which means that they would need to search by themselves 
manually through the data they would have and would depends on their skill 
to  extract  the  required  information  and  sometimes  by  trial  and  error.  This 
demonstrates  vividly  that  in  order  for  managers  to  retrieve  information, 
computing skills are crucial.  
 
These facts really highlight the importance of having a reliable data access 
management system to control the processes in the hospitals and manage 
the information flow, as doing this could highly affect the life of millions of 
people.    This  system  should  have  the  ability  to  retrieve  exact  information 
without excess and to be correct (without error) and in a short time.  
 
In  the  next  chapter,  the  hypothesis  and  the  methodology  needed  for 
investigating such a system will be discussed. 
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Chapter 4 
Hypothesis  and 
Methodology 
 
Albert Einstein said: 
“If we knew what it was we were doing, it would not be called research, would 
it?” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The  problem of  the  unavailability  of  reliable  data access management  has 
been  raised  in  previous  chapters.  A  chosen  example  has  been  given  in 
Chapter 4 to show the dimensions of the problem in the healthcare domain. 
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As  in  healthcare,  the  processing  of  sensitive  data  is  used  in  entering  and 
retrieving the information to and from the system. 
  
The overall aim of this thesis is to develop access control models that are 
“context-aware”,  “more  dynamic”  and  overall  better  suited  to  the  needs  of 
healthcare. However, through the literature review it became clear that the 
information needed to design such models is very difficult to find. As a result, 
detailed research has been carried to get this information which was scattered 
and incomplete. This investigation led to collaboration with the IBM company 
(these discussions led to a study agreement and a number of publications and 
a patent proposal for the developed system), Trento University, Eindhoven 
University (these discussions also led to number of publications) and Madrid 
University  (these  discussions  also  produced  publications).    These 
collaborations  were  essential  to  decide  on  the  basics  of  the  experiments 
designed and to get help in carrying them out. 
 
As presented at the end of the previous chapter, each of the leading solutions 
from  the  literature  such  as  Hippocratic  (Agrawal  et  al.,  2002),  Role  Based 
Access Control (RBAC) (Sandhu, 1998) and the classical Chain (Al-Fedaghi, 
2007)  has  their  own  problems  such  as  the  complexity  of  design  and 
implementation  processes,  the  need  for  expert  staff  for  the  design  and 
implementation processes. Therefore these methods do not provide a reliable 
solution  to  the  key  problems  of  data  access  management  discussed  in 
previous chapters. 
   
In  addition  to  the  problems  described  in  the  previous  chapters,  a  further 
problem has been found: 
 
•  Finding experts to participate in large numbers to test the developed 
prototype system. 
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The  classical  chain  method  seems  to  provide  a  much  simpler  solution  for 
those two problems with the idea of limited acts. This doesn't require so much 
special skills from the database designer in order to create complex hierarchy 
of  authorised  users  and  functions  they  can  perform,  such  as  that  of  the 
Hippocratic database or of RBAC. But the classical chain method has its own 
problem. It needs to have a way to decide for any given request, which chains 
to  be  allowed  for  which  user.  This  decision  should  be  based  more  on  an 
assessment of the situation in which access requests are made.   For this 
reason it would seem plausible that combining the chain based method with a 
domain model would provide a basis for deciding whether a given chain can 
be executed by a given user in the given context. In the following sections the 
problems found through research will be presented and how a solution was 
reached.  The research question and hypothesis will also be highlighted. 
 
So in order to provide a scientific focus to the investigation, the researcher 
starts by forming a research question and consequent hypothesis as well as 
deciding on the methodology required to assess the proposed approach via 
the hypothesis and develop a valid experiment. 
 
Therefore,  in  this  chapter,  the  researcher  will  describe  the  proposed 
Hypothesis  and  methodology  for  designing  a  reliable  data  access 
management  system that preserves  privacy  while  keeping  the  simplicity  of 
design.  This  methodology  is  claimed  to  satisfy  the  requirements  listed  in 
section 4.2 and thus serves as a solution for the main problem presented in 
Chapters 1 and 2, i.e.  The increasing amount of personal information that 
needs  to  be  protected  from  unauthorised  users,  while  relying  on  expert 
database  designers  to  develop  a  database  system  through  a  complex 
process.  
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This chapter is organised as follows: 
 
In section 4.1 the research question and hypothesis are presented. Section 
4.2  describes  the  criteria  for  success  for  this  project.  Then,  section  4.3 
explains  the  contribution  to  knowledge.  In  section  4.4  outlines  the 
methodology of the thesis. Finally, section 5.5 is an overall discussion of the 
chapter and draws its conclusions. 
 
4.1 Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
In order to appropriately protect sensitive personal information, such as in the 
healthcare domain, there is a need for workable solutions that can be handled 
more easily and thus reliably. Consequently, system programmers need to 
implement privacy rules in information systems and to improve the capabilities 
of information systems. The purpose of this is to very stringently apply data 
protection  and  privacy  protection  when  information  and  functionality  is 
accessed by users.  It is time now to revisit the research question and turn it 
into  a  hypothesis for which  the  researcher  can  derive  a  meaningful  set  of 
criteria for success and a valid set of experiments. 
 
The  outstanding  problem  that  has  been  concluded  from  Chapter  1  is  “the 
need  for  an  efficient  method  that  can  enforce  privacy  technically.”  
Consequently,  and  on  the  basis  of  the  results  of  the  literature  review,  the 
research  question  can  be  narrowed  down  to:  whether  a  context  sensitive 
approach to enable data access management of sensitive information, which 
is also less complex than the traditional access methods, where seven simple 
to apply acts replace complicate polices of RBAC and Hippocratic methods. In 
addition, semantics and ontology adds context sensitivity and accuracy to the 
process of data access management. 
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So the research question can be summarised as: 
 
RQ: “Can a semantic approach based on simple limited acts of Chain 
method improve the data access management of personal information 
while preserving privacy? “ 
 
From  the  research  question,  hypotheses  should  be  drawn  to  highlight  the 
purpose of this dissertation. Accordingly the criteria of success and evaluation 
experiments need to be delivered from these hypotheses also. 
 
The  hypotheses,  according  to  the  research  question,  have  to  suggest 
semantics  and  Chains  to  be  the  basics  of  the  proposed  solution.  This 
proposed solution also needs to overcome the shortcomings of the currently 
available  methods  in  the  literature  in  order  to  deliver  better  data  access 
management.  
 
Given the research question presented above the researcher now proposes 
the following hypotheses: 
 
The improvement of the data access is defined as: 
•  H1: To simplify the configuration of a data access 
management system for a given database through a 
reduction of complexity (complexity means number 
of  required:  tables,  SQL  statements  and 
constraints). 
•  H2: To increase the precision (more focused results) 
with  which  the  algorithm  discerns  between 
legitimate and illegitimate access. As precision will 
limit  the  unnecessary  data  disclosure  by  focusing 
only on the required one.  
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In summary, there is a problem of correctly setting up and maintaining access 
privileges for a dynamic set and large numbers of users. In addition, there is a 
need  for  a  context  sensitive  approach  that  can  respond  to  changes  in 
circumstances to adapt to what records users can have access to and at what 
level.  
 
The researcher has proposed a solution to this problem using semantics and 
the Chain method. This system works through reducing complexity in applying 
data access policies during user administration and subsequently improving 
the accuracy with which access attempts are assessed.   
 
The methodological principles will be applied to the healthcare domain to test 
its reliability in managing access to the sensitive data processed there.    
 
4.2 Criteria for success 
 
In this thesis, the main issue is to enable system programmers to successfully 
and  easily  apply  relevant  privacy  protection  policies.    Reliably  measuring 
subjective concepts such as ease is fraught with problems. Therefore there is 
a  need  to  measure  more  indirect  indicators  to  provide  more  readily 
measurable  data  to  allow  us  to  conclude  that  the  design  of  privacy  policy 
application has been simplified. According to our hypothesis, the new method 
should deliver better access management. Evaluating this progress in data 
access management is not a direct issue.  Therefore the researcher proposes 
to summarise the criteria of success in the following points: 
  
•  Reducing the number of steps required to carry out essential tasks. 
The measurements of this factor are:  
o  Reduction in the number of SQL statements required to build a 
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o  Reduction in the number of tables required for a specific data 
access scenario. 
o  Reduction  in  the  number  of  constraints  required  to  apply  a 
specific data access scenario. 
 
•  Measuring the time required to assess access requests and retrieve 
information. This is carried out by giving the database administrators 
and hospital staff a set of scenarios and measuring the time required to 
retrieve  data  for  each  scenario.    The  measuring  process  is  done 
number of times and the average of time is taken. 
 
•  Evaluating the accuracy (consistency-exact result) and precision (more 
focused  results)  of  the  retrieved  information  (Teufel,  2006).    This  is 
done  by  comparing  the  retrieved  data  with  the  data  that  should  be 
retrieved theoretically for each scenario.   
 
In  this  thesis,  accuracy  is  defined  as  the  percentage  of  records  correctly 
classified as returned or not returned.  Precision is defined as the percentage 
of retrieved results that are relevant to the query (Han and Kamber, 2006). 
 
If the developed prototype that is based on the investigated method improves 
upon  the  traditional  methods  in  each  of  the  above  three  criteria,  the 
hypothesis will be accepted.  These criteria have been chosen according to 
the discussions with IBM and Trento, Madrid and Eindhoven Universities. In 
addition to the observations, discussions and surveys have taken place the IC 
hospital. 
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4.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
 
A unique aspect of the developed approach is that it focuses on developing 
the appropriate privacy preserving measures early in the design process while 
taking into account the different types of malicious users and the effect each 
type might have. As in Sawma (2002) malicious users can be grouped into 
three categories: Crackers, intruders and insiders. A cracker is someone who 
breaks into systems for nefarious purposes from, and he is a person from 
outside the system. An intruder is someone who gains access into systems by 
force,  and  he  is  a  person  from  inside  the  system.  Finally,  an  insider  is  a 
person who is in a position of power or has access to system confidential 
information. The insider could access and disclose information because he 
has  authorisation  to  access  information  (more  than  required  information  to 
fulfil his job functions). In this thesis the researcher is developing a method 
that preserves the privacy from attacks of all of the above types.  
 
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  Developing a new Chain method (ChBAC) based on the classical chain 
method. 
 
2.  Integrating semantics into the system by developing an ontology, and 
enabling  this  single  ontology  to  be  attached  to  the  method,  making 
modification much easier. 
 
3.  Reduction  of  complexity  in  setting  up  and  maintaining  access 
privileges. 
 
4.  Developing  an  original  dynamic  approach  that  responds  to 
circumstance to grant access only to legitimate records 
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5.  Provision of extensible personal information ontology and its use as a 
classification layer in database access management. 
 
6.  Identifying the major challenges that are to be addressed in the design 
of chain based solutions.  
7.  Translating a large set of typical hospital procedures into one of Al-
Fadeghi’s 7 acts.   
 
 
The classical chain method that has been suggested by (Al-Fedaghi, 2007) 
has  never  been  implemented  nor  tested  in  any  hypothetical  nor  real 
enterprise.  As  mentioned  before,  the  specifications  given  in  (Al-Fedaghi, 
2007) do not help alone in implementing the Chain method in reality without a 
semantic study that shows the definitions of each act. In addition, it has never 
been designed to solve any particular problem like for example the problem of 
managing access to personal information in healthcare without loss of privacy.  
   
The second original contribution will be a dynamic data access management 
approach. This new approach decides on access attempts not statically as 
does the role based access method but dynamically, based in the situation in 
which a request is made. 
 
Better privacy protection tools are required to manage personal information 
and  determine  what  personal  information  really  needs  to  be  or  can  be 
collected.  Most  importantly  methodologies  and  guidelines  for  implementing 
and integrating them into information systems are required. This is because 
system  developers  and  operators  have  had  little  guidance  on  how  to 
implement and comply with privacy guidelines and rules. Further, there have 
been  few  analytical  or  systematic  attempts  to  understand  the  relationship 
between  privacy  and  technology.  Therefore,  Information  Systems  need  a 
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of  this  thesis.  That  is,  to  develop  a  new  database  management  access 
method  that  integrates  the  Chain  idea  with  a  newly  developed  personal 
information ontology to answer the question of privacy preserving through a 
dynamic, durable and easy to implement method 
 
4.4  Methodology 
 
In this section, the researcher provides a detailed description of our proposed 
methodology  for  deriving  and  applying  the  Chain  ontology  based  to  the 
existing  data  access  management  principles.  To  verify  the  hypothesis  that 
was reached earlier in this chapter, it is necessary to define a methodology 
that tests the semantic system for the main two criteria of success: reduction 
of design complexity and precision of the data retrieved. 
 
In the following section, the choice of research methodology and the purpose 
behind this selection will be presented.   
 
4.4.1 Choice of research methodology 
 
In  the  previous  section  the  research  question  and  hypothesis  have  been 
presented together with the criteria for success.  The hypothesis, that will be 
followed to improve the privacy protection methods, has been discussed. In 
some fields of study as is the case for this dissertation - it is not easy to 
measure  each  criterion  independently.  Nevertheless,  it  is  preferable  to 
measure each criterion separately to see its effect on the process and how it 
has improved the performance of the system. 
 
Often one compares against a scientific control or traditional treatment that 
acts as baseline, since a reference point is needed to measure improvement 
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on  a  comparative  study  where  the  researcher  compares  the  proposed 
approach against existing, widely used, approaches.   
 
•  The problem: Current implementation technologies are too complex to 
be  implemented  therefore  the  researcher  will  investigate  newer 
technologies that can reduce complexity and thus enhance the overall 
system  performance  in  terms  of  development  and  maintenance. 
Although the fundamental concepts of roles in the traditional methods 
(Hippocratic, RBAC and TBAC) are common knowledge, the capability 
to formalise model specifications needed to implement these models is 
beyond  the  knowledge  base  of  existing  staff  in  many  software 
companies. The lack of knowledge and staff expertise in the area of 
RBAC  increases  the  uncertainty  of  both  the  technical  feasibility  of 
developing successful RBAC-enabled products and the development 
cost and time-frame. 
 
•  Type of problem: An applied research problem where the domain is in 
privacy, security and database. The problem can be summarised as 
filtering  authorised  and  unauthorised  users  and  then  classifying 
authorised  users  using  an  ontology  into  groups  of  users  that  can 
access certain groups of data. As new users access the system and 
old  users  no  longer  have  the  authority  to  use  the  system,  the 
importance of having a reliable, flexible methodology that can deal with 
all the expected and unexpected problems becomes essential. Also, 
the system needs to be context sensitive to enable this flexibility. 
 
•  The  Solution:  A new  methodology  is  required  that  incorporates the 
Chain method along with an ontology for modelling privacy policies in a 
database system. The Chain method provides a simple design solution 
with many fewer conditions, policies and hierarchies, while the ontology 
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the given constraints from the ontology GUI) that is not available in 
current traditional database access management methods.  
 
•  Type  of  experiment:  Comparative.  In  a  comparative  study,  two  (or 
more) cases, specimens or events are examined, often in the form of a 
table where a column is reserved for each case. On the basis of the 
aims  of  this  study,  a  decision  has  been  made  as  to  which  are  the 
interesting aspects, properties or attributes that will have to be noted 
and  recorded  for  each  of  the  cases.   The  evaluated  method  will  be 
compared with three other state of the art methods in the literature: 
RBAC, TBAC and Classical Chain method.  
 
This  thesis  follows  the  experimental  design  approach.  In  an  experimental 
design, the researcher actively tries to change the situation, circumstances, or 
experience  of  participants  (manipulation),  which  may  lead  to  a  change  in 
behaviour or outcomes for the participants of the study. The participants are 
ideally randomly assigned to different conditions, and variables of interest are 
measured.  In  the  case  of  this  thesis, the  situations  that  were  given  to  the 
users are the scenarios presented in Table3 in Chapter 3. 
 
In a good experimental design, some things are of great importance. First of 
all, it is necessary to think of the best way to implement the variables that will 
be measured. Therefore, it is important to consider how the variable(s) will be 
measured, as well as which methods would be most appropriate to answer 
the research question. In addition, statistical analysis of the collected results 
has to be taken into account. Thus, the researcher should consider what the 
expectations of the study are as well as how to analyse this outcome. Finally, 
in an experimental design the researcher must think of the practical limitations 
including  the  availability  of  participants  as  well  as  how  representative  the 
participants are to the target population. It is important to consider each of 
these factors before beginning the experiment (Adèr et al 2008).  
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•  Who  will  carry  out  the  experiments?:  As  there  are  two  types  of 
experiments,  two types of users will  carry out the experiments: 
–  For  the  simplicity  of  the  design:  five  expert  database 
administrators from the three largest institutions in Kuwait will go 
through this set of experiments. 
–  A real hospital in Kuwait has provided us with the possibility of 
using  their  system  design  to  compare  with.  In  addition  their 
employees  will  use  our  system  for  the  usability  comparison 
experiments.   
 
•  Desired  results  from  the  experiments:  To  demonstrate  that  our 
methodology can be applied in real situations and addresses privacy 
problems,  is  easier  to  design  and  implement  than  other  existing 
systems, and can retrieve information quickly in real time.  
  
The  points  presented  in  this  section  shape  the  experiments  that  will  be 
conducted in order to evaluate the investigated method performance. 
 
4.4.2 Details of the methodology and the proposed approach 
 
The  thesis  methodology,  depicted  in  Figure  27  can  be  divided  into  two 
functional phases. In phase 1, reliable data access management features are 
selected  and  a  privacy-preserving–oriented  design  model  is  derived  and 
verified. In phase 2, the derived model from phase 1 is instantiated to fit the 
healthcare sector.  
 
The  following  UML  figure  shows  possible  relationships  among  Privacy 
violation attack, privacy feature, and access management method and attack 
enabler. 
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The following should be highlighted: 
-  One  or  more  privacy  violation  attacks  (whether  dependent  on  or 
independent  of  other  attacks)  might  be  applicable  to  one  privacy 
feature.  This  means  the  relationship  is  one  feature  to  one  or  more 
attacks. 
-  One privacy violation attack can rely on one attack enabler to succeed.   
-  A reliable data access management method is required to disable an 
attack enabler. 
-  Residual  vulnerabilities  may  remain  after  applying  the  data  access 
management functions. 
-  In addition, residual vulnerabilities might enable one or more privacy 
violation attacks to sensitive data. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27:  A UML class diagram of the relationships between Privacy violation attack, 
privacy feature, Access management method, and attack enabler. 
 
 
The researcher has reviewed the literature in order to find the privacy features 
required for our project. The researcher selected four features of the NIST 
security services model (NIST, 2012) in order to focus on them and try to 
develop  them  which  are  widely  seen  as  the  common  features  required  to 
ensure  security.  They  are  namely:  authentication,  authorisation,  access-151 
 
control enforcement, and transaction privacy. Types of intruders which can 
attack  and  affect  these  services  such  as  Misfeasor,  Masquerades  and 
Clandestine users are explained in details in chapter 9 in Stalling (2011).  
 
After  drawing  the  main  features  of  the  method,  the  researcher  began 
designing the system that will use this method. In order to do this, two years 
of observations and taking notes have taken place in a hospital in Kuwait. The 
researcher  collected  all  the  possible  scenarios  there  and  saw  how  they 
manage access to their huge database. The results of this phase led to the 
use  of  the  chain  method  and  semantics  as  a  suggested  solution  from  the 
literature,  and  the  set  of  scenarios  that  has  been  presented  in  Table  3  in 
Chapter 3.   
 
4.4.3 Overview of Proposed Experiments 
 
In this thesis the issue is to enable system programmers to successfully and 
easily  apply  relevant  privacy  protection  policies.    Reliably  measuring 
subjective uneasy criteria to measure such as ease is fraught with problems. 
Therefore  there  is  a  need  to  measure  more  indirect  indicators  (like  for 
example the number of tables has indirect reason for its increase which is the 
number of required constraints) to provide more readily measurable data to 
allow us to conclude that the design of privacy policy application has been 
simplified.  
 
The evaluation of the performance of the developed method will be through 
comparative experiments and analysis for the performance of the investigated 
system over traditional system using a set of standard scenarios.  The criteria 
of evaluation for the experiments are: 
 
1-  Design  Simplicity  (the  number  of  specifications  required).  This  is 
related to the part of the hypothesis that is concerned with simplifying 
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database through a reduction of complexity. This will be evaluated in 
two levels: 
 
-Database  level:  Comparison  between  the  classical  Chain 
method  and  the  RBAC  method.  This  set  of  experiments  will 
evaluate the required number of: SQL commands, tables and 
constraints to construct each method for each specific scenario 
from  Table  3.  The  respondents  needed  to  write  down  SQL 
statements, create tables and constraints to apply the principles 
of  each  method  for  each  specific  scenario.  The  respondents 
need to be experts in database administration. 
 
-Semantic  level: Comparison  between  the  Chain,  RBAC  and 
TBAC  methods.  These  methods  have  been  chosen  for 
comparison as all of them work at the same level the application 
level. On the other hand, the Hippocratic database method for 
example works at the data level and would require redesign of 
the database.  The experiments were to evaluate the number of 
OWL  statements  and  constraints  needed  to  develop  each 
method in OWL. The experiments also measure the number of 
tables  that  need  to  be  accessed  in  the  determination  of  an 
access or disclosure decision. The respondents needed to write 
down OWL statements and constraints to apply the principles of 
each  method  for  each  specific  scenario.  The  respondents 
needed to be experts in the OWL language. 
 
The desired results from this set of experiments: To have fewer 
specifications and design parameters which simplifies the design and 
the implementation of the method. 
 
2-  The Precision measurements.  This set of experiments is related to 
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precision (i.e. more focused results) with which the algorithm discerns 
legitimate from illegitimate access. 
 
This  set  of  experiments  is  not  easy  to  measure  and  needed  to  be 
designed carefully to measure criteria that affect the precision (more 
focused  results)  of  the  data  retrieved  from  each  method  such  as: 
accuracy, context sensitivity and correctness. The methods chosen for 
evaluation  for  this  set  of  experiments  were  the:  Developed  Chain 
method, the classical Chain method and RBAC. The respondents for 
this set needed to complete questionnaires that have scenarios from 
Table 3 to be fulfilled. The respondents in this case were staff from the 
Kuwaiti hospital. 
 
The results expected from this set of experiments: To retrieve more 
focused data instead of having access data that are not required and 
could make harm in case of disclosure. In addition the more precision 
of the data, the easier will be the work of the users to accomplish their 
work.  
 
3 -Time of retrieving information from the database: 
 
Time is a vital factor in the healthcare process. Therefore there were 
two  sets  of  experiments  to  evaluate  the  time  required  to  retrieve 
information.  The  first  sets  of  experiments  need  to  evaluate  time  to 
retrieve  information  (this  process  was  repeated  and  average  of 
measures taken) for increasing the number of records. 
 
The  second  set  of  experiments  looked  at  the  time  to  retrieve 
information when the classical Chain, developed Chain based ontology 
and RBAC methods are applied. 
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The desired results from this set of experiments: To retrieve information 
without notification of delay from the users. 
 
 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion  
 
This  chapter  stated  the  research  questions,  stated  the  hypothesis  and  the 
criteria of success that reflected whether the hypothesis and goal of the study 
were  reached.  The  proposed  experimental  approach  and  how  it  can  be 
evaluated has been given. 
 
The  main  question  the  researcher  is  trying  to  answer  is:  Can  a  semantic 
approach  based  on  simple  limited  acts  of  Chain  method  improve  the 
data  access  management  of  personal  information  while  preserving 
privacy?  In  order  to  solve  this  problem,  the  following  process  will  be 
undertaken: 
•  To  simplify  the  configuration  of  a  data  access 
management system for a given database through a 
reduction of complexity.  
•  To increase the precision for data retrieved out of 
users queries.  
 
1-  Collecting  knowledge  that  forms  a  foundation  for  access  control 
requirements in healthcare systems. 
 
2-  Creating improved access control models for healthcare systems based 
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Criteria for success should be the reduction of complexity of applying data 
access control policies to the selected users and also the reduction of errors. 
The  criteria  of  success  for  improvement  of  performance  and  precision  are 
based on well-known measures from the NIST security services model and 
based on accuracy and precision measures through testing given scenarios 
that allow  assessment  of  how  close  a  given  technique  comes  to  the  ideal 
solution.  The  crucial  issue  for  a  successful  approach  is  to  ensure  that 
legitimate access is provided at all times, while avoiding inadvertent release of 
unnecessary data. In the next chapter, the design of the developed system 
will be presented based on the hypothesis given in this chapter. 
 
In  short,  this  thesis  proposes  the  combination  of  chains  and  semantics  to 
improve  access  management  to  personal  information.  This  will  be  through 
implementing  and  evaluating  the  Chain  method,  reduction  of  design 
complexity and provision of an extensible PI ontology. 
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Chapter 5  
Proposed 
Architecture for 
the Chain 
Ontology Base   
 
 
 
 
 
In the previous chapters, the problem of preserving privacy in the course of 
data  access  management  has  been  discussed.  The  problem  has  been 
analysed using a pertinent example from the healthcare sector. Because of 
the dynamic nature of this case in terms of incoming and out coming flows of 
sensitive  information  it  is  particularly  difficult  to  preserve  privacy  in  such a 
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The next step is to design a solution, which is the purpose of this chapter. 
Based  on  the  insights  gained  from  the  problem  analysis,  an  effective  and 
workable design has been developed. The researcher will also illustrate how 
lessons  learned from the  literature  review  have  been  incorporated  into  the 
design.  Consequently, the present chapter is organised as follows: 
 
•  Section  5.1  revisits  the  key  outcomes  from  the  earlier  problem 
analysis; 
•  Section 5.2  highlights the key system requirements; 
•  Section 5.3 presents the concept of the proposed solution and the 
logical architecture required to implement the proposed solution.   
•  Section 5.4 shows the system infrastructure. 
•  Section 5.5 analyses the ontology design. 
•  Section 5.6 gives an example of how the system works. 
 
5.1 The Problem 
 
Automated  processing  systems  often  store  data  that  is  required  to  be 
protected from unauthorised disclosure.  For example, medical information is 
stored  by  automated  processing  systems  at  doctor’s  offices,  hospitals, 
insurance companies, and various other facilities.  Protecting this information 
from unauthorised or even inadvertent disclosure is becoming an increasing 
concern and in some cases is also the subject of industry regulation.  For 
example,  the  Health  Insurance  Portability  and  Accountability  Act  (HIPAA) 
requires  that  individuals’  health  related  information  be  protected  from 
unauthorised disclosure. 
 
One example of limiting access to resources assigns individuals to groups 
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of selected groups.  However, identifying an accurate and complete set of 
groups  for  an  organisation  such  that  the  group  definitions  correspond  to 
different needs for information access and information, can be inaccurate and 
time intensive and subject to change over time.  
 
In  Chapter  2,  the  researcher  has  presented  the  problems  affecting  the 
effective management of data access in Chapter 3, the healthcare sector was 
chosen  as  a  crucial  example  that  shows  real  problems  facing  a  sensitive 
domain  such  as  the  healthcare  domain.  The  researcher  has  taken  the 
International  Clinic  in  Kuwait  as  a  real  example  from  the  healthcare  field. 
Because  of  the  context  in  which  the  clinic  retains  and processes  personal 
information, it is critical that they are able to maintain very tight control over 
how the information is used. This includes the individuals and users that have 
access  to  the  data,  the  circumstances  and  contexts  under  which  they  are 
granted such access, and control over the specific actions they can take on 
this data. This includes for example collecting, modifying and disclosing to 
third  parties.  In  this  scenario  individuals  may  be  staff  within  the  clinic,  or 
external  parties  such  as  the  insurance  company.  Therefore,  the  rules 
governing access must take into consideration: 
 
1.  The proprietor of the data (e.g. patient) 
2.  The individual processing the data (e.g. doctors, nurses.) 
3.  The  context  under  which  the  data  is  being  used  (e.g.  appointment, 
emergency.) 
 
From the above three elements, the access control mechanism must define 
the specific actions which can be taken to handle the data in question.  
 
The problem is twofold. The first aspect comes from the fact that the rules 
required to enforce the privacy policies are very complex. The complexity of 159 
 
these rules can make them difficult and time consuming to define, which is the 
case in all the traditional methods discussed in Chapter 3 such as RBAC, 
Hippocratic and XACML. As the system approaches this level of complexity, it 
becomes more and more difficult to provide an assurance of correctness. This 
increases the probability of errors in the definition of data entities, which could 
result  in  unintended  side-effects  and  ultimately  data  protection  breaches.  
Since access policies will probably need to be reviewed from time to time (in 
line with changes in policy or legislation), this problem will be constant and on-
going. 
 
Secondly, due to the sheer volume of data being controlled by the clinic, and 
the consequent fluidity of this data, the access control mechanism requires a 
high level of flexibility in order to manage the roles of users and constantly 
changing  contexts  which  govern  how  the  data  can  be  accessed.  In  such 
reliable organisations of large size, it is not practicable to update and check 
the rules manually every time there is a change to the database. The large 
volume of data also requires a lot of consumption power to manage. A large 
set of complex rules applied to a large set of data will inevitably consume a lot 
of CPU resources at runtime. 
 
In designing robust data access management, the following questions should 
be considered: 
 
1.  Who should be responsible for access policy?  
2.  What kind of access policy do you require?  
3.  What resources do you need to protect?  
4.  How do I plug in the access management solution?  
 
This  chapter  describes  a  systematic approach  to managing  the complexity 
associated with software access management.  In section 5.2, a look at the 160 
 
system requirements will be given.  Next in Section 5.3, explanation of the 
system design and its different components will be presented. 
 
5.2  System Requirements 
 
In  the  literature  review  chapter,  outstanding  problems  of  traditional  access 
management methods have been identified. These problems are: 
 
-  Complexity of system design; 
-  Lack of context sensitivity while performing data access management; 
-  Lack of precision while retrieving required data. 
 
Therefore  in  developing  new  data  access  management  systems,  such 
concerns should be taken into consideration. For the first point, a decision has 
been made to use the Chain method (Al-Fedaghi, 2007) as it has the simplest 
design  with  the  least  number  of  parameters  based  on  seven  limited  acts. 
While  for  the  other  two  points,  an  ontology  and  semantics  have  been 
developed specifically for this project to overcome these two problems. In the 
following two sections, other system requirements will be highlighted.  
 
5.2.1 Who should be responsible for access policy? 
 
To implement an application access management solution, it must be ensured 
that access policies exist and are unambiguous.  Although access controls will 
be  enforced  by  technology,  defining  the  required  access  policy  is  the 
responsibility of the business.   
 
For  this  reason,  an  access  policy  related  to  the  release  of  sensitive 
information and/or application features should be documented using business 
terminology.    During  the  analysis  of  these  business  requirements,  concise 
rules will be defined governing who has access to specific classes of business 161 
 
or  personal  information  and under  what  circumstances  (there may  also  be 
rules regarding who can access application features).   
 
This analysis often requires a significant classification effort in three areas:  1) 
information;  2)  application  features;  and  3)  people.    Many  organisations 
already  have  an  information  protection  group  entrusted  with  ensuring  that 
business  policies  are  in  place  to  ensure  the  protection  of  business  and 
personal  information.    Such  an  organisation  can  play  an  important  role  in 
ensuring  that  access  policy  is  consistent  across  business  applications.    If 
each application group does this classification independently, inconsistencies 
in policy may occur.  
 
But  can  an  internal  organisation  define  access  policy?    Increasingly  the 
answer is no.  Legislation regarding confidentiality and privacy requires that 
individuals be allowed to define who (and under what circumstances) personal 
information  is  released.    This  adds  new  requirements  for  business 
applications in the area of access management.  The users have become 
policy administrators with respect to access to personal information.  While 
the application may restrict the policy choices, it must be able to dynamically 
change the policy in use.     
 
5.2.2 What kind of access policy is needed? 
 
An access policy can be very simple or very sophisticated.  Once it has been 
determined  that  applications  require  access  management  features,  they 
typically begin with a very simple access control policy based on user identity.  
There  are  many  applications,  however,  that  require  more  sophisticated 
access  policies.    To  determine  all  requirements  for  access  management 
solutions,  one  should  determine  the  type  of  access  policy  should  be 
determined.  Access Policy can be classified as follows:  
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Policy Type 
 
Question answered with regard to 
protected 
resource (information or application 
feature) 
Example(s) 
Identity-
Based 
Are you an individual that has been 
specifically granted access? 
User ID / Password, 
Private 
Key, Electronic Token, 
Biometrics 
Role-Based  Are you currently in a role that has been 
specifically granted access? 
Manager, Emergency 
Room 
Personnel 
Group-
Based 
 
Are you part of a group that has been 
specifically granted access? 
Accounting, 
Engineering 
Context-
Based 
 
Is the context of the request such that 
access should be granted to this 
individual? 
Time of Day, Location, 
Emergency, Account 
Balance 
Entitlement- 
Based 
 
Is this individual entitled to access this 
class of information? 
 
Clearance Level 
 
Relationship- 
Based 
 
Is this individual entitled to access the 
Personal/business information because of 
a relationship with the person or business? 
 
Primary Care Physician, 
Manager of Employee, 
Account 
Representative, Parent 
Rule-Based 
 
Does  the  policy  governing  access  to  the 
resource allow this individual to access the 
resource? 
Combination(s) of 
above 
 
Table 4: Access Types 
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Access Management solutions may also support different types of rules.  For 
example,  iLock  Security  Services  supports  all  of  the  Policy  Types  shown 
above and allows an access policy to have multiple “rules.”    
 
These  rules  determine  whether  or  not  to  allow  access.  Rules  are  of  the 
following  types,  and  in  a  “rulebased”  policy  are  evaluated  in  the  following 
precedence order:   
 
 
Rule Type 
 
How the rule is 
evaluated 
Example of usage 
Nobody  Deny access to 
everyone. 
In a Context-Based Policy, 
access may be denied during 
certain times of the day 
Deny 
 
Deny access to anyone 
that has any 
of these credentials 
(access ID, group, role). 
A security alert is in place.  
You may wish to 
Temporarily deny certain 
groups who normally have 
access. 
Required 
 
Allow access only if the 
requestor has all the 
credentials. 
Allow only owners who are 
officers (you must be both an 
officer and an owner). 
Any 
 
Allow access to anyone 
with any of these 
credentials. 
You wish to allow users who 
are in the group 
administrators or. 
Anybody  Allow access to anyone.  You may wish to audit the 
request for the resource even 
though you do not restrict 
access. 
 
Table 5: Rule Types 
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The  system  described  below  is  directed  at enabling  healthcare  vendors  to 
augment their current systems to address the current market demands and 
regulatory  requirements  through  non-intrusive  techniques  that  seamlessly 
handle the many various permissions that are required to effectively support 
their  operations.    These  permissions  include,  for  example,  storage  access 
rights  and  “execute”  rights  for  methods  of  individual  object  classes.    The 
system  and  methods  described  below  overcome  the  challenge  typically 
associated  with  reliably  automating  the  determination  of  the  purpose  of 
requested data accesses. 
 
 
5.2.3 What to protect? 
 
 
Traditionally,  machines  and  networks  have  been  the  resources  commonly 
protected.  However, while integrating applications and expanding the use of 
systems, it has been noticed that the application assumes the responsibilities 
for guarding access to business information and/or application functionality.  
The security community uses the generic term “resource” when discussing 
business information or concepts that need to be protected.   
 
Protected resources are typically given a unique name (or ID) that is used in 
communicating  with  an  access  manager  to  request  an  access  decision.  
Deciding  what  resources  should  be  protected  and  assigning  them  an  ID 
sounds  simple  –  and  sometimes  it  is  –  but  it  can  also  become  a  time-
consuming identification and data classification project not considered in the 
original application estimates. For example, most hospitals would agree that a 
patient medical record should be protected. In the next table issues such as: 
 
–  ‘Where do I insert the software guard?’,  165 
 
–  ‘What  is  the  actual  resource  it  must  protect  to  ensure  medical 
information is not accessed improperly?’ 
 
 
Granularity  of  Protected 
Resource 
Access  Policy  that  protects  the 
system 
Machine and/or network  Only people with the authority to run 
the application have User IDs on the 
machines-such  as  the  database 
administrator 
Entire Application  Only people with the authority to view 
HR information are granted User IDs 
for  the  human  resources  application-
the  database  administrator  and  the 
general manager 
Specific  Application  Feature  (e.g. 
Screen, Menu, 
Button or URL…) 
 
Specific GUI for each group of users: 
Doctors, Nurses and Receptionists 
Entire Database  Only people with the authority to view 
HR  information-The  database 
administrator-  have  User  IDs  in  the 
human  resources  database.    The 
database  is  accessed  using 
requestors’ ID. 
 
Table (in a database)  According to the context user can see 
a specific table from the database. 
Row (in a table in a database)  According to the context user can see 
a specific table from the database. 
Field  (in  a  Row  in  a  table  in  a  According to the context user can see 166 
 
database)  a specific table from the database. 
Concept (information that contains 
multiple 
fields  –  potentially  from  different 
sources) 
 
According to the context user can see 
a specific table from the database. 
 
Table 6: Access policies that protect the system 
 
From the literature review, two concepts have been realised: 
-  There  is  no  adequate  personal  information  ontology  in  the  literature 
which is related to H1 and H2 of our hypothesis.  
-  There is no method that provides a sufficiently simple design among 
the all methods that have been reviewed from the literature which is 
related to H1 of our hypothesis.  
Therefore these were the two basic concepts that the researcher has started 
to  build  upon  for  this  investigated  system.  The  need  for  an  ontology  that 
clarifies  concepts  is  of  crucial  importance  in  the  information  age,  and  its 
importance in the data access management field is more obvious. In the next 
section  we  will  show  how  we  have  integrated  semantic  concepts  into  our 
system of chain database.  
 
5.3  System Design 
 
The system and method described in this section addresses specification and 
enforcement of access rights to shared data resources, such as Electronic 
Medical Records (EMRs) and other forms of individual health records.  This 
system  is  based  on  identified  information  flow  models  that  represent  the 
movement of information and the actions taken on that information.   
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As  shown  in  Figure  28  for  example,  an  information  flow  model  identifies 
actors, resources, and processes used to handle protected information (acts 
or chain of acts).  These processes are divided into a limited set of discrete 
actions.    For  example,  multiple  actors  are  able  to  create  new  information, 
where those actors may or may not own the created information.   
 
The created information is then able to be used at several different locations 
by various information users. One example of processing medical information 
includes analysis of the data, such as by editing the medical record. 
 
 
Figure 28:  System Processing Flow Model 
 
the developed system works as follows: 168 
 
At point (1): the system receives a request from a specific user. (e.g. a doctor 
is requesting to access the medical record of a specific patient). At point (2): 
the system will first check from the database the group of users which this 
user  belongs  to  (in  the  example  of  point  1  the  group  of  the  users  will  be 
“doctor”). After checking the group of users, the system will return back to the 
ontology-and map the given request with the conditions and properties of that 
class of users (for the above example it will check if the access to patients 
medical records is one of the properties given to the doctor class of users). At 
point 3: the system needs to map the class “medical record” in the ontology to 
the database entity “medical record”. At point 4: Authorisation to the user to 
access  the  database  will  be  either  given  to  the  user  or  not  (in  the  above 
example the doctor will be given access to the medical record data because it 
has this privilege according to his group of users in the “doctor” class in the 
ontology. Then at point (5) the system will retrieve the acts (from the 7 acts of 
the chain method) that are authorised for the combination of user/database 
entity  from  the  ontology  (for  the  example  the  doctor  will  be  given  acts  of: 
collecting,  processing  and  storing  to  act  on  the  database  entity:  medical 
record).  At  point  (6): these  acts  will  be  enabled from  the  GUI  as  the  acts 
represented in the GUI by buttons (In the example, the buttons of collecting, 
processing and storing will be enabled in the GUI for the doctor). At point 7: 
The user can perform all the acts which he has been given authorisation for 
(Finally  in  the  example,  the  doctor  can  perform  collecting,  processing  and 
storing on the patient medical record). 
 
The abstract terms defined in figure 28 (such as start, receiving request, etc.) 
are translated to more practice terms (such as web service, GUI…)   Figure 
29 above illustrates an ontology-based access control processor that includes 
several data stores (the ontology and the database) an interface (java GUI) 
and an evaluation system that works as described previously in figure 28.   
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figureb29
The system has two inputs at point 1 from web services (e.g. user trying to 
access  the  system  from  home
appointments schedule from home). Other input at point 2
user can access from the system GUI through the hospital LAN. Point 3 works 
similar to point 4 in figure 28. 
needs to receive access requests from either of the two inputs and submit 
them to the evaluation system at point 3. The evaluation system will need to 
refer to the ontology that is developed in protégé OWL to check authori
privileges  given  to  this  user  as  mentioned
ontology needs to check from the database the group of user which this user 
belongs to. To do so, the ontology needs to be mapped to the database at 
point 7. Checking the group of user, the ontology in protégé owl will check t
given properties and conditions to this user at point 5 and accordingly the 
authorised  acts  of  chain  (as  in  our  example  the  doctor  is  only  allowed  to 
access  his  appointment  schedule  to  “collect”  information  only  as  he  can’t 
“process” means change or edi
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b29:  Ontology-based access control system 
The system has two inputs at point 1 from web services (e.g. user trying to 
access  the  system  from  home-such  as  doctor  wants  to  check  his 
appointments schedule from home). Other input at point 2-each authorised 
user can access from the system GUI through the hospital LAN. Point 3 works 
similar to point 4 in figure 28. The system through its application interface 
ess requests from either of the two inputs and submit 
them to the evaluation system at point 3. The evaluation system will need to 
refer to the ontology that is developed in protégé OWL to check authori
privileges  given  to  this  user  as  mentioned  previously  in  figure
ontology needs to check from the database the group of user which this user 
belongs to. To do so, the ontology needs to be mapped to the database at 
point 7. Checking the group of user, the ontology in protégé owl will check t
given properties and conditions to this user at point 5 and accordingly the 
authorised  acts  of  chain  (as  in  our  example  the  doctor  is  only  allowed  to 
access  his  appointment  schedule  to  “collect”  information  only  as  he  can’t 
“process” means change or edit the appointments as this is the job of other 
The system has two inputs at point 1 from web services (e.g. user trying to 
to  check  his 
each authorised 
user can access from the system GUI through the hospital LAN. Point 3 works 
The system through its application interface 
ess requests from either of the two inputs and submit 
them to the evaluation system at point 3. The evaluation system will need to 
refer to the ontology that is developed in protégé OWL to check authorisation 
previously  in  figure  28.  The 
ontology needs to check from the database the group of user which this user 
belongs to. To do so, the ontology needs to be mapped to the database at 
point 7. Checking the group of user, the ontology in protégé owl will check the 
given properties and conditions to this user at point 5 and accordingly the 
authorised  acts  of  chain  (as  in  our  example  the  doctor  is  only  allowed  to 
access  his  appointment  schedule  to  “collect”  information  only  as  he  can’t 
t the appointments as this is the job of other 170 
 
group of users which is the receptionist). The ontology will then retrieve the 
authorised set of acts to the evaluation system at point 4 and accordingly the 
evaluation system will allow the user to access the database entity at point 6.  
 
5.4 The Ontology Design 
 
The whole ontology is presented in Figure 30.  171 
 
  Figure 30:  Overall Ontology classes. 172 
 
 While Figure 31 gives more focus on the healthcare part: 
 
 
 
Figure 31:  Focus on the healthcare part of the ontology. 
 
The  ontology  given  on  the  previous  figure,  defines  the  components  of  a 
healthcare organisation that is used to implement an ontology-based access 
control.  In this healthcare organisation example, different classes of actors or 
organisations are each provided access to different types of information or 
stored data.  Each of the different classes of actors or organisations is also 
able to be provided with different permissions with regards to the different acts 
that can be performed on that information or stored data upon which the acts 
are performed.   
 
The top level of the ontology states “healthcare” and indicates that all lower 
level nodes of the example ontology are part of the “healthcare” organisation.  
The healthcare organisation has an actor node with lower level nodes defining 
each  class  of  actor.    Illustrated  are  a  patient,  a  doctor,  a  nurse,  an 
administrator and a manager.  Each class of actor is generally provided with 173 
 
different accesses to information and to different acts that can be performed 
on that information. 
 
The healthcare organisation has an organisation node with lower level nodes 
defining each class of organisation that is permitted access to information.  
Illustrated are a hospital, general practice and insurer organisation.  Access to 
information and to different acts that can be performed on that information are 
able to be restricted or granted based upon the organisation associated with 
the user who is requesting the act.   
 
The healthcare organisation has a record node with lower level nodes defining 
each class of data record that is stored and operated upon by acts performed 
on that data.  Each class of data record is a type of data stored in a database 
or other data storage device and to which access is controlled.  Illustrated are 
a medical record, a doctor’s letter and an insurance policy data set.  Access to 
each of these classes of data, and the type of access such as create, access, 
delete is able to be restricted or granted based upon the class of requestor or 
organisation associated with the requestor of the act to be performed on that 
data. 
 
The  healthcare  organisation  has  an  event  node  with  lower  level  nodes 
defining each type of context that can occur in the healthcare organisation.  
Illustrated are a referral, surgery, treatment and consultation.  The ability to 
initiate each of these events/contexts, or to be the object of each of these 
events, is able to be restricted or granted based upon the class of requestor 
or organisation associated with the requestor of that event or of the object of 
the requested event.  For example, a doctor is able to request medical record 
of a patient, but an administrator is not able to request patient medical record. 
 
The system receives a request from the user.  The system uses the ontology 
mapping and the ontology definition database to determine the class of actor 
to which the requestor belongs.  The system accesses the chain associated 174 
 
with the requested act and determines if the user is authorised to perform the 
act associated with that chain on the requested data. 
 
5.5 Example of the Mechanism of the Overall System 
 
The  overall  mechanism  of  the  system  and  all  its  parts  is  presented  in  the 
following two figures. 
 
 
 
Figure 32:  How the system works. 
 
And the following figure (Figure 33) is an example of how the system above 
works for a specific scenario. 175 
 
 
 
 
As shown in the two figures: a data access request will begin with the user 
requesting  access  to  a  specific  record  (for  example  a  doctor  requests  a 
patient record).  From the profile of the current user, it is possible to determine 
what kind of user they are designated (for example a doctor).  By querying the 
ontology,  one  can  determine  the  set  of  contexts  under  which  this  user  is 
allowed  to  access  the  data  (in  this  example,  appointment,  emergency, 
consultation, etc.). Next, each context must be checked for preconditions until 
a  context  is  confirmed  as  being  valid  for  the  user  (in  this  case  the 
appointment).  Checking the preconditions may involve gathering data from 
the database, or querying the credentials of the user. Once a given context is 
 
Figure 33:  Example on how the system works. 176 
 
valid for the request, access can be granted.  Otherwise, access to the record 
is denied.  
 
5.6 Summary  
 
The method, for controlling access to sensitive data, should contain: 
•  Storage  of  chain  definitions,  each  chain  definition  is  defining  a 
respective chain to perform a respective act on respective data, and 
the respective chain defining the number of processes to be performed 
on the respective data. 
•  Receiving  a  request  from  a  user  to  perform  a  requested  act  on  a 
requested data. 
•  Defining  a  class  of  actor  associated  with  the  user  to  determine 
permissions for the class of actor associated with the user to execute a 
chain that performs the requested act on the requested data. 
 
Implementation of the system that has been designed in this chapter will be 
presented in the next chapter. 177 
 
 
Chapter 6  
System 
Implementation 
and Testing   
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This chapter will focus on the process undertaken to implement and integrate 
each component of the system such as:  
-  Chain method 
-  Ontology and semantics 
-  The Java code 
 
Implementation  choices  according  to  design  strategy  and  problems 
experienced  during  implementation  process  will  be  also  highlighted  in  this 
chapter. 
 
6.1 Overview of the System Architecture 
 
The  user  data  on  a  working  system  will  be  constantly  changing,  so  a 
requirement  of  this  project  is  to  provide  and  act  upon  a  live  view  of  the 
database in order that it can behave dynamically as the database updates 
and  changes.  The  system  also  needs  a  facility  to  write  data  back  to  the 
database. This means that the system needs to address this issue also, by 
providing both read/write access to the live data as show in Figure 34. 
 
In order for the prototype to be usable, it was also agreed that a GUI needed 
to be provided to the user for the presentation and input of data. 
 
In short the system requirements are: 
 
1.  To provide a live connection to a database. 
2.  To apply access control to this database in a context sensitive manner. 
3.  To allow configuration of the system via a domain ontology as provided 
by the system administrator. 
4.  To provide both read and write access to the database. 
5.  To present some form of GUI, intended for the end user. 179 
 
 
The requirements of the project were formally identified. A high level overview 
of the system was produced in order to provide an overall impression of the 
structure of the prototype as shown in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 34:  a high level overview of the system according to requirements. 
 
A  list  of  system  scenarios  has  already  been  presented  in  Chapter  3. 
Scenarios  were  used  for  the  design  of  the  medical  ontology  and  were 
intended to provide formal documentation of the semantic rules to be applied 
to the database.  
 
These lists of scenarios provide quite comprehensive coverage for all possible 
users of the system and all of the possible actions these users at any hospital 
could undertake.  
 
The system design is an integration of many subsystems such as ontology, 
reasoner  and  database.  The  following  diagram,  gives  a  close  look  at  the 
system back end and the “model” of the MVC design pattern. It illustrates how 
the  subsystems  (ODEMapster,  Jena)  interact  with  the  reasoner  to  form  a 
whole system.  In the following sections the researcher will go through the 
subsystems in detail. 
 
 180 
 
 
Figure 35:  A high level MVC diagram. 
 
The  first  implementation  decision  that  was  made  was  to  select  the  Java 
language to code the system, because this language is understandable by all 
other supporting elements such as Protégé OWL, Jena (HP Labs, 2009) and 
ODEMapster  (UPM,  2010).    Using  Java  simplified  the  integration  between 
these  tools,  because  they  could  be  imported  directly  into  the  project  as 
required.  
 
The  other  main  component  was  the  database.  This  database  has  gone 
through many versions: the first version used ORACLE DBMS while the final 
version used MySQL DBMS, because some of the supporting tools such as: 
ODEMapster has not been previously connected with ORACLE. In addition, 
MYSQL  provides  also  a  large  database  which  was  required  for  the 
experiments. 
 
Another key requirement of the prototype was to provide a live connection to 
the fundamental database. In order to do this, two choices were available: 
D2RQ and ODEMapster.  ODEMapster was chosen because it provides more 
GUI features and is easier to use. Also it  was essential to define a direct 181 
 
mapping from the fundamental database system to the reasoning engine and 
ontology which would define the access rules. Therefore colleagues from the 
University of Madrid have suggested using ODEMapster in conjunction with 
the  NeON  toolkit  to  achieve  this.  This  would  provide  the  required  GUI  for 
configuring  the  database.  In  addition  the  latest  version  of  this 
programODEMapster2  allowed  programmatic  access  to  the  engine  and 
allowed it to be embedded within the system more efficiently. 
 
In a real system, it is crucial that the back end model of the system must be 
run directly on the database server or another trusted system, as running the 
model  on  the  user’s  computer  may  cause  the  passing  of  unfiltered  data 
across  the  network  and  to  systems  over  which  the  organisation  has  no 
control. This would cause a threat to the system security.  
 
A  central  part  of  the  system  is  the  use  of  ontologies  for  modelling  and 
reasoning. As has been mentioned in the previous chapters, our proposed 
solution  to  preserving  the  privacy  in  the  data  access  management  should 
make use of ontologies to define the problem domain, and in doing so provide 
a  definition  of  the  prerequisites  by  which  the  information  stored  in  the 
database  will  be  controlled.  This  demands  that  the  system  must  have  the 
ability of reading, interpreting and manipulating ontologies. 
 
For  this  purpose  it  has  been  decided  to  use  a  tool  known  as  Jena.  This 
simplifies a considerable amount of the work required for interfacing with the 
ontologies. There are other APIs that could have been used, such as Jastor 
(Szekely and Betz, 2011) and OWL API (University of Manchester, 2011), but 
Jena  is  currently  the  most  popular  and  reliable  option  as  it  supports  for 
connection  to  other  tools.  Now  that  the  relevant  subsystems  have  been 
identified,  it  is  possible  to  discuss  how  these  will  fit  together  to  form  the 
system as a whole. 
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In the following sub sections the researcher will go through the subsystems in 
detail. 
 
6.2 Chain Method 
 
As  mentioned  in  Chapter  2,  Al-Fedaghi  proposed  an  alternative  way  of 
dealing with personal information. In order to do this, 7 distinguished types of 
acts on personal information have been identified, varying from collecting data 
from a specific proprietor to the disclosing of data to a specific agent. The 
purpose  of  accessing  or  processing  is  defined by  a  chain  of  acts  that  are 
carried  out  during  the  course  of  this  processing  activity.  By  following  the 
possible paths that data may take in order to transfer from one act to another, 
potential threats in the data protection policy can be occurred by identifying 
the possible paths by which personal information may end up in malicious 
hands. Chains can be used to observe the purposes in a visual sense which 
helps in the process of simplifying the defining the privacy policy (Al-Fedaghi, 
2007). The Chain method will be used according to the context founded in the 
ontology, in order to decide which authorised users to access what data and 
what are the functions to be given to those users on this data. The Chain 
method for a Receptionist/Admin is given in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 36:  Acts of Chain for Admin. 
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The Chain has been implemented in the system at the application level. As 
shown in the figure, the acts of the chains for the receptionist are shown as 
buttons  that  are  connected  to  the  required  database.  Once  the  user  is 
authorised these buttons will be enabled to act on the required data. The acts 
that  are  applicable for  the  receptionist  in  this  case are Process, Mine  and 
Create.  Each  act  is  associated  with  specific  functions  such  as:  Create-to 
create new profile file at the registration process, Mine-to search for existing 
patient data and process-to edit the information of an existing patient. 
 
   
In  addition,  those  acts  (that  are  presented  as  buttons)  are  connected  to 
specific entities of the data and can only be applied to these entities according 
to the context given. 
Figure 37:  The “acts” of the Chain method as it appears in the Admin GUI. 184 
 
 
6.2.1 Overview of the Developed Database 
 
The process that will be followed for the construction of the database is the 
designing  Phase,  which  includes  a  number  of  iterative  steps  for  the  end-
product  to  be  flexible.  This  phase  actually  defines  the  information  (+  its 
structure) that will go into the database, the assumptions made related to the 
type or values of the data items and the relationship between the data items 
within the database. In fact, there is a need to construct a database for the 
scenarios that have been collected from the hospital. Standard practice will be 
followed based on exist clinic management systems such as open HER. 
 
In order to construct the required database, the following main steps have 
been followed: 
 
1. Requirement Analysis 
 
The  database  requirements  are  determined.  The  exact  requirement  of  the 
user from the system is captured. All the relevant information related to the 
system is gathered. Therefore the procedures below have been undertaken to 
get the required information to build the system database: 
•  Sampling of existing documentation, forms, databases from the IC 
•  Research and site visits 
•  Observation of the work environment in the IC 
•  Questionnaires for the staff at the IC 
•  Prototyping  build  a  small  model  of  the  user’s  requirement  to  verify 
beforehand.  Our  database  went  through  many  version  before  it 
reached its final shape 
•  Joint Requirements Planning (JRP)- group meetings were conducted to 
analyse existing problems 185 
 
 
2. Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) 
 
The  information  gathered  during  the  ‘Requirement  Analysis’  step  is 
transformed  into  an  ERD  (Entity  Relationship  Diagram)  that  is  the  data  is 
organised into entities and relationships between them. So instead of going 
through  a  lengthy  piece  of  material,  a  pictorial  representation  of  the  same 
piece of information will be provided which is easier to read. 
 
The ER diagram is presented in Figure 38. 
 
 
Figure 38:  ER of the developed database. 186 
 
 
Various data modelling languages can be used to create an ERD such as 
crow’s  foot  notation,  Chen  notation,  IDEFIX  (Integration  Definition  for 
Information  Modelling),  Shading  notation,  Bachman  notation,  UML  (Unified 
Modelling Language) standard etc.  
 
3. Relational Model 
 
After developing the ER diagram, it will be converted into a relational model 
through the following three steps:  
•  Turned each non-weak entity set into its corresponding table with the 
same set of attributes 
•  Replaced a relationship by a relation whose attributes are the keys of 
the connecting entity sets 
•  Replaced a weak entity set by a relation whose attributes are its own 
attributes  (if  any)  plus  the  borrowed  attributes  that  help  to  make 
its primary key. 
 
Figure 39 shows the main database tables and attributes.  
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Figure 39:  Tables of our database. 188 
 
 
4. Normalisation 
 
An example medical database has been prepared according to the discussion and 
information  collected  from  experts  in  the  field  and  especially  the  database 
administrator from the hospital. This was a prototype relational database running on 
a MySQL environment. The researcher attempted to include all the necessary fields 
and tables required to cover the given scenarios from Chapter 4 in this database. 
The  final  version  of  the  relational  database  is  composed  of  17  tables  and  a 
description will be provided of each table in the following: 
 
•  Appointments table– Records a list and details of all appointments arranged 
between patients and medical staff. 
 
•  Billing table – Records a list of billable items resulting from services provided 
to a patient. 
 
•  Clinicians  table  –  Records  a  list  of  all  medical  staff,  along  with  their 
information and specific job role. 
 
•  Clinical users – Records a list of all system users. This includes both medical 
and non-medical staff and can also include patients who have access to their 
own data. 
 
•  Departments table – Records a list of the different departments which form 
the clinic. 
 
•  Doctorinstructions table – Records a list of the instructions that have been 
specified by a doctor to be completed for the patient. 
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•  Episodes  table –  Records  a  list  of  “episodes”  which  are  simply  individual 
cases where the patient has needed to visit the clinic. 
 
•  Immunisations table – Records a list of immunisations that have been given 
to each patient. 
 
•  Lab table – Records the results of laboratory testing, undertaken in order to 
diagnose the patient. 
 
•  Nursing table – Records instances where the patient has been kept under 
the care of the clinic. 
 
•  Patients table – A very crucial table. Stores a demographic record of each of 
the patients. 
 
•  Prescriptions  table  –  Records  the  prescriptions  that  have  been  given  by 
doctors to each patient. 
 
•  Radiology  table  –  Records  instances  where  a  patient  has  visited  the 
radiology department, along with subsequent results. 
 
•  Referrals  table  –  Records  a  list  of  referrals,  where  patients  have  been 
referred to other areas of the clinic for further diagnosis or treatment. 
 
•  Surgery table – Records a list of instances where a patient has undergone 
surgery. 
 
•  Vitals table – Records each instance where a patient has had their vitals 
checked (blood pressure, etc.) along with the results of these checks. 
 
•  Waitinglist table – Records a list of patients who are waiting to be seen by a 
clinician. This differs from an appointment as the patient does not have an 190 
 
agreed time to be seen and patients should generally be seen by assigned 
priority based on the severity of their condition. 
 
In this section, a description of the database has been given: starting with its basic 
requirements and then the creation of the ER diagram and finally, the transfer of the 
ER diagram into tables. 
 
“The proof is in the pudding”—the quality of the database is assessed only by using 
it in applications for which it has been designed, as will be described later on this 
chapter.   
 
6.3 Ontology 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the main chain method problem is in defining its 
terms (the 7 acts) and how to apply them in real applications such as the healthcare 
domain.  The  solution  has  been  found  in  defining  its  terms  in  an  ontology,  as 
analysing domain knowledge is possible once a declarative specification of the terms 
is available.  Formal analysis of terms is extremely valuable when both attempting to 
reuse existing ontologies and extending them (McGuinness et al., 2000). 
 
Though the developed ontology for personal information in healthcare, this ontology 
can then be used as a basis for many applications but the researcher has chosen to 
use it in data access management. 
The ontology has been constructed using the Protégé Owl environment in order to 
be  connected  to  a  real  project from  the health  sector.  Web  Ontology  Language 
(OWL)  is  part  of  the  growing  stack  of  W3C  Recommendations  related  to  the 
Semantic Web. The Semantic Web is a vision for the future of the Web, in which 
information is given explicit meaning, making it easier for machines to automatically 
process and integrate information available on the Web.  
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 Another main decision in developing the otology was whether to use an existing 
ontology from the literature or start working on it from scratch. There are libraries of 
reusable  ontologies  on  the  Web  and  in  the  literature.  For  example,  (Ontolingua, 
2011) or (DAML, 2011) could be used.  There are also a number of publicly available 
commercial ontologies (e.g., UNSPSC, RosettaNet and DMOZ). 
 
There are also a number of medical ontologies in the literature such as: open clinical 
ontology,  clinical  ontology  website,  UMBEL,  open  wetware  and  much  more. 
However, none of them cover all the process in the hospital, the health personal 
information  and  the  rules  controlling  the  access  management  of  the  hospital 
database that are covered by the ontology proposed in this thesis. 
 
The second phase of ontology implementation was writing down a list of all terms the 
researcher would like either to make statements about or to explain to a user. For 
our case, important healthcare-related terms according to our survey in the hospital 
was doctor, patient, nurse, medical record, prescription, etc. It was essential to get a 
comprehensive list of terms without worrying about overlap between concepts they 
represent, relations among the terms, or any properties that the concepts may have, 
or whether the concepts are classes or slots. Once this phase has been finished, a 
class hierarchy needed to be constructed. 
 
There are several possible approaches in developing a class hierarchy (Uschold and 
Gruninger,  1996).  In  this  thesis  a combination  approach  has  been  followed  (the 
combination approach is a combination of the top-down and bottom-up approaches). 
The researcher has defined the more salient concepts first and then generalises and 
assigns  them  appropriately.  She  started  with  a  few  top-level  concepts  such 
as AgentUser, and a few specific concepts, such as doctor. She then related them to 
a middle-level concept, such as AgentRole as shown in figure 40.   
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Figure 40:  Basic classes of the developed Ontology. 
 
 
 
In this thesis the third approach has been followed. 
 
Figure 41 provides an overview of the basic structure of the classes, subclasses and 
relations.  
  
Figure
 
Classes from the list of terms created in
remaining terms are likely to be 
example, hasContext of, is
record and hasValidUserType for classes like Admin as shown in this part of the 
ontology shown in the following figure ex
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42:  Example on Properties in the ontology.
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These  properties  become  slots  attached  to  classes.  Thus,  the Record class  for 
example will have the following slots: isUsedby and is usedfor. 
 
Some systems allow specification of a minimum and maximum cardinality (e.g. the 
value of a name slot (as in “the name of a patient”) is one string. That is, name is a 
slot with value type String) to describe the number of slot values more precisely. 
Minimum  cardinality  of  N  means  that  a  slot  must  have  at  least  N  values.  For 
example, a doctor should have a maximum of one patient at each appointment, and 
a patient should have minimum of one address to be registered. 
 
After defining a considerable number of new classes, it is helpful to stand back and 
check if the emerging hierarchy conforms to guidelines in (Natalya et al., 2003). 
 
The class hierarchy represents an “is-a” relation: a class A is a subclass of B if every 
instance of B is also an instance of A. For example, MedicalRecord is a subclass 
of Record.  Another  way  to  think  of  the  taxonomic  relation  is  as  a  “kind-of” 
relation: MedicalRecord is a kind of Record.  
 
A common modelling mistake is to include both a singular and a plural version of the 
same  concept  in  the  hierarchy  making  the  former  a  subclass  of  the  latter.  For 
example,  it  is  wrong  to  define  a  class  Doctors and  a  class Doctor as  a  subclass 
of Doctors. Once you think of the hierarchy as representing the “kind-of” relationship, 
the modelling error becomes clear: a single doctor is not a kind of doctors. The best 
way  to  avoid  such  an  error  is  always  to  use  either  singular  or  plural  in  naming 
classes.  In  this  thesis  the  researcher  uses  singular  naming  for  classes  such  as: 
doctor, record etc. 
 
Some  of  the  relations  in  this  thesis  have  been  made  transitive.  For  example,  a 
class AgentUser is defined, and then a class AgentRole as a subclass of AgentUser 
is defined. Then a class Doctor is defined as a subclass of AgentRole. Transitivity of 195 
 
the  subclass  relationship  means  that  the  class Doctor is  also  a  subclass 
of AgentUser.  
 
To summarise the steps that have been followed to construct this ontology are: 
 
•  defining classes in the ontology, 
•   arranging the classes in a taxonomic (subclass–superclass) hierarchy, 
•   defining slots and describing allowed values for these slots, 
•   Filling in the values for slots for instances. 
 
The validity of the developed ontology will be tested using it in the application for 
which it has been designed for, as will be shown on next sections. 
 
6.3.1 Ontology Mapping 
 
A central concept in this system design is linking the relational database that has 
been made to the ontology that has been developed. For this purpose a kind of 
software called ODEMapster2 has been used.   
 
ODEMapster2 was used in defining these mappings, first using the R2O schema, but 
this was then changed to R2RML (W3C, 2011) upon the advice of the colleagues in 
Madrid, as ODEmapster2 was considered to be a more accurately defined standard. 
The R2RML mapping format is expressed as RDF graphs, which was very helpful in 
simplifying the work.   
 
Figure 43 shows the mappings made to link the relational database to the ontology. 
This  illustrates  how  the  tables  in  the  database  directly  relate  to  classes  in  the 
ontology. 
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Each table is defined as containing a list of objects; this creates a list of individuals 
within  the  ontology.  Then,  the  relationships  between  tables  are  defined  as  being 
properties of these objects. 
 
Figure 43:  The mapping between the ontology and the database. 
 
As shown in the figure above, the researcher has connected the main concepts from 
the ontology to the main entities of the database. This would help the reasoner and 
the system works effectively as will be shown on Chapter 7. 
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6.3.2 The Jena Framework 
 
One of  the  key  features  of this  system  is that  it needs  to  integrate a  number  of 
subsystems.  So in order to get use of the ontology, there is a need to import Jena 
v2.6.4 as a library in Eclipse. JENA is a Semantic Web Rule Language. The purpose 
of using JENA in this project is creating a mapping between the RDF file created and 
OWL ontology created. 
 
Jena was then used to import and manipulate ontology OWL files inside the Java 
code. 
 
The methods for doing this are so clear and straight forward (see appendix for the 
java code details).   
 
Getting the defaultNS (namespace) right is very important. If it is mixed up, the files 
would successfully be loaded into the model but then this causes a silent issue when 
creating the bridge, it does not produce any visible errors. This has been fixed by 
using the same namespace when creating the RDF file (using ODEMapster), and the 
OWL ontology.  
 
“http://www.q8onto.org/healthcareOntology/” is used as the project namespace. 
 
6.4 ODEMapster 
 
A complete discussion and code used for ODEMAPSTER can be found in Appendix. 
 
 
6.5 The Semantic Web 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, semantics is the study of meanings. It is needed in this 
thesis  to  define  the  prerequisites  and  chains  for  the  system.  This  is  necessary 198 
 
because the aim is to retrieve data which can be understood and shared across 
many applications. This will eventually enable data access management systems to 
not  only  display  information,  but  also  understand  this  information,  gather  other 
relevant  data  and  make  decisions  based  on  this.  This  would  help  significantly  in 
making the work of the database administrators more efficient (Berners-Lee, 2001). 
In  order  to  achieve  this  goal,  a  number  of  technologies  are  currently  under 
development. These include RDF, Ontologies and SPARQL. And the researcher will 
integrate  all  of  these  technologies  in  order  to  produce  our  new  data  access 
management system. 
 
 
6.5.1 Semantic Reasoner 
 
The reasoning API is encapsulated in the edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.inference 
package. The main classes that will be used are the ReasonerManager (used to 
obtain  a  reasoner)  and  Protégé  OWLReasoner  (an  interface  to  the  external  DIG 
reasoner. 
 
Usually,  the  first  step  when  using  the  reasoning  API  is  to  obtain  an  instance  of 
Protégé OWLReasoner for an OWL model. This instance of the reasoner can then 
be  used  to  obtain  inferred  information  about  the  model  such  as  inferred  super 
classes, inferred equivalent classes, and inferred types for individuals. The Protégé 
OWLReasoner manages communication with the external DIG reasoner, ensuring 
that it is always properly synchronised with the internal Protégé-OWL model. 
 
In  order  to  get  an  instance  of  Protégé  OWLReasoner  for  an  OWL  model,  the 
ReasonerManager,  which  is  found  in  the 
edu.stanford.smi.protegex.owl.inference.protegeowl package, must be used.  
 
The ReasonerManager is a singleton class (a class with only one instance), whose 
instance can be obtained by using the static method getInstance(). 
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The getReasoner(OWLModel kb) method on the ReasonerManager can be used to 
obtain the reasoner for the specified OWLModel. This method will return the same 
instance of Protégé OWLReasoner for a given model each time it is called. This 
method  of  reasoning  is  preferred  since  the  default  implementation  of  Protégé 
OWLReasoner only synchronises the external DIG reasoner with the Protégé-OWL 
model when necessary (when changes have occurred to the OWL model) - creating 
a  new  reasoner  every  time  will  cause  the  external  DIG  reasoner  to  be 
resynchronised  every  time,  which  could  be  costly  in  terms  of  time  for  large 
ontologies.  
 
Once  the  connection  to  a  reasoner  has  been  established,  the  reasoner  can  be 
queried for information about the ontology. 
 
6.6 JAVA Graphical User Interface 
 
From these design diagrams, it was now possible to start developing the system as it 
would appear in the form of Java classes. The prototype system was divided into five 
packages. These are: 
 
Model:  contains the back end of the system. These classes deal with overseeing 
the running of the system back end, which includes calling the semantics, and then 
retrieving and interpreting the data received. 
 
View:  Contains the GUI of the system. 
 
Control:  Deals with interpreting events from the GUI as triggered by the user, and 
in turn driving the model to produce the required data to be displayed in the GUI. 
 
Semantics:  Contains  the  decision-making  engine  of  the  system.  Classes  in  this 
package rely on the use of ODEMapster2 and Jena in order to interface with the 
domain ontology and database. 
  
Consts:  A  package  dedicated  solely  to  defining  constants for  use  in  the  system 
internally. These include constants for identifying the GUI components, as well as 
variables  that  form  part  of  the  system  configuration  (location,  username  and 
password of the database for example).
 
Figure
 
Figure 45 is a snapshot for the system that shows how the final GUI is presented by 
the prototype. Simple Widget Toolkit SWT has been used in order to implement the 
system interface. This involved importing an SWT library into the project. This also 
presented  an  issue,  as  SWT  requires  a  specific  library  depending  on  the  host 
operating system (i.e. Mac/Windows/Linux). As a result, it was necessary to either:
 
1) Include multiple versions of the SWT library in order to support multiple operating
systems. 
Or, 
2) Package multiple versions of the prototype to support different systems.
 
Using  approach  number  one  would  involve  producing  a  prototype  that  was 
unnecessarily bloated, and option two would involve providing a program for each 
specific OS. In a real case scenario
decide the correct version at the point of installation, or installing a more bloated 
program which would then take more disk space. It has been chosen to package 
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multiple versions for each OS, as this was easier for the sake of a prototype than 
detecting the OS and loading the correct library at runtime. The figure below shows a 
view of the final GUI as it appears in the prototype. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Testing the System Implementation 
 
In this section and Appendix I, an oversight will be provided on how each component 
was tested, and the rationale behind each set of tests. In a recent paper, (Liu and 
Tan, 2009) have stated on the subject, the “for a system with ordinary complexity, 
the  number  of  input  conditions  can  be  very  large”.  This  statement  supports  the 
common belief that it is simply not feasible to test every single possible input to 
ensure the correct behaviour of the program. 
 
Instead, it is important that one carefully selects a specific set of tests that will focus 
on identifying cases where the tests are most likely to fail (Hayes and Offutt, 1999). 
Over  the  following  section  and  Appendix  I,  overview  will  be  given  how  each 
component was tested, including the results of these tests.  
Figure 45:  Final Java GUI. 202 
 
Testing the integrated system as a whole in real application  
 
After each part of the system has been tested separately, the performance of the 
system as a whole will be examined in real application. The first thing that shows up 
when the researcher runs the project as a java application is the login screen as 
shown on Figure 46. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the user access with his username and password, then the system will check his 
authority to access which chains by checking the ontology through spiral queries.  
 
Once it checks the validity of the username and password according to the ontology 
conditions he would be directed to the following interface as shown in Figure 47.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46:  Login screen of the investigated system. 
Figure 47:  Main GUI of the investigated system. 203 
 
As shown in the figure above, there is a table called Results. The patient IDs, names 
and DOB appears in that table according to the context of the authorisation. This 
context is a condition that has been stated in the ontology and according to them not 
all the patients that are saved in the database and have relation with that user will 
appear.  
 
Only those who fulfil the ontology conditions will appear. Also as shown in the figure 
above,  there  are  buttons  at  left  top  and  right  bottom.  Those  buttons  have  been 
named  according  to  the  chain  terminologies  such  as:  Mine,  process  and  create. 
These buttons enabled and disabled according to the conditions in the ontology. The 
conditions in the ontology can be easily edited in protégé owl editor and saved and 
then used directly in the system.  
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter design principles that have been set in Chapter 6, are translated into 
implementation  procedures  to  compose  the  whole  integrated  system:  starting  by 
analysing  the  system  architecture  and  overall  shape,  and  finally  analysing  the 
implementation of each part separately. The three main parts of the system are: 
 
-  Chain and Database  
-  Ontology 
-  Java GUI 
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In  addition  to  technical  presentation  of  the  process  that  have  been  followed  to 
implement each part. Finally, a series of tests have been done to each part of the 
developed system and the system as a whole to prove its functionality.  On next 
chapter, the hypothesis will be tested through set of experiments using the system 
that has been implemented and tested in this chapter. 205 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Experiments  and 
Evaluations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recalling  back  the  hypotheses  from  Chapter  4,  it  says  that  the  purpose  of  the 
present thesis is to improve the data access management by: 
 
•  Simplifying the configuration of a data access management system for a given 
database through a reduction of complexity (H1) 
•  Increasing the precision with which the algorithm discerns between legitimate 
and illegitimate access (H2). 206 
 
In the last two chapters the researcher has presented the design and implementation 
of  the  proposed  solution.  Several  experiments  were  conducted  to  evaluate  the 
proposed solution by comparison with existing techniques and the experiments and 
results are reported here. The experiments are divided into two main stages as will 
be presented in the following sections. In this chapter, the term ChBAC will be used 
to refer to the Chain that has been designed and implemented in this thesis and 
distinguish it from Al-Fedaghi’s Chain.  The Chain that has been proposed by Al-
Fedaghi  lacks  the  required  parameters  and  specifications  for  design  and 
implementation purposes.  
 
7.1 Experiments Overview 
 
As presented in Chapter 4, the experiments were divided into two main parts:  
 
-  To  validate  the  first  hypothesis  (H1)  that  has  been  presented  on  the 
introduction of this chapter: a set of experiments that compare RBAC to the 
Chain would be carried to show the simplicity/difficulty of the design of the two 
methods.  
-  While for the second hypothesis (H2) another set of experiments to examine 
the  performance  (Accuracy  /precision,  context  sensitivity  and  time  for 
retrieving) of the semantic chain method against RBAC and classical Chain.  
Consequently there are two main sections in the chapter to present these. 
In  the  next  two  sections,  the  two  sets  of  experiments  mentioned  above  will  be 
discussed in detail. First a presentation of the purpose of the experiment and how it 
is linked to the hypothesis will be given; then a description of the content of the 
experiments, type of respondents and type of data that will be collected. Details of 
the data that have been collected, how, with whom, and using what instruments will 
be given. Finally, discussion and analysis of the results are shown at the end of each 
set of experiments. 
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7.2 Ease of Design Experiments 
 
In these experiments the chain method was evaluated against the most common 
data access control paradigm, RBAC to validate H1. The main contention was that 
RBAC despite its popularity is complex both in the setting up and its use during run-
time  and  that  the  Chain  method,  as  claimed  in  the  literature,  provides  a  simpler 
method (Al-Fedaghi, 2007). As discussed in Chapter 2, the classical Chain method 
has neither been implemented nor tested to date. Thus the present thesis provides a 
first application of it and evaluates it against the RBAC method-as both methods 
provide management to database access in the application level.  Before presenting 
the results, the design of the experiment will be described. 
 
7.2.1 Design of Experiments 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, this set of experiments was designed to evaluate the 
required  number  of:  SQL  commands,  tables  and  constraints  to  construct  each 
method for each specific scenario from Table 3. The respondents were asked to 
write down all the SQL statements, create tables and constraints needed to apply the 
principles of each method for each specific scenario. The respondents were experts 
in database administration. 
 
The objective of the evaluation was to compare the complexity of the process of 
configuring  access permissions  using  the  ChBAC method  versus  the  RBAC one. 
The Hypothesis that relates to the reduction of complexity will be verified in this set 
of experiments. To evaluate this, the criteria for success will be: 
 
•  Reducing the steps of the design  
 
The experiments were conducted to evaluate the scenarios in Table 3 from Chapter 
four for the following main criteria: 
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•  Number of SQL statements needed to construct each scenario. 
•  Number of tables needed to fulfil requirements of each scenario. 
•  Number of constraints needed to fulfil requirements of each scenario. 
 
The respondents were asked to go through the scenarios one by one and implement 
the  necessary  restrictions  and  tables  using  SQL  statements  entered  from  the 
command line. It was decided to go through the construction of scenarios one by one 
as in practice if any access policy needed to be changed, the database administrator 
will go through the scenario independently (each scenario will be treated separately 
because this what happens in reality, e.g. the database administrator could either 
register a patient or disclose other patient billing) . In addition, he will need to change 
the related, tables, SQL commands and constraints. Every database administrator 
was given the scenarios table (Table 3 of Chapter 3). They were asked to design the 
database for each scenario (which would require certain number of SQL commands, 
number of tables and number of constraints). The database administrators used SQL 
statements for Oracle to create the database such as the following:  
 
CREATE TABLE [ IF NOT EXISTS ] table_name 
( column_declare1, column_declare2, constraint_declare1, ... ) 
constraint_declare :: = [ CONSTRAINT constraint_name ] 
 
Details of the SQL commands are given in Tables 7 and 8 later in this chapter. 
 
The numbers of SQL commands, tables and constraints received from the different 
database  administrators  were  almost  the  same  exactly,  and  in  case  of  different 
numbers, the number who has been agreed most by the database administrators 
has been selected. 
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7.2.2 Technical details of Experiments 
 
The tests were carried out by 5 database administrators as follows: 
•  3 database administrators from the IT department in the American University 
of Kuwait. 
•  A database administrator from the “International Clinic” hospital in Kuwait 
•  A database administrator from “Zain Company” for telecommunications.  
 
The respondents were asked to implement the required restrictions using the ChBAC 
and the RBAC methods and record the number of tables they had to create, as well 
as  the  number  of SQL  statements  required  and  the  number  of  constraints.    The 
reason  behind  choosing  these  measures,  which  may  be  overlapping  to  some 
degree, is to gain some insight into the typical complexity of implementing them from 
the point of view of the database administrator, as well as the results produced in the 
database that will affect the complexity with assessing access requests when users 
try to access the database.  
 
The  respondents  set  up  two  complete  and  working  designs,  one  for  the  RBAC 
method  and  the  other  for  the  ChBAC  method.  Their  design  and feedbacks  were 
recorded in large Excel sheets. Samples of these feedbacks are given in Tables 7 
and 8.The complete set of data is summarised in graphs 48, 49 and 50. The five 
database administrators produced their results in a lab in the American University of 
Kuwait,  in  the  IT  department. The experimental  setup  consisted  of five  computer 
units, each with 1066MHz Quadcore processors and 16 GB of RAM. They used SAN 
Storage and the database storage was 500 GB (mirrored with raid5) with ORACLE 
10g.  This  software  platform  was  the  clients’  preferred  back-end.    The  database 
administrators were asked to use the basic SQL statements. The respondents were 
asked to do this in the standard SQL format command prompt so that the researcher 
would have comparable results. 
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7.2.3 Results 
 
In this section the researcher presents all the results of the database administrators 
using the RBAC and Classical Chain methods.  
 
The following two tables go through examples from the results, to show the type of 
results that one would have in each field of the table. 211 
 
Scenario  Name of 
scenario 
 
 
Number of steps-
Number of SQL 
commands 
Number of 
tables 
Number of 
Constraints 
Constraints 
1.1  New patient 
registration 
 
4 
1-Create table patient; 
2-Create table Role-
Privilege for 
administrators; 
3-Insert data; 
4-Insert data; 
2 
1-Patient, 
2-Role-
Privilege for 
administrator
s; 
3  For each table constraints for: privilege and 
describing action on that table 
1.2  Booking 
appointments 
 
6 
1-Create table patient; 
2-Create table Role-
Privilege for 
administrators; 
3-Create table 
appointments; 
4-Insert data; 
5-Insert data; 
6-Insert data; 
3 
1-Patient, 
2-Role-
Privilege for- 
administrator
s, 
3-
Appointments 
7 At least  For each table constraints for: privilege and 
describing action on that table 212 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Sample of detailed scenario for RBAC 
1.3  Visit for 
appointment 
 
6 
1-Create table patient; 
2-Create table Role-
Privilege for 
administrators; 
3-Create table 
appointments; 
4-Insert data; 
5-Insert data; 
6-Insert data; 
3 
1-Patient, 
2-Role-
Privilege for- 
administrator
s, 
3-
Appointments 
6 At least  For each table constraints for: privilege and 
describing action on that table 
1.4  Emergency case  6 
1-Create table patient; 
2-Create table Role-
Privilege for 
administrators; 
3-Create table A&E; 
4-Insert data; 
5-Insert data; 
6-Insert data; 
3 
1-Patient, 
2-Role-
Privilege for- 
administrator
s, 
3-A&E 
6 At least  For each table constraints for: privilege and 
describing action on that table 213 
 
 
Scenario 
Name of 
scenario 
 
 
Number of 
steps-Number 
of SQL 
commands 
Number of 
tables 
Number of 
Constraints 
Constraints 
1.1  New patient 
registration 
 
2 
1-Create table 
patient; 
2-Insert data; 
1 
Patient 
2 
As in the case of 
the chain the 
constraints are 
the same as the 
chain 
Create, Store 
(As the privilege and action on data are specified 
by the act of the chain) 
1.2  Booking 
appointments 
 
4 
1-Create table 
patient; 
2-Create table 
appointments; 
3-Insert data; 
4-Insert data; 
2 
1-Patient, 
2-Appointments 
4 
For each table 
two constraints 
Create, Store 
1.3  Visit for 
appointment 
4 
1-Create table 
2 
1-Patient, 
4 
For each table 
Create, Store 214 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Sample of detailed scenario for Chain or ChBAC 
 
 
 
  patient; 
2-Create table 
appointments; 
3-Insert data; 
4-Insert data; 
2-Appointments  two constraints 
1.4  Emergency 
case 
4 
1-Create table 
patient; 
2-Create table 
A&E; 
3-Insert data; 
4-Insert data; 
2 
1-Patient, 
2-A&E 
4 
For each table 
two constraints 
Create, Store 215 
 
 
In  Figures  48,  49  and  50,  the  results  agreed  by  the  five  respondents  are 
shown  each  scenario  from  Table  3.    Considering  the  number  of  SQL 
statements, Figure 48 shows that in all cases the ChBAC method required 
fewer statements, tables and constraints to set up except for two situations 
4.1 and 4.2.  The results are mirrored for the three measures (Number of SQL 
statements,  Number  of  Tables  and  Number  of  Constraints)  with  the  only 
exception of the managerial access scenarios (scenarios 4.1 and 4.2) where 
the results are the same.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 48:  Comparison by Total number of SQL statements. 
 
Figure 48 shows that the number of SQL statements required for the Chain method 
is by 50% for scenarios 1.1 and 5.1.  While the percentage is 60% for scenarios 
1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.1, 3.3, 7.1 and 8.1. The percentage becomes 80% 
1.6, 2.2 and 3.2. 216 
 
The results presented in Figure 49 refer to the number of tables that had to be 
created to accommodate the restrictions and show in all but 2 scenarios a 
reduction of tables for ChBAC as compared to RBAC.   
 
Though  the  economy  (i.e.  reduction  in  number  of  tables  and  constraints 
required) was using 1 table per scenario, yet in some cases 2 or 3 are used. 
Again there was no difference for the management related scenarios.   
 
Figure 49 shows that number of tables required for the Chain method is less 
by 50% for scenarios 1.1, 1.4, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1 and 5.1.  While the percentage is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49:  Comparison by Total Number of Tables. 
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 60% for scenarios 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.1, 3.3, 7.1 and 8.1. The 
percentage becomes 80% 1.6, 2.2, 2.3 and 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 50:  Comparison by Total Number of Constraints. 
 
Figure 50 shows that number of constraints required for the Chain method is 
less by 50% for scenarios 2.4, 2.5, 3.1 and 6.1. While the percentage is 66% 
for scenarios 1.3, 1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.1, 3.3, 7.1 and 8.1. The percentage 
becomes 80% 1.6 2.3 and 3.2. 
 
 
7.2.4 Analysis and Discussion for the First Set of Experiments 
 
It should be noted that the results presented in Figures 48, 49 and 50 are not 
independent in that the SQL statements are used both for the setting up of 
tables and specifying constraints.   
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There appears to be a definite advantage of using ChBACs over RBAC from a 
configuration  perspective  and  the  researcher  expects  that  if  suitably 
implemented this reduced complexity could also speed up the assessment of 
privileges  as  users  access  the  database  to  retrieve  records,  though  this 
remains to be demonstrated.   
 
The benefits in terms of the measures presented are also reflected by the 
participants’  responses  to  an  exit  poll.    This  was  conducted  by  running 
experiments  with  database  administrators.    In  the  experiments  differing 
numbers  of  records,  for  differing  scenarios,  were  used  across  the  two 
methods.  Despite being seasoned implementers of RBAC access restrictions 
the database administrators did prefer the ChBAC method and felt that it was 
less  complex  and  easier  to  implement  All  five  of  our  respondents,  when 
questioned  about  their  views  on  these  two  methods  following  the  test 
implementations, agreed on the potential of the ChBAC method for their work 
in the database administration of the hospital. They were considering applying 
the ChBAC method on the system of the new branches of the hospital. They 
felt that the limited acts would help reduce the time to complete the database 
design.  They  were  impressed  by  the  fact  that  setting  up  the  required 
restriction took them half the time using ChBAC as compared to RBAC as will 
be shown in the next section. 
 
7.3 Run-time as opposed to configuration 
 
In order to see the effect of this difference in the number of required SQL 
statements, tables and constraints on the speed of the system and retrieving 
data, the researcher has developed two prototype Oracle databases using the 
two methods. The objective of this set of experiments is: 
 
•  To  measure  the  time  required  to  retrieve  required  data  for  each 
scenario with an increasing number of records. 219 
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7.3.2 Results 
 
 
The researcher conducted the experiments for the four first scenarios from 
Table  3  (as  they  contain  all  types  of  functions  and  privileges  that  can  be 
performed on a database such as: read, write, edit, delete and transfer) for 
different  numbers  of  records:  100,  200,  300,  400,  500,  600  and  700.  The 
results were as shown in Figures 51, 52, 53 and 54 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51:  
Time  required to 
query 
scenario 1.1 from Table1. 
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Figure 52:  Time required to query scenario 1.2 from Table1. 
Figure 53:  Time required to query scenario 1.3 from Table1. 221 
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Figure 54:  Time required to query scenario 1.4 from Table1. 222 
 
Those scenarios have been selected carefully to present all type of acts and 
privileges have been observed from the real hospital. As the real number of 
patients records were varying from 300-700 a day in the hospital, it has been 
decided to examine the two methods on the possible number of records from 
least possible scenario 100 to the maximum which is 700. The researcher has 
been advised by the expert database administrator to select the most relevant 
scenarios  that  usually  happen  in  the  hospital  to  concentrate  on  them  and 
create a prototype database for them. She has been also advised to repeat 
each  experiment  5  times  to  check  that  no  machine  or  human  error  has 
happened while recording the results. 
 
The results of the above figures show that the ChBAC outperforms the RBAC 
in the time required to perform the SQL queries. Chain requires half the time 
that is required by the RBAC on average. This is because the Chain method 
needs a lower number of tables, constraints and SQL commands than the 
RBAC method as shown in the previous section on Tables 7-11.   As shown 
also  in  the  figures,  the  time  increases  exponentially  while  the  number  of 
records increases.  
 
7.3.3 Analysis of the results 
 
The results were carefully examined by the five database administrators on 
different number of records: 100, 20, 300, 400, 500 and 600 on 4 different 
scenarios.  Each experiment has been repeated five times to assure that the 
results are really representative of the real case. As seen in Figures 54, 55, 56 
and 57 using the chain/ChBAC needed less time than the RBAC by 50-60 % 
in all scenarios. This would help very much in developing the Chain ontology 
based system as the time required to translate the SPARQL query to the SQL 
query  and  to  download  the  Jena  model  wouldn’t  affect  the  total  time  of 
retrieving data from the system, as the ChBAC needs much less time than the 
RBAC  method  as  shown  in  the  results  above.    After  being  the first  in  the 
literature to implement and test the Chain/ChBAC idea, but in the world of 223 
 
semantic this wouldn’t be enough when different users/agents need common 
language  (agreement  on  basic  concepts  definitions)  to  communicate  and 
share  data.  Other  criteria,  which  have  equal  importance  to  the  time  of 
retrieving and simplicity of design, come to the surface. A detailed discussion 
of these criteria is given in the next section. 
 
7.4 Overview of Semantic Experiments  
 
The first part of the experiments was regarding the simplicity of the design and 
it was shown that the Chain outperformed the RBAC in this regard. However, 
according  to  findings  from  the  literature  (see  Chapter  2),  the  outstanding 
problems from the RBAC and classical Chain have not been solved yet. The 
most  outstanding  among  these  problems  is  the  lack  of  context  sensitivity, 
flexibility, and accuracy. 
 
Flexibility here means that if you want to add, remove or edit a policy for a 
user; you need to reconstruct your database. And in this case, Chain would be 
easier as it requests fewer tables and constraints but it is still impractical to 
reconstruct your database each time you want to change a policy. On the 
other hand, context sensitivity means that the data retrieved according to the 
situation that the user in. So if the doctor who has an appointment would deal 
with  data  differently  than  if  he  had  an  emergency  case.  Finally,  accuracy 
means that the user will get exactly the information he needs, no more and no 
less. Because, if the user gets less information than he needs he will not be 
able to perform the task as required, while if he gets more than the required 
information, the possibility of disclosing sensitive information and the difficulty 
of auditing this disclosure will increase. 
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In this section, the researcher will validate the hypothesis “H2” which is: 
 
•  To  increase  the  precision  with  which  the 
algorithm  discerns  between  legitimate  and 
illegitimate access. 
 
The criteria of success for this are: 
 
•  The  need  for  fewer  parameters  to  implement  the  method  in  the 
semantic  language  OWL.    This  point  relates  to  the  simplicity  of  the 
design.  
•  Comparison between the ideal-results user expected from inquiries and 
the one resulted after using the developed prototype.  This point is to 
rewrite improve the data access management by improving precision 
(which means more focused set of results for answering a query) of the 
retrieved data. 
•  Measuring the time required to assess access requests and retrieve 
information.  To check that improving the precision of the retrieved data 
did not affect the time of retrieving data and make it slower compared 
with traditional methods. 
 
In  this  section,  the  researcher  has  established  experiments  by  which  the 
performance  of  the  method  under  investigation  against  RBAC  can  be 
evaluated  in  terms  of  retrieval  results.  The  researcher  will  show  on  next 
sections how the system needs much less parameters to convert its principles 
in semantic languages than RBAC and TBAC. Then and most important, the 
researcher    evaluates    the  semantic  system  with  the  classical  Chain  and 
RBAC  methods  in  terms  of  a  scenario  based  evaluation  where      a  multi-
pronged approach is taken by going through the scenarios with an information 
retrieval based evaluation and also by involving a user-based blind evaluation 
to confirm user neutrality towards the three systems. 225 
 
 
7.4.1 Design of Semantic Experiments 
 
Our strategy for this set of experiments was to divide it into two main parts: 
 
•  Experiments to show the difficulty or simplicity in implementing policies 
in OWL for three methods: RBAC, TBAC and Chain 
•  Experiments  to  show  the  reliability  of  the  system  in  handling  real 
scenarios with real users from the hospital to test specific performance 
criteria 
 
The first set of semantic experiments were carried out with the collaboration of 
the  IBM  research  manager  and  are  vital  to  show  the  relative  difficulty  in 
implementing the different methods (RBAC, TBAC and Chain) in OWL. 
 
7.5  Experiments  to  show  the  possibility  and  ease  of 
implementing the chain in semantic language 
 
As  mentioned  earlier  in  this  chapter,  the  Chain  method  proposed  by  Al-
Fedaghi (2007) lacks design and implementation specifications. 
 
Accordingly when the researcher started her experiment with IBM, she found 
at  that  she  is  not  able  to  neither  design  nor  implement  the  original  Chain 
because of lack of the design parameters. In addition, in order to translate 
these Chains to the ontology, it needs a clear definition for these parameters 
and to find its candidates in the other two methods RBAC and TBAC and this 
was the aim of the following part of the experiments. In addition, examples 
have been added to demonstrate the meaning of each parameter when it is 
applied to a real HL7 rule. 
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In order to set specifications, the first set is to set parameters of each method 
as will be shown in this section. 
 
For  generality,  the  researcher  will  walk  through  the process and  show  the 
results for a typical example, the IC and the OSF Healthcare System
1. The 
researcher represents and implements it in RBAC, TBAC, and Chains. 
 
As  these  representations  will  be  required  to  be  translated  into  a  standard 
form, both for healthcare domain reasons and in order to do a fair comparison, 
each representation was transformed into OWL
2, which has a direct mapping 
into HL7.  
 
Representing the three models above in the OWL language, the researcher 
found that the Chain model was the easiest to be translated as it contains 
fewer statements and simpler syntax. 
 
Figure 55:  Chain model using OWL. 
 
Figure 55 shows that the result of the transformation process would be of the 
form: 
<User ID>…. <User ID> 
<Act ID>……<Act ID> 
 
An example for this: 
                                                           
1OSF HealthCare is a multi-state corporation operating facilities in Illinois and Michigan. 
2OWL (The Web Ontology Language) is a family of knowledge representation languages for authoring ontologies 
that is endorsed by the World Wide Web Consortium. 227 
 
<User ID> receptionist1 <User ID> 
<Act ID>collect1<Act ID> 
 
Figure 56 shows the refinement process from the RBAC statements to OWL. 
 
Figure 56:  RBAC model using OWL. 
 
 
The resulting policy statement is of the form: 
<User ID> …… <User ID> 
<Object>………<Object> 
<Action> ……… <Action> 
<Role>……<Role> 
<Permission> …. <Permission> 
 
An example for this: 
 
<User ID>receptionist1<User ID> 
<Object>registration<Object> 
<Action> write<Action> 
<Role>receptionist<Role> 
<Permission>Allow<Permission> 
 
As TBAC is based on RBAC, the translation of the TBAC statements is similar 
to  the  translation  of  RBAC  statements  but  with  more  requirement  policies 
added to it the command: 228 
 
 
The resulting policy statement is of the form:   
 
<User ID> …… <User ID> 
<Object>………<Object> 
<Action> ……… <Action> 
<Role>……<Role> 
<Permission> …. <Permission> 
<Task> …. <Task> 
 
An example for this: 
 
<User ID>receptionist1<User ID> 
<Object>registration<Object> 
<Action> write<Action> 
<Role>receptionist<Role> 
<Permission>Allow<Permission> 
<Task> register <Task> 
 
 
 
Figure 57:  TBAC model using OWL. 
 
The following example shows the privileges that are requested while building 
a new policy in RBAC. This sequence of privilege requests closely follows the 
methods  that  were  used  to  create  the  policy  in  question.  The  policy 229 
 
constructed  consists  of  one  rule  that  has  three  prerequisites  (one  of  each 
type) with each prerequisite having a single parameter. The rule is: 
 
In addition, the Chain combines the action and the policy/reason of access in 
one thing which is the act of the chain.  
 
This  means  that  if  one  wants  to  model  the  three  systems  using  their 
parameters: 
 
RBAC = (U, O, A, R, P) 
Where:  
    U: Users 
    O: Objects 
    A: Actions 
    R: Roles 
    P: Set of Permissions 
 
TBAC = (U, O, A, R, P, T) 
Where:  
    U: Users 
    O: Objects 
    A: Actions 
    R: Roles 
    P: Set of Permissions 
    T: Set Of Tasks 
 
Chain = (U, A) 
Where:  
    U: Users 
    A: Acts of Chains  
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For ease of enforceability, the researcher measures the number of tables that 
needs  to  be  accessed  in  the  determination  of  an  access  or  disclosure 
decision. 
 
7.5.1 Technical Details 
 
The responders for this set of experiments were:  
 
-  The database administrator 
-  Myself 
-  The experiments with the collaboration of the IBM research manger  
 
The  respondents  have  gone  through  basic  access  policies  and  how  to 
translate them into OWL for the three methods. The results, which have been 
published in (Omran et al, 2010a) and (Omran et al, 2010b), are discussed 
below. 
 
 
7.5.2 Results 
 
In Figure 58 and Figure 59, the researcher has chosen statements from the 
HL7 website and designed the access policies of them for the three methods: 
RBAC, TBAC and Chain based on the system designs shown above. 
 
Figure 58 shows that the number of required accessed tables in the Chain 
method is always the minimum (1), while, for this example (OSF Healthcare), 
TBAC and RBAC needs more implementation parameters. While the effort 
required may vary in TBAC and RBAC from policy to policy, the trend is that 
the effort is always more than Chains.  
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For the effort required in enforcement, this is measured by the work that has 
to be performed in evaluating the attributes and conditions in a statement (all 
other things, such as low-level enforcement platform details, being equal). 
 
 
Figure 58:  Ease of Enforceability. 
 
Figure 58 shows the re-thinking of the underlying representational model in 
Chains  yields  benefits  in  terms  of  the  number  of  checks  that  have  to  be 
performed during policy enforcement.  
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Figure 59:  Number of attributes/conditions required for authorisation. 
 
The results conducted from this set of experiments shows the ease of the 
Chain method implementation in OWL compared to the RBAC and TBAC.  
Starting  from  this  point,  the  researcher  proceeds  with  the  semantic 
experiments to the next stage. 
 
7.6 Semantic Experiments for real application 
  
This set of experiments concentrates on issues that differ from the previous 
sets  and  are  more  important  to  measure.  The  experiment  here  to  verify 
whether the methods are able to discern between situations where access 
needs to be granted from when access should be denied as this is a question 
of precision. 
 
The objective of this set of experiments is as mentioned in H2: 
 
To show that using the developed system, one can improve data access 
management through having more accurate results. 
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In  the  case  of  Information  system  for  a  hospital,  the  availability  of  the 
information is not the only required factor to ensure efficient service providing. 
Other critical factors are also crucial such as: precision (more focused results) 
and accuracy (correct results). Unlike the availability, precision and accuracy 
are  hard  to  be  evaluated.  Therefore,  the  research  has  decided to  make a 
questionnaire to number of users from a real hospital to examine those two 
sensitive criteria for carefully chosen scenarios. Each user has been given a 
set of scenarios to apply them using three prototypes for three systems:  
 
System A: Using Classical Chain method for data access management. 
System B: Using Chain ontology based method for data access management. 
System C: Using Classical RBAC method for data access management. 
 
The  three  systems  have  exactly  the  same  GUI  to  ensure  that  the  users 
wouldn’t  recognise  the  difference  between  them  which  may  affect  their 
feedback accordingly. Also the researcher took care of the user trainee after 
iteration, and for this purpose she put her system to be system “B”, i.e. in the 
middle between the two other systems. . The researcher has optimised the 
scenarios  from  Table  3  to  the  selected  tasks,  which  appear  in  the 
questionnaires tables presented in this section, given that if similar processes 
appear in different scenarios; we select the more comprehensive ones. The 
questionnaires concentrated on the four main types of users in the hospital: 
doctor, nurse, admin and database administrator. These users really cover the 
comprehensive and main critical scenarios for most of healthcare applications 
that have been covered by the researcher survey. The tasks covered some 
scenarios shared between different type of users such as doctor and nurse 
and doctor and admin. But different users need to see different parts of the 
data according to the context and this was one of the most critical points that 
the researcher intended to figure out. As she was trying to find how each 234 
 
system (A, B and C) will help the user to get precise and accurate data taking 
into consideration the context changes. 
 
In  order  to  evaluate  these  criteria,  the  researcher  has  decided  to  give 
questionnaires to a randomly chosen set of users from the hospital. The only 
requirement that she asked for is that this set should contain at least one 
member of each group of users. 
 
The main scenarios that have been tested are: 
 
For users of type Receptionist/Admin: 
 
•  New patient registration 
•  Booking appointments 
•  Visit for appointment 
•  Billing 
•  Managing Patients 
 
For users of type Doctor: 
 
•  Routine Patient Consultation 
•  Outgoing referral 
•  Incoming referral 
 
For users of type Nurse: 
 
•  Nurse Consultation 
•  Incoming Referral 
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For users of type Database Administrator 
 
•  Overall database managing 
•  Changing access policies. 
 
The evaluation for the performance of our system was about four criteria: 
 
-  Accuracy 
-  Correctness 
-  Context sensitivity/Flexibility of the system  
-  Relative time to perform a task 
 
7.6.1 Technical Details 
 
The responders for this set of experiments were staff from real hospital and 
their roles were as follows: 
 
-  Three admin/receptionist(s)  
-  A doctor 
-  Three nurses 
-  The database administrator 
 
Then, the questionnaires have been given to those users and experiments 
have  taken  place  at  the  hospital  on  a  computer  with  the  following 
specifications: 
 
Windows Edition: Windows 7 Ultimate 
Processor: Intel® Core™ Duo CPU T2450 @ 2.00GHz  
Installed memory (RAM): 1.00 GB 
System type: 32- bit Operating System 
Memory type: DDR2 236 
 
 
Those users has been given the tasks on an Ms Word sheet, after giving them 
a short tutorial by the researcher on how to use the three systems and then 
asked them to perform the scenarios that have been presented at the bottom 
of  the  introduction  of  7.6  above  (each  group  of  users  has  been  given  a 
questionnaire that contains the basic selected scenario related to their group 
and which describes the tasks they were to complete).The users then were 
allowed to complete these tasks an saving their responses to a text file.  Also 
observation by the DA has been told to give assistance or answer questions if 
needed.  After  testing  the  Chain  ontology  based  system,  they  have  been 
asked to test three anonymised systems: System A: System of Chains without 
semantics, System B: System of chains with semantics and System C: system 
of RBAC without semantics. All the questions and answers are presented in 
this section. The researcher has tried to have the same GUI for the three 
systems so that not to make any indication for the users about identity of the 
systems. The users started first with the authorisation experiments, as they 
were asked to enter user name and password that are related to their group of 
users. According to this user name and password they were directed to their 
GUI which contains the rules in the case of RBAC and acts in the case of the 
Chain method. In the developed system “Chain with semantics” this step pass 
through the ontology layer to check the authorised acts through properties of 
the group of users’ class. All the experiments results will be presented in next 
sections. Screen shots for the GUI for different users in different scenarios are 
placed in the Appendix (figures 63-68). 
 
7.6.2 Results 
 
In Table 3 of Chapter 4, the receptionist/admin is given the authority to create 
new patient record for no specific condition-except to give valid name, DOB 
and address. And he is given the authority to access the patients’ record to 
set appointment for the condition that the user has arrived to his specified 
appointment and want to have new one according to the doctor request-as 237 
 
seen  in  the  appointment  tab  for  a  doctor.    And  the  receptionist  also  can 
access the billing of a patient given the condition that the record of that patient 
has been disclosed to this specific admin to pay. Otherwise he will not be able 
to access them.  
 
The  researcher  in  this  thesis  has  asked  three  admin/receptionists  to  go 
through  these  scenarios  to  test  the  developed  system  and  to  get  their 
feedback. The results were as follows: 
 
User  Task  Action  Status 
 
Admin1  Access with username and 
password 
Read information from the java 
code check with the ontology 
through Sparql query 
Success-As 
shown in Figure 
60-Appendix 
Admin2  Access with username and 
password 
Read information from the java 
code check with the ontology 
through Sparql query 
Success 
Admin3  Access with username and 
password 
Read information from the java 
code check with the ontology 
through Sparql query 
Success 
Admin1  Create new profile record for a 
new patient 
Write information to the 
database 
Success 
Admin2  Create new profile record for a 
new patient 
Write information to the 
database 
Success 
Admin3  Create new profile record for a 
new patient 
Write information to the 
database 
Success 
Admin1  Process/edit the information of 
an existing patient 
Read and write information to 
the database 
Success-As 
shown in Figure 
61-in Appendix 
Admin2  Process/edit the information of 
an existing patient 
Read and write information to 
the database 
Success 
Admin3  Process/edit the information of 
an existing patient 
Read and write information to 
the database 
Success 238 
 
Admin1  Check the billing of a specific 
patient 
Read information from a 
database 
Success 
Admin2  Check the billing of a specific 
patient 
Read information from a 
database 
Success 
Admin3  Check the billing of a specific 
patient 
Read information from a 
database 
Success-As 
shown in Figure 
62-Appendix 
 
Table 9: Admin(s) feedbacks on the questionnaire-part1 
 
After checking the ability of the Chain ontology based system to perform the 
basic required functions for different Admin tasks,  the researcher has then 
asked the three admin to do the same actions to three systems: System A, 
System B and System C.  
 
-  System A: System of classical Chains without semantics 
-  System of chains with semantics  
-  System of RBAC without semantics.  
 
The evaluation was according to their answers to the following questions: 
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Question  User  System A  System B  System C 
1- Is there a delay in 
Accessing the system at 
the login 
Admin1  No  No  No 
Admin2  No  No  No 
Admin3  No  No  No 
2-Did you have any 
problem or experience 
any delay while creating 
the new patient profile 
Admin1  No  No  No 
Admin2  No  No  No 
Admin3  No  No  No 
3-Did you have any 
problem in editing the 
patient record 
Admin1  No  No  No 
Admin2  No  No  No 
Admin3  No  No  No 
4-If you want to search 
the profile of a specific 
patient and you are not 
sure about the patient ID 
nor name but you know 
Admin1  All the 30 patients’ 
records. 
 
I get four patients-including the one I 
search for –according to the system 
condition 
 
Mohammed Imran 
All the 30 patients’ records. 240 
 
he has a condition of: he 
has appointment today 
with the doctor and you 
need to press the all 
button what you will 
have? 
Noor Husin 
Paula Jones 
Greg Spencer 
 
Admin2  The system is 
retrieving all the 
30 patients 
records 
I get four patients-including the one I 
search for –according to the system 
condition 
The system is retrieving all 
the 30 patients records 
 
Admin3  The system is 
retrieving all the 
patients record 
I get four patients-including the one I 
search for –according to the system 
condition 
The system is retrieving all 
the patients record 
 
5-Can you edit all 
patient fields in the 
billing tab? 
 
 
Admin1  Yes-as shown in 
Figure 61 
Yes-except the description-its 
transformed from the doctor-as shown in 
Figure 60  the description field is 
disabled (grey colour) 
 
Yes-as shown in Figure 61 
Admin2  Yes  Yes-except the description-The attribute 
is locked 
 
Yes 241 
 
Admin3  Yes  Yes-except the description-I can’t edit it 
but I can read it 
Yes 
6-If you want to search 
the bill of a specific 
patient-who didn’t pay- 
and you are not sure 
about the patient ID nor 
name and you need to 
press the all button what 
you will have 
 
Admin1  The system is 
retrieving all the 
30 patients 
records 
The system is retrieving only the 6 
patients with specific condition-who 
didn’t pay 
The system is retrieving all 
the 30 patients records 
Admin2  The system is 
retrieving all the 
30 patients 
records 
The system is retrieving only the 
patients -who didn’t pay 
The system is retrieving all 
the 30 patients records 
Admin3  The system is 
retrieving all the 
30 patients 
records 
The system is retrieving only the 
patients -who didn’t pay 
The system is retrieving all 
the 30 patients records 
7-What is the time you 
get from the timer for the 
login 
Admin1  100 ms  109 ms  108 ms 
Admin2  98 ms  110 ms  110 ms 
Admin 3  98 ms  110 ms  110 ms 
8-What is the time you 
get from the timer for 
Admin1  190 ms  219 ms  240 ms 
Admin2  192 ms  219 ms  238 ms 242 
 
retrieving the billing 
information 
Admin3  192 ms  219 ms  240 ms 
 
Table 10: Questionnaire given to admins and their answers. 
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7.3 Analysis of Results Related to Admin Feedbacks 
 
The reason behind choosing the tasks on Table 9 is to test the validity of the 
system to cover required daily hospital system functions.  The results show 
that the system can read from the ontology, can translate the sparql queries 
and finally write to the database.  
 
While questions given on Table 10 were to evaluate the criteria of: Accuracy, 
Context Sensitivity and Time required to retrieve data.  The questions have 
been carefully set to reflect real scenarios that take place in the hospital and 
on the same time measuring the above criteria of performance for the three 
systems. 
 
Below  is  a  description  given  to  show  questions  related  to  evaluate  each 
criterion.  The expected (ideal) answer is also given to be compared to the 
results collected from the users.  
 
1- Accuracy: 
 
The  questions  that  have  been  put  to  evaluate  this  criteria  for  the  three 
systems where: Q4, Q5 and Q6. 
 
The  expected  result  For  Q4  is:    Mohammed  Imran,  but  the  doctor  has 
appointment today with the following patients: 
Mohammed Imran 
Noor Husin 
Paula Jones 
Greg Spencer 
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This means that system “B” has reached the expected result according to the 
condition given by the user. 
 
The expected result for Q5: According to Table3 in Chapter 3, the admin can 
access the billing fields but the description is related to the doctor to decide it. 
This also mean that the only system which has meet the expected function is 
system “B” as it gives only read capability for admin type of users. 
 
The  expected  result  for  Q6:  Noor  Hussni  But  6  patients  didn’t  pay  also 
including Noor Hussni.  So the system “B” has retrieved the data according to 
the condition given by the user while the other two retrieved the whole set of 
patients. 
 
System (B) shows more accurate results according to conditions that  have 
been added to the ontology and hard coded in the java code to narrow the 
spectrum of the search results and be more specific which makes the work of 
the admin easier and more accurate. 
2-Context sensitivity: 
 
The questions that have been put to evaluate this issue for the three systems 
where: Q4, Q5 and Q6. 
 
It’s obvious from the results retrieved in this part and the previous part that 
system  (B)  is  changing  with  the  context  and  affected  by  it:  the  context  is:  
appointment, billing, registration and patient profile editing.  This is not the 
case of the other two systems as they give access rights according to the role 
only without affecting by the context.  This result is not surprising according to 
the discussion of the disadvantages of RBAC and classical Chain that have 
been given in Chapter 2.  245 
 
 
 
The  following  table  presents  clearer  analysis  of  Table  10.    The  table  show 
comparison between the three systems for the given criteria.  Symbol ￿ means 
the system meet this criterion and ￿ means it doesn’t.  Also average time to 
fulfil scenarios on questions 7 and 8 (of three iterations for each user) is given. 
 
 
 
 
3-Time required to perform the queries: 
 
The questions that have been put to evaluate this issue for the three systems 
where:  
 
Q1, Q2, Q7 and Q8. 
 
The data should be retrieved without making the user experience a delay. 
 
The researcher was looking for a system that has semantics without a significant 
delay compared to other systems and this is exactly what she  got as the users 
didn’t  recognise  a  delay  while  using  the  system,  in  addition  this  system  has 
overcome the time of the RBAC in some cases-as the time required to translate 
the Sparql query has not affected the time of the system considerably because of 
three things: 1- there is chain based for the database design, which means less 
table  and  constraints  to  consider  2-not  all  attributes  and  tables  need  to  be 
checked in this system-just the one related to the context 3- in the case of the 
read from the database, the system deals only with snapshot from the database  246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11:  Analysis for 
data in Table  10-receptionist 
feedback. 
Criteria to be 
evaluated 
Questions related 
to this criteria 
from Table 11 
Does the system meet the criteria of evaluation for 
each question? 
System A  System B  System C 
1- Accuracy  Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
2-Context 
sensitivity 
Q4 
Q5 
Q6 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
3-Time required 
to perform the 
queries 
Q1 
Q2 
Q7 
Q8 
￿ 
￿ 
Avg.=98.66 ms 
     Avg.=191.33 ms 
 
￿ 
￿ 
Avg.=109.667ms 
Avg.=219.33 ms 
 
￿ 
￿ 
Avg.=109.33 
ms 
Avg.=239.33ms 247 
 
As can be seen from the above table, that system (B) is showing significant 
improvement  in  the  accuracy  and  the  context  sensitivity  while  keeping  a 
competitive  time  of  retrieving.  In  order  to  evaluate  these  factors  in  more 
complicated situations were two different types of users are working with the 
system, the researcher gave the questionnaire for two nurses and one doctor 
and their answers have been recorded in Table 12.  
 
7.6.4  Analysis  of  Results  Related  to  Doctor  and  Nurses 
Feedbacks 
 
Then  the  researcher  moves  on  to  the  next  phase  of  the  real  scenario 
experiments. In this phase, the researcher asks one doctor and two nurses to 
answer the following questionnaire. 248 
 
Question  User  System A  System B  System C 
1- Can you check 
the profile of the 
patient you’re 
searching for 
Doctor  Yes-as shown 
in Figure 65 
Yes-as shown in 
Figure 66 
Yes-as 
shown in 
Figure 65 
Nurse 1  Partially-DOB 
and address 
No-only his name 
-as shown in 
Figure 66 
Partially-DOB 
and address 
Nurse 2  Some-DOB and 
address 
only his name  Some-DOB 
and address 
2- Can you edit the 
profile of the patient 
you’re searching for 
Doctor  No  No  No 
Nurse 1  No  No  No 
Nurse 2  No  No  No 
3-Can you check all 
the attribute in the 
patient immunisation 
Doctor  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nurse 1  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nurse 2  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4-Can you update all  Doctor  Yes  Yes  Yes 249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12:  Questionnaire 
for doctor and  nurses and 
their answers. 
 
 
the patient 
immunisation 
attributes 
Nurse1  Yes  No-only status of 
the immunisation 
-as shown in 
Figure 68-only 
status is editable 
Yes 
Nurse2  Yes  I can’t-only status 
of the 
immunisation 
Yes 
5-What is the time 
you get from the 
timer for the login 
Doctor  110 ms  187 ms  190 ms 
Nurse 1 
 
80ms  94 ms  92 ms 
Nurse 2 
 
82ms  93 ms  92 ms 
6-What is the time 
you get from the 
timer for retrieving 
the immunisation 
information 
Doctor  168 ms  219 ms  230 ms 
Nurse 1  168 ms  219 ms  230 ms 
Nurse 2  168 ms  218 ms  232 ms 250 
 
7.6.5 Analysis of Results Related to Doctor and Nurse Feedbacks 
 
Below are the criteria that have been evaluated through this set of experiments:   
1- Accuracy: 
Questions that have been put to evaluate these criteria: 
Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 
For Q1, the expected result is: According to Table 3 in Chapter 3, the doctor has the 
authority to access the full patient profile, but the Nurse doesn’t need to access only the 
patient name from patient profile.  It’s found that system “B” is the only system which 
meets this criterion as it gives authority to the doctor that differs from that given to the 
nurse according to the context which gives more accuracy to the retrieved data.    
For Q2, the expected result is: The Doctor and the Nurse shouldn’t be able to edit the 
patient profile.  This is what we get from system “B” which satisfies the hospital policy. 
 
For  Q3,  the  expected  result  is:  To  deliver  better  services,  both  doctors  and  nurses 
should be able to check all the fields of the immunisation tab.  This is what we get out of 
the three systems. 
 
For Q4, the expected result is: Only doctor can edit all the immunisation fields but the 
nurse shouldn’t be able to do that, she needs only to edit the status of the immunisation 
which is her job. 
 
System  (B)  showed  more  accurate  results  according  to  conditions  that  have  been 
added to the ontology and hard coded in the java code to narrow the spectrum of the 
search results and be more specific which makes the work of the admin easier and 
more accurate. As for tables that can be viewed by both doctor and nurse, not all the 
information should be editable and viewable for both of them. And this is what system 
(B) offer. 
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2-Context sensitivity: 
 
Questions that have been put to evaluate this criterion: 
 
Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 
System (B) is changing with the context and affected by it: the context is: Immunisation 
(can be fully edited and viewed by the doctor and partially by the nurse), patient profile: 
can be viewed by the doctor but without being able to edit it and only patient name is 
viewable by the nurse.  
3-Time required to perform the queries: 
 
Questions that have been put to evaluate this criterion: 
 
Q5 and Q6 
The data should be retrieved without making the user experience a delay. 
The researcher was looking for a system that has semantics without a significant delay 
compared  to  other  systems  and  this  is  exactly  what  she  gets  as  the  users  didn’t 
recognise a delay while using the system, in addition the system has overcome the time 
of the RBAC in some cases-as the time required to translate the sparql query has not 
affected the time of the system considerably because of three things: 1- there is chain 
based for the database design, which means less tables and constraints to consider 2-
not all attributes and tables need to be checked in the system-just the one related to the 
context  3-  in  the  case  of the read from  the  database  the  researcher  deal  only  with 
snapshot from the database . 252 
 
 
Table 13:  Analysis for data in Table 12 
 
 
This  set  of  scenarios  has  verified  the  evaluation  from  Table  12  that  this  system  is 
showing significant signs in the way of semantics because it shows signs of accuracy 
preserving, context sensitivity while providing good time for retrieving. 
 
7.6.6 Results Related to Database Administrator Feedback 
 
Then the researcher asked the database administrator to change some of the policies 
for the three systems as follows: 
Criteria to 
be 
evaluated 
Questions 
related to 
this criteria 
from Table  
Does the system meet the criteria of evaluation 
for each question? 
System A  System B  System C 
1- Accuracy  Q1 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
2-Context 
sensitivity 
Q1 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
￿ 
3-Time 
required to 
perform the 
queries 
Q5 
Q6 
 
Avg.=90.667 
ms 
     Avg.=168 
ms 
 
Avg.=125 ms 
Avg.=218.667 
ms 
 
Avg.=124.67 ms 
Avg.=230.667ms 253 
 
 
Task  System A  System B  System C 
1- What do you need to do 
if you want to add authority 
for the admin/receptionist 
on the patient profile 
Need to audit the 
SQL statements in 
the patient table and 
change and add SQL 
statements 
Only change one 
statement in the 
admin class in the 
protégé OWL 
editor-add property 
to that class 
Need to audit the SQL 
statements in the patient 
table  and the policy/user 
table and change and add 
SQL statements 
2- What do you need to do 
if you want to add authority 
for the admin/receptionist 
on the immunisation profile 
Need to audit the 
SQL statements in 
the patient table and 
the immunisation 
table and the nursing 
table and change 
and add SQL 
statements 
Only change one 
statement in the 
admin class in the 
protégé OWL editor 
add property to that 
class 
Need to audit the SQL 
statements in the patient 
table, the policy/user table, 
the immunisation table and 
the nursing table and change 
and add SQL statements 
 
Table 14:  Database Administrator feedbacks on the questionnaire.254 
 
7.6.7  Analysis  of  Results  Related  to  Database  Administrator 
Feedback 
 
There  is  still  one  criterion  to  be  highlighted  about  developed  system  which  is 
“Flexibility”. In Table 14 the researcher asked the database administrator to change 
two conditions and see the effect of that on the three systems. It is clear that system 
(B) is easier to change the conditions in as most of the cases you don’t need to go 
and change the construction of the database as it’s the case in system “C”.  As in 
system  “C”  you  need  to  go  and  change  the  conditions  saved  in  the  table of  the 
Role/policies and also change the conditions of the attribute of the related tables.  
But  in  the  case  of  system  “B”  the  changing  of  the  conditions  is  controlled  from 
protégé OWL-and the researcher tries to put instructions inside the ontology so that 
changing  the  policies  would  be  easier.      An  email  has  been  received  from  the 
hospital database administrator that shows his feedback and recommendation to use 
the  developed method  in  the hospital  according  to  the flexibility  and  the  ease of 
changing the policies while preserving the privacy of the data. 
 
In this chapter a presentation of the experiments that have been carried through the 
years as raw data with primary analysis. In the next section, Findings and summary 
of the experiments will be highlighted. 
 
7.7 Findings and Summary of the Experiments Analysis 
 
The experiments in this chapter have been designed according to the hypothesis 
and  criteria  of  success  presented  in  Chapter  4. The  three  main  points  that have 
shaped the experiments were: 
 
-  The  ease  of  the  design  and  implementation  for  a  reliable  data  access 
management method related to H1; 
-  The precision of the data retrieved by the developed method related to H2; 255 
 
-  The time required for data retrieving which is a result of the ease of design-
first bullet. 
 
Accordingly,  the  experiments  have  been  designed,  implemented,  recorded  and 
analysed. 
 
To verify the first criteria of success which is related to H1, the ChBAC and the 
RBAC have been implemented by a set of expert data base administrators. Results 
showed a clear advantage towards the ChBAC compared to the RBAC. The criteria 
that have been tested in this set of experiments: 
 
-  Number of required SQL statements to implement the two methods, 
-  Number of required tables to implement the two methods. 
-  Number of required constraints to implement the two methods. 
-  In addition to the required time to retrieve the information. 
 
The  recorded  results  have  shown  that  the  ChBAC  needed  half  number  of  SQL 
statements, number of tables, constraints and time for retrieving in almost all the 
scenarios. This gives the advantage to the ChBAC over the RBAC in the first and the 
third criteria of success above. 
 
But according to the results that the researcher has got out of these experiments, 
none  of  the  two  methods  provides  a  solution  for  the  second  criteria  which  is 
precision.  This  raises  the  importance  of  integrating  the  semantic  to  the  chain  or 
ChBAC principles. But before going further to the second criterion of success, the 
researcher needs to check that this integration will not affect the first criterion which 
is the ease of design. And this was the reason behind carrying the second set of 
experiments related to the ease of implementing the principles of the RBAC, ChBAC 
and  TBAC  in  semantic  language.  Because  the  chain  has  less  parameter  to  be 
implemented,  the  results  have  shown  that  its  implementation  in  OWL  was  much 
easier and straight forward than the TBAC and RBAC. 
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Then,  the  experiments  have  been  transformed  into  another  critical  phase,  where 
precision is the criterion of success which is related to H2. And for this purpose, 
consultation has been asked from experts from IBM Company, Trento University, 
Eindhoven  University  and  Madrid  University  in  order  to  design  the  required 
experiments. 
 
It has been agreed that users’ feedback is needed. Also, those users need to be 
given  carefully  chosen  scenarios  to  test  the  reliability  of  the  system  in  retrieving 
accurate information in context sensitive manner. The feedbacks of the users were 
very  positive,  as  they  have  noticed  the  difference  in  the  precision  of  the  data 
retrieved by the developed system. 
 
The system shows also flexibility in working in the different situations by focusing 
more on the required data.  
 
The insights gained from the user study are that the Chain ontology based method:  
 
•  is simple and precise in policy specification; 
•  is flexible in its expressiveness; 
•  uses  less  tables  and  conditions  than  the  system  currently  used  at  the 
healthcare provider; 
•  is faster than the RBAC method.  
 
The  conclusion  of  the  study  was  that  the  Chain  ontology  based  method  was  a 
simpler and clearer way for preserving database privacy without losing the highest 
standard of database design and administration.  
 
In the next chapter, an overview conclusion will be given in addition to the future 
work suggestions. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and 
Future Work  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The overall contribution of this thesis is to address several issues related to the use 
of data access management and try to investigate a new method that adopts of the 
advantages of the classical methods and avoid their disadvantages. In order to use 
semantics to intelligently manage data access, the researcher started by looking at 
the  need  to  protect  personal  data.  Usually  enterprises  and  organisations  are 
entrusted with the information of their clients and are required by law and obligation 
to keep it hidden from unauthorised people. But this is not an easy task as every day 
there are reports of cases of privacy mismanagement. Laws and guidelines have 258 
 
been put in place to help clients stipulate how they want their personal information to 
be used. But even with these laws and guidelines, the personal information abuse is 
still growing. 
 
A healthcare system is a perfect example, where sensitive information is collected on 
a  daily  basis,  and  where  there  is  also  an  increasing  possibility  that  data  access 
management would be a problem because healthcare systems continue to grow. 
This growth is not local, but global as there is a need to share information. Hence the 
local databases where healthcare records are stored have to be protected against 
privacy leaks both from within and externally. 
 
From the literature, it is easy to note that in order to manage access to a system, one 
may specify rules; either on the resource, or on a user or on a role. And with this it is 
easy to try out a new solution that allows for the specification of a lot of rules. 
 
A semantic data access model was developed as a solution. This semantic data 
access  model  is  more  like  a  semantic  role  based  access  control;  semantically 
specifying access conditions based on user roles in the hospital. For example, if the 
system identifies a user as a doctor, using semantic rules it decides what part of the 
information the doctor is allowed to see. This is a safe data access style because its 
implementation  ensures  that  the  user  can  query  only  the  amount  of  information 
allotted to him/her be separating the information from the bulk. 
 
Semantics  is a  safe way  to  manage data access  because  it promises  a flexible, 
interoperable  and  reusable  solution  that  can  easily  be  improved  upon.  The  only 
concern that the researcher had at the beginning was that a system using semantics 
could be limited by speed, because a lot inference is carried out to find out what 
amount of data a user should view. But later on, it was found out that an optimised 
way of using semantics will not affect the speed of data retrieving.  
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In the next section, the researcher presents the contributions of this thesis in more 
detail, and outlines some directions for future work in Section 8.2. 
 
8.1 Summary of contributions 
 
Research was carried out in order to investigate the technologies and techniques 
which  must  be  employed  to  produce  a  working  prototype.  This  area  of  research 
focuses  on  the  application  of  ontologies,  semantics  and  the  surrounding 
technologies that have been developed to support this. A thorough understanding 
and grasp of these concepts was crucial to developing the system. The literature 
review also investigated alternative solutions to the problem in hand. Specifically an 
overview of database access control systems that are already being used worldwide. 
By  assessing  alternative  methods  that  are  already  in  use  or  are  currently  under 
development, the researcher was able to analyse their relevant pros and cons, and 
this provided a lot of guidance in the subsequent design and implementation of the 
prototype.  Decisions  were  also  made  based  on  the  experiences  and 
recommendations revealed in the research material. 
 
To the researcher’s knowledge, the classical chain method that has been suggested 
by (Al-Fedaghi, 2007) has never been implemented nor tested in any hypothetical 
nor real enterprise. In addition, it has never been designed to solve any particular 
problem  such  as  the  problem  of  managing  access  to  personal  information  in 
healthcare  without  loss  of  privacy.  The  thing  which  makes  the  design  and 
implementation  of  the  chain  method  the  first  of  its  kind  and  the  challenges  the 
researcher  faced  during  the  design  has  enriched  the  literature  about  the  chain 
method (Omran et al., 2008), (Omran et al., 2009 a,b,c), (Omran et al., 2010 a,b) 
and (Omran et al., 2012).  
   
The second main contribution of this thesis was the development of a dynamic data 
access  management  approach.  This  new  approach  decided  access  attempts  not 260 
 
statically,  as  does  the  role  based  access  method,  but  dynamically  based  on  the 
situation  in  which  a  request  is  made,  which  is  expected  to  improve  on  existing 
approaches in terms of recall and precision 
 
The major contribution of this thesis can be summarised as follows: 
 
1.  A methodology has been created for applying privacy policies based on the 
idea of Chain method integrated with the ontology 
 
2.  Privacy assurance has been applied not just inside conventional databases 
but an approach that can deal with more challenging flexible and dynamic 
data streams. 
 
3.  Personal  information  ontology  has  been  developed  and  used  it  as  a 
classification layer in database access management. 
 
4.  The  major  challenges  in  the  design  of  chain  based  solutions  have  been 
identified and solved.  
 
5.  An  architectural  design  of  a  Chain  data  stream  that  addresses  those 
challenges and used it as a reference framework for research in the area of 
security and privacy techniques has been developed. 
 
6.  This is the first implementation and evaluation of the chain method reported in 
the literature. 
 
In  order  to  prove  hypothesis  (H1  and  H2)  and  contribution  the  researcher  had 
arranged set of comparative type of experiments. In this comparative study, a set of 
scenarios  have  been  examined,  often  in  the  form  of  a  table  where  a  column  is 
reserved for each case. The experiments were divided into two main lines.  
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The  first  was  at  the  database  level.  To  show  the  ease  of  the  design  that  the 
Chain/ChBAC method is providing compared with the RBAC. The experiments that 
have been carried out by the expert database administrators shows that the Chain 
requires 50% less number of tables, constraints and SQL statements to set up. 
 
We also showed the effect of choosing the ChBAC method on the time required to 
retrieve  data  using  the  two  methods.  The  ChBAC  needed  almost  half  the  time 
required by the RBAC method. 
 
The second phase has been undertaken by creating the whole semantic system. 
The  researcher  started  by  testing  each  part  of  the  system  separately  and  after 
checking that each part is working as supposed individually she moved to the next 
step. 
 
In the next step the researcher decided to test the system as a whole to check its 
performance for four criteria: 
 
1-  Accuracy 
2-  Context sensitivity 
3-  Time required to retrieve data 
4-  Flexibility 
 
In  order  to  test  these  criteria,  staff  at  the  hospital  were  given  a  number  of 
questionnaires.    
 
The answers that the researcher gets out of these questionnaires gave us a good 
indication about the reliability of the system in fulfilling the requirements of a real 
system while maintaining good results for the above four criteria.  
 
In this thesis the researcher has presented a flexible method to improve personal 
information  protection  in  information  system  at  both  the  implementation  and 
subsequent  access  levels.  The  ontology  would  add  a  flexibility  layer  that  is  not 262 
 
available  in  existing  methods  as  it  can  classify  new  users  and  distribute  them 
amongst  authorised  user  groups.  She  has  chosen  to  create  a  prototype  medical 
information  exchange  system  to  enable  industry  collaboration  and  accelerate 
development  of  a  standards-based  national  healthcare  information  system.  This 
approach aims to automatically derive the minimum set of authorisations needed to 
achieve a service, and as such, the researcher addresses the problem of a privacy 
preserving data management technique for stream data. Such a problem is already 
challenging within conventional database systems, but is much more difficult in a 
data  stream  context  characterised  by  huge  amounts  of  fast  arriving  data  and  by 
strong  performance  requirements.  This  is  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  numerous 
services are being moved online. These services are collecting gigantic amounts of 
personal information. The need for excessive and increasing collection habits is a 
cause  for  concern.  This  practice  needs  to  be  questioned  and  stopped  as  it 
represents a serious threat to personal privacy.  
 
8.2 Future Work 
 
This application has given evidence that semantics can be used as a tool to control 
access to a database using simple rules. But still there is more work that could be 
done to make the enhance application functionality and make it more effective. 
There are some improvements to the system which the researcher suggests to be 
taken forwards in the future: 
 
1) Semantic reasoning was investigated, and partially designed but ultimately not 
fully  realised  in  the  prototype  (The  semantics  that  has  been  implemented  in  this 
prototype  is  focusing  mainly  on  user’s  authorisation).  It  would  be  a  great 
achievement to develop a completely general-purpose semantic reasoning engine 
which could apply the required rules.  
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This thesis started a method for optimising how the system reasoner works but it 
could be developed more in the future. In the reasoner that has been envisaged, in 
which the user does not have strictly defined roles, the researcher stated that in 
some conditions it may be necessary to iterate through all possible contexts and 
check all preconditions.  
 
However if one wants to apply all the HIPPA rules for example in this system, the 
size and complexity of a system grows and more contexts are defined, one may find 
that it is very processor intensive to do. This could make reasoning very difficult on 
large  databases,  where  the  amount  of  database  requests  required  to  check  the 
preconditions may make semantic reasoning prohibitively slow.  
 
The researcher started by applying semantics only in the authorisation stage. This is 
where  the  system  checks  the  users  and  the  chains/acts  they  can  apply  on  the 
database and then we work normally with the database. But if the researcher wants 
to  check  all  the  possible  tasks  that  require  semantics  in  the  system,  it  may  be 
beneficial to investigate methods of optimising this. This could be possibly done by 
devising a way of grouping methods automatically by analysing their preconditions. 
In this way, a group of contexts could be evaluated together in order to speed things 
up.  Of  course,  an  ontology  would  provide  the  ideal  structure  for  defining  these 
groupings. Such an optimisation method and ontology would be one of the basic 
research goals in the future. 
 
2) Although ODEMapster worked for reading from the relational database, it was not 
capable of writing data back. This is a possible improvement that would benefit the 
Kuwait Clinic project enormously as it would provide a uniform method of database 
access.  
 
3) Instead of bridging the gap between a relational database and an ontology, it 
would be very useful to devise a way of providing persistent storage in the form of an 
ontology which conforms to the ACID principles of traditional database systems. This 264 
 
way, the information could be stored solely inside the ontology, and one could forget 
about the relational database altogether. 
 
Finally, this solution can be developed and used as a web service. When loaded 
onto  a  web  server,  an  authenticated  user  could  login  in  to  the  system  using  an 
interface  designed  by  an  application  programmer.  Based  on  his  credentials,  this 
present system would retrieve the required semantic information and pass it on to 
the users system. Then from his system, he can query his piece of information via 
his interface. 
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Appendix  
This  Appendix  represents  some  basic  java  codes  required  for  system 
implementation and then shows some early system testing. 
 
The following  codes  snippet  show  the  basic  steps  required  to  develop  the 
following basic parts: 
 
1-  To connect to Jena program 
“ 
A JENA model is created using JENA’s model factory. 
  Model = ModelFactory.createOntologyModel() ; 
Once the model is created, the RDF and OWL files are loaded into it; 
InputStreammodelFile = FileManager.get().open(rdfFile); 
model.read(modelFile, defaultNS); 
And 
InputStreaminFoafInstance = FileManager.get().open(ontologyFile); 
model.read(inFoafInstance,defaultNS); 
“ 
2-  To connect to OdeMapster 
 
 
In the earlier version of the system prototype the RDF-file has been produced 
manually, semantic statements like: 
 
“ 
Doctor (OWL class) is an equivalentClass to Clinicianstable (GP) 294 
 
Nurse (OWL class) is an equivalentClass to Clnincianstable(nurse) 
Patient (OWL class) is an equiventClass to patientstable(patient) 
 
The whole process involves creating a Resource to represent the OWL class 
(subject),  a  property  to  represent  the  predicate  and  another  resource  to 
represent the RDF object. An example is given in the Appendix. 
 
 
So that JENA would find relationship between the two semantic data’s (RDF 
and OWL).  
 
After this, the schema is passed into a JENA’s OWLReasoner to create a new 
model that sees the RDF and OWL files as one. For this thesis, the JENA was 
the approved SWRL, but this posed no restriction to what reasoner that can 
be used for this thesis, as any reasoner that supports SWRL rules can be 
used to perform semantic inferencing. For example SweetRules and Pellet 
reasoners can be used for inference. (Carminati et. al., 2009) But a decision 
made to stick to the basic JENA reasoners for simplicity. 
 
Reasonerreasoner = ReasonerRegistry.getOWLReasoner(); 
reasoner = reasoner.bindSchema(schema); 
inferredModel = ModelFactory.createInfModel(reasoner, model); 
 
ODEMapster has been utilised then for producing the RDF file and then to 
collaborate  it  with  JENA  for  the  mapping  between  the  database  and  the 
ontology. To import the software, the researcher retrieved the source code 
directly  from  the  subversion  development  server,  using  the  following 
instruction directly on the command prompt: 
esraa@esraa-desktop:~$  svn  checkout  http://oeg-
obdi.googlecode.com/svn/trunk/ ODEM2 
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This “checked-out” the latest version of the source code into a directory on the 
local machine so that the directory would be imported into Eclipse.  
 
Configuration of ODEMapster engages two files. The first file describes the 
database mappings. In this prototype, this file is called “kuwaitclinic.ttl”. The 
database mapping file is consisted of RDF-Triples which map the tables of the 
relational database to an ontology structure. Once generated, this ontology 
can then be imported into Jena.  
 
Example  of  this  is  the  “clinicusers”  table  is  described  as  holding  a  list  of 
“Person” objects; this creates a list of individuals within the ontology named 
according to their UserID and defines the users’ names as being properties of 
these objects. 
 
The second file for this prototype is called “kuwaitclinic.r2rml.properties”. This 
file  contains  the  name  of  the  mapping  file,  details  of  the  database  to  be 
accessed, its location, username and password.  
3-  To develop the semantic interface part: 
“ 
// Get the reasoner manager and obtain a reasoner for the OWL model. 
ReasonerManager reasonerManager = ReasonerManager.getInstance();  
Protégé OWLReasoner reasoner = reasonerManager.getReasoner(model); 
“ 
 
Communication with an external DIG compliant reasoner is done over HTTP, 
so the URL of the external DIG Reasoner needs to be provided. This is done 
with  the  setReaonerURL  (String  url)  method  on  Protégé  OWLReasoner. 
Having set the URL, the connection may be tested using the isConnected () 
method. An example is shown in the following code snippet: 
 
“ 296 
 
// Set the reasoner URL (using the default URL for Racer here) and test the 
connection. 
reasoner.setURL(http://localhost:8080); 
if (reasoner.isConnected()) {  
    // Get the reasoner identity - this contains information  
    // about the reasoner, such as it's name and version, 
    // and the tell and ask operations that it supports. 
    DIGReasonerIdentity reasonerIdentity = reasoner.getIdentity();  
    System.out.println("Connected to " + reasonerIdentity.getName());  
} 
“ 
a – Database read/write testing 
 
As the system is using connection to the database, one of the most basic 
tests  was  to  ensure  that  the  system  is  able  to  read  and  write  data  to  the 
MySQL database successfully. It is important to note that these tests do not 
need to test the database itself, only that the prototype can interact with the 
database correctly. 
 
These  tests  were  carried  out  from  within  the  Java  system,  as  this  would 
provide  proof  that  the  prototype  has  been  successfully  connected  to  the 
database.   
 
  
 
These three tests cover the three actions that software will perform on the 
database  (read,  write,  and  update)  on  so  this  was  sufficient  to  test  the 
database connection. 297 
 
 
b- JENA Model Test 
 
The purpose of this test is to ensure that a model was created and all the 
required files were loaded into it. These files includes 
•  The RDF database file 
•  OWL ontology file 
•  FOAF ontology file 
Test Method: Print Model to screen by using a created print method 
 
“ 
//printModel, prints JENA models to standard output 
  public void printModel(){ 
    model.write(System.out); 
} 
Execution:  
public SemanticModel() throws IOException{ 
    createModel(); 
    //test 
    //printModel(); 
     
    loadRDFModel() ; 
    //test 
    //printModel() ; 
     
    loadOntology() ; 
    //test 
    //printModel(); 
     
    loadFOAFModel(); 
     298 
 
} 
“ 
 
Result:  The  result  below  is  printed  to  output  showing  RDF  header  after 
createModel() was called. 
<rdf:RDF 
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" 
    xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" 
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" 
    xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" >  
</rdf:RDF> 
 
Test conclusion: This indicated that a model has been successfully created. 
 
c- Bridge Test 
 
After integrating the RDF and OWL files into a model, a test is required to 
ensure that the reasoner merged the namespaces. 
 
Method: Run a query to select all clinicians. If this is successful, if would also 
return the Individuals created in the Medical ontology 
Execution: Run the query below before creating bridge 
 
str = ("select?name {" + 
  "?doc vocab:clinicianstable_ClincianName ?name}"); 
 
Result:  
--------------------- 
| name              | 
===================== 
| "Ms Molly Matron" | 
| "Dr Whitbread"    | 299 
 
| "Dr Dixon"        | 
 
Run Query again after bridge creation. 
Result: Error,  
Error Analysis: The result is the same as the first one. Try again but this time 
use the inferfferedModel and not the model. 
Result: Success! 
 
--------------------- 
| name              | 
===================== 
| "Ms Molly Matron" | 
| "Dr Whitbread"    | 
| "Dr Dixon"        | 
| "Ontology Doc1"   | 
| "Ontology Nurse1" | 
---------------------  
 
It is easy to see that “Ontology Doc” and “Ontology Nurse” are individuals 
created with the ontology and not from the database 
 
d- Ontology Mapping testing 
 
Testing the ontology mappings was a little more involved. In order to do this, it 
was necessary to run ODEMapster in batch mode. It was then possible to 
load  the  results  file  into  the  Protégé  ontology  editor  in  order  to  view  the 
results. Test # Description Action Expected Result Actual Result 1 Test the 
mapping of the database to ontology. Modify mappings file, run ODEMapster 
in batch mode. Results file shows correct objects when viewed in Protégé. 
Test Failed Initially this test failed, because of the failure of the mapping file to 
differentiate between 
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Doctors, Nurses, Admin and Patients are objects in the clinicusers table. In 
order to correct this, Jena has been used to import the domain ontology and 
then the results file. I then called the “resolveRoles” method, as described in 
the implementation chapter. Once this was done, it was necessary to write the 
results  back  to  a  file  to  be  loaded  into  Protégé.  This  was  done  with  the 
following code: 
 
“ 
public void printModel(Model model){ 
model.write(System.out); 
} 
“ 
 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  these  test  were  run  multiple  times,  every  time  the 
mappings file was modified. By doing this, the mappings file was constructed 
and tested step by step until complete. 
 
e – SPARQL Query Test 
 
The  SPARQL  query  test  was  the  last  to  be  completed,  as  it  relied  on  a 
complete and correct mapping file and an assurance that both ODEMapster 
and  the  database  connection  were  working  correctly.  As  mentioned  in  the 
implementation, ODEMapster was used to translate the SPARQL queries into 
SQL  statements,  and  these  SQL  statements  were  then  issued  to  the 
database. This provides two junction points at which the researcher can test. 
Firstly,  the  query  translation  was  tested  (test  1).  Then  the  resulting  SQL 
statement was issued, and results inspected (test 2). By linking the two tests 301 
 
together, the researcher can check that the SPARQL query issued ultimately 
results in the expected set of data from the database. 
 
 
 
For an example of this, here are the results of a test ran on the system: 
SPARQL Query Issued: 
 
PREFIX qqq: <http://www.q8onto.org/healthcareOntology.owl#> 
PREFIX rdfs: <http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#> 
PREFIX rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> 
PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> 
SELECT ?patient ?name ?dob 
WHERE { 
?patient a <http://www.q8onto.org/healthcareOntology.owl#Patient> . 
 
?patient foaf:name ?name . 
?patient qqq:dob ?dob . 
?patient qqq:hasPrimaryDoctor ?primarydoctor . 
FILTER ( ?primarydoctor = "3" ) 
} 
 
Translated into SQL: 
SELECT var_patient AS patient, var_dob AS dob, var_name AS name 
FROM (SELECT * 
FROM  (SELECT  var_primarydoctor  AS  var_primarydoctor,  var_name  AS 
var_name, 302 
 
v_9257.var_patient  AS  var_patient,  uri_dob1075654325  AS 
uri_dob1075654325, var_dob AS 
var_dob,  uri_name1396749066  AS  uri_name1396749066, 
uri_hasPrimaryDoctor1710373065 AS 
uri_hasPrimaryDoctor1710373065 
FROM  (SELECT  v_8217.PatientID  AS  var_patient, 
'http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name' AS 
uri_name1396749066, v_8217.FullName AS var_name 
FROM patientstable v_8217 
WHERE (v_8217.FullName IS NOT NULL) ) v_9257 
INNER  JOIN  (SELECT  v_2231.var_patient  AS  var_patient, 
uri_hasPrimaryDoctor1710373065 AS 
uri_hasPrimaryDoctor1710373065, var_dob AS var_dob, uri_dob1075654325 
AS uri_dob1075654325, 
var_primarydoctor AS var_primarydoctor 
FROM (SELECT v_4940.PatientID AS var_patient, 
'http://www.q8onto.org/healthcareOntology.owl#dob'  AS  uri_dob1075654325, 
v_4940.DOB AS var_dob 
FROM patientstable v_4940 
WHERE (v_4940.DOB IS NOT NULL) ) v_2231 
INNER JOIN (SELECT v_8725.PatientID AS var_patient, 
'http://www.q8onto.org/healthcareOntology.owl#hasPrimaryDoctor' AS 
uri_hasPrimaryDoctor1710373065,  v_8725.PrimaryDoctor  AS 
var_primarydoctor 
FROM patientstable v_8725 
WHERE  (v_8725.PrimaryDoctor  IS  NOT  NULL)  )  v_2910  ON 
((v_2231.var_patient = 
v_2910.var_patient)  OR  (v_2231.var_patient  IS  NULL)  OR 
(v_2910.var_patient IS NULL)) ) v_1346 
ON  ((v_9257.var_patient  =  v_1346.var_patient)  OR  (v_9257.var_patient  IS 
NULL) OR 
(v_1346.var_patient IS NULL)) ) v_8149 303 
 
WHERE (var_primarydoctor = '3') ) v_9720 
 
Returned results: 
Two records, correctly identifying the patients for whom the primary doctor is 
DoctorID #3 
 
Screenshots for the GUI for different users: 
 
 
 
Figure 60:  The GUI for Admin after a successful access-check section 7.7-part f. 
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Figure 61:  Editing the information of existing patient. 
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Figure 62:  Checking the billing of a specific patient. 
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Figure 63:  GUI for admin for system A and C. 
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Figure 64:  Immunisation tab as shown for a user type Doctor for system B and it’s the 
same for systems A and C also . 
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Figure 65:  Immunisation tab as shown for a user type Nurse for system B. 
 
 